Tehran Reserves Right To Self Defense After ‘Israeli & US Aggression’, Says Iranian FM

Referring to the performance, Solangi wrote that Kabul had been a hub of culture and the arts before the mujahideen and later the Taliban took control of Afghanistan.

Mehdi Hasan, widely known as the “King of Ghazal” in Pakistan, was a celebrated singer whose popularity extended beyond Pakistan to India and Afghanistan. The presidential spokesperson referred to one of Hassan’s concerts held in Kabul during the reign of King Zahir Shah. During the monarchy, Kabul was a gathering place for prominent Indian and Pakistani artists.

Hassan performed in Afghanistan in 1960, during Zahir Shah’s rule, and also sang in Persian.

Posting on X on Saturday alongside a clip of the concert, Solangi wrote that there was a time when Kabul was a centre of culture and music, noting that the ghazal performance by Mehdi Hassan took place in the city.

He added that the concert occurred long before what he described as US-funded mujahideen came to power, and before the Taliban seized Afghanistan and turned it into a "big torture camp."

Both the mujahideen and the Taliban have, at different times, received support from Pakistan.

The Taliban consider music forbidden under their interpretation of Islamic law and have banned the broadcast of music in media and public places. Since returning to power, they have destroyed thousands of musical instruments during their second period of rule.

Araghchi said the Iranian government had released an official list documenting 3,117 people killed during recent protests, including about 200 members of the country’s security forces. He added that anyone questioning the accuracy of the figures should support their claims with evidence.

Trump had earlier said in a speech at the White House that 32,000 people had been killed in Iran over a relatively short period of time.

Referring to conditions inside Iran, Trump said the Iranian people were very different from the country’s leaders.

The fighting took place in the Sheikhan area of the district, where the two rival groups exchanged heavy gunfire, according to the sources.

Security officials said the clash was triggered by a dispute over extortion payments.

Reports said three ISKP members were killed, including a commander identified as Abid, also known as Hamza. One TTP member was also killed, and three others were seriously wounded.

Brokered by the World Bank after nearly a decade of negotiations between India and Pakistan, this instrument has survived three wars, numerous military standoffs, and decades of political hostility between the two South Asian neighbours. Yet, in April 2025, India's unilateral decision to hold the treaty "in abeyance" following the Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir has cast an unprecedented shadow over this foundational agreement.

This development raises profound questions about regional stability, food security, and the future of Indo-Pak relations. While the immediate trigger was a security incident, the deeper implications touch upon the very fabric of peaceful coexistence in a region where water scarcity is rapidly emerging as an existential challenge. This article examines the ramifications of India's action, the legal and diplomatic dimensions of the crisis, and explores how lessons from successful transboundary water management elsewhere in the world might offer pathways toward resolution based on principles of equity and mutual benefit.

The Indus Waters Treaty: A Delicate Balance

To understand the gravity of the current situation, one must appreciate the careful equilibrium that the IWT established. The treaty divided the Indus River system's six rivers into two categories: the three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi) were allocated to India for unrestricted use, while the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) were allocated to Pakistan. This division acknowledged geographical realities while protecting Pakistan's dependence on waters flowing from Indian-administered territory.

The treaty was never merely a technical water-sharing arrangement. It represented a recognition by both nations, facilitated by international mediation, that cooperation on shared resources was essential for survival. Pakistan, as the lower riparian state, received guarantees of uninterrupted flows from the western rivers, while India retained significant rights to develop hydropower projects subject to strict design specifications that would prevent storage or manipulation of flows.

The Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), comprising commissioners from both countries, was established as a institutional mechanism for continuous dialogue, data exchange, and dispute resolution. This commission has met regularly throughout the treaty's history, demonstrating that even when political relations deteriorated, technical-level cooperation could continue.

India's Decision to Hold the Treaty in Abeyance: Legal and Political Implications

India's announcement in April 2025 that the IWT would be "held in abeyance with immediate effect" represents an unprecedented departure from six decades of practice. From a legal standpoint, this action finds no support in the treaty text or in general international law. Article XII of the IWT explicitly states that the treaty shall remain in force "until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments." There is no provision for unilateral suspension or abeyance.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration, in its supplemental award of August 2025, has unequivocally affirmed that "the text of the Treaty does not provide for the unilateral 'abeyance' or 'suspension' of the Treaty." The Court further observed that permitting such unilateral action would fundamentally undermine the object and purpose of the treaty and the efficacy of its compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.

India's justification invokes the doctrine of "fundamental change of circumstances" (rebus sic stantibus), citing changing population demographics, climate change impacts, and security concerns related to cross-border terrorism. However, international law, as codified in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, sets an extremely high threshold for invoking this doctrine. The change must be fundamental, unforeseen at the treaty's conclusion, and must radically transform the scope of obligations still to be performed. Whether India's cited circumstances meet this threshold remains highly questionable.

Implications for Regional Peace

The suspension of the IWT carries profound implications for regional stability that extend far beyond water flows.

Existential Security Concerns: Pakistan's National Security Committee has declared that any attempt to stop or divert waters allocated to Pakistan under the treaty would be considered "an act of war" and responded to with "the full spectrum of national power." While such statements contain an element of deterrence, they reflect genuine existential concerns. Pakistan's agriculture sector contributes approximately 24 percent of GDP, employs nearly half the labour force, and relies on irrigation for over 90 percent of crop production. The Indus Basin supports 90 percent of Pakistan's food production and is home to over 200 million people.

Economic Disruption: Reduced water availability would cascade through Pakistan's economy. Hydropower generation, currently utilising only 18 percent of the country's 60,000 MW potential, would suffer directly. The Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project alone faces a 9 percent reduction in generation capacity due to India's Kishanganga project. Agriculture would face yield reductions, groundwater depletion costs could reach $50 billion annually by 2030, and food security for millions would be jeopardised.

Environmental Degradation: Reduced flows in the western rivers would diminish their assimilative capacity, concentrating pollutants and affecting downstream ecosystems. The Ravi River's flow into Pakistan has already been effectively halted by India's Shahpur Kandi Dam, completed in February 2024, threatening groundwater recharge in Lahore and projects aimed at river rejuvenation. Reduced flows can trigger algal blooms, create dead zones, and devastate aquatic biodiversity.

Regional Instability: Water scarcity rarely remains a bilateral issue. The Indus Basin's transboundary nature means that mismanagement or weaponisation of water resources can trigger refugee movements, food insecurity, and economic instability that ripple across South Asia. The region's shared vulnerability to climate change, glacial melt, and extreme weather events demands cooperation rather than confrontation.

Lessons from Successful Transboundary Water Cooperation

While the Indus situation appears dire, there exist numerous examples of successful transboundary water cooperation that demonstrate the possibility of equitable resource sharing even between nations with complex histories.

The Danube River Basin: Europe's Model of Inclusive Governance

The Danube River, flowing through 19 countries—the world's most international river basin—offers a compelling model of cooperative management. The Danube River Protection Convention (1994) established the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR), which includes all riparian states plus the European Union. What makes this arrangement remarkable is its inclusion of both upstream and downstream states with varying economic capacities and political systems.

The ICPDR operates on principles of equality, sustainability, and integrated management. It has successfully addressed challenges including water quality, flood protection, and hydropower development through consensus-based decision-making. Regular monitoring, joint surveys, and transparent data sharing have built trust among riparians. Most importantly, the convention recognises that all basin states have legitimate interests in the river's management, and that cooperation yields benefits unavailable through unilateral action.

The Danube experience offers several lessons for South Asia: the value of inclusive institutional frameworks, the importance of data transparency, and the recognition that upstream and downstream states share a common destiny.

The Senegal River Basin: Development through Shared Sovereignty

Perhaps even more relevant to the Indus context is the Senegal River Basin experience. In 1972, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal established the Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), later joined by Guinea. What distinguishes the OMVS is its radical approach to shared sovereignty: member states declared the Senegal River and its tributaries to be an international river and committed to joint management of all water infrastructure.

The OMVS constructed the Manantali Dam and the Diama Dam through joint financing and ownership. These projects serve all member states: Mali gains hydropower, Mauritania and Senegal receive irrigation benefits, and all share flood control advantages. Crucially, the OMVS includes binding dispute resolution mechanisms and has maintained cooperation even during periods of political tension among member states.

The OMVS demonstrates that joint infrastructure development, shared ownership, and benefit-sharing rather than merely water-sharing can transform transboundary rivers from sources of conflict into catalysts for regional integration.

The Rhine River: From "Sewer of Europe" to Restoration

The Rhine River experience illustrates how environmental challenges can drive cooperation. Flowing from Switzerland through Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to the North Sea, the Rhine was heavily polluted by industrialisation. The 1950s saw the creation of the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR), which initially focused on pollution control.

What makes the Rhine story instructive is how cooperation on one issue created institutional capacity that addressed broader challenges. The ICPR evolved to address flood management, navigation, and ecosystem restoration. The 1986 Sandoz chemical spill, while catastrophic, demonstrated the interdependence of riparians and catalysed stronger cooperation. Today, the Rhine is restored to remarkable health, supporting biodiversity while serving the economic needs of Europe's industrial heartland.

The Rhine experience shows that crises can catalyse cooperation rather than conflict, and that institutions built for specific purposes can adapt to address emerging challenges.

Pathways Forward for the Indus Basin

Drawing on these international experiences, several pathways emerge for addressing the current crisis while building a more resilient framework for Indus cooperation.

Reaffirming the Treaty's Legal Foundation: The immediate priority must be to establish, through all available diplomatic and legal channels, that the IWT remains valid and binding. Pakistan's engagement with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, despite India's boycott, demonstrates commitment to peaceful dispute resolution. The World Bank, as the treaty's original broker, has a particular responsibility to facilitate resolution and ensure the integrity of the dispute resolution mechanism.

Institutional Strengthening: The Permanent Indus Commission has served the treaty well but could be strengthened. More frequent meetings, mandatory data sharing protocols, and modern telemetry systems for real-time flow monitoring would enhance transparency and build trust. Joint field inspections, when resumed, should become more substantive and technical, focusing on compliance verification and problem-solving.

Benefit-Sharing Beyond Water Allocation: Following the Senegal model, India and Pakistan could explore joint ventures that transform the relationship from water allocation to benefit-sharing. Joint hydropower projects on the western rivers, with shared ownership and power purchase agreements, would give both countries stakes in each other's prosperity. Flood management cooperation, including joint early warning systems, would address a shared vulnerability.

Scientific and Technical Cooperation: Climate change impacts on Himalayan glaciers, monsoon variability, and extreme weather events affect both countries. Joint research programs, data exchange on glacial dynamics, and collaborative climate modelling would serve mutual interests. Such cooperation could be insulated from political tensions, as demonstrated by technical-level engagement even during past conflicts.

Track II Diplomacy: The current political climate may preclude official dialogue, but Track II initiatives involving academics, retired officials, and technical experts can explore options and build relationships. Water dialogues involving civil society, agricultural experts, and environmental groups can generate innovative solutions and maintain channels of communication.

International Support for Cooperative Frameworks: The international community has a stake in preventing water conflict in South Asia. Development partners could support joint projects, capacity building, and technical cooperation. International financial institutions could condition infrastructure lending on compliance with transboundary water law principles and support for cooperative management.

Conclusion

The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty represents one of the most serious challenges to Indo-Pak relations in recent decades. Its implications extend far beyond bilateral relations to threaten regional peace, food security, and environmental sustainability. Yet international experience demonstrates that transboundary water cooperation, even between adversarial states, is not only possible but essential.

The principles of equity, justice, and mutual benefit that underpin successful water-sharing arrangements worldwide must guide the path forward. India and Pakistan share not only the Indus waters but also the risks of climate change, the aspirations of their young populations, and the dream of a peaceful, prosperous South Asia. The IWT, with its six decades of resilience, remains the best instrument for realising that shared vision.

What is required now is statesmanship: the courage to step back from confrontation, the wisdom to recognise interdependence, and the vision to build on the treaty's foundations rather than dismantle them. The Indus has sustained civilisations for millennia; it can continue to do so if India and Pakistan choose cooperation over conflict, coexistence over confrontation. The choice is theirs, but the consequences will be felt by millions across the subcontinent and beyond.

In a message posted on X on Friday, Chaudhry said the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had devastated Pashtun society and that the community was heading towards complete ruin.

He urged Pashtun leaders to return to the teachings of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the founder of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, who championed non-violent resistance, social reform, education and equality among Pashtuns. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan advocated peaceful coexistence among ethnic and religious communities.

Chaudhry referred to the situation in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, where Pashtuns form the majority of the population. The province is regarded as Pakistan’s most insecure region and, according to officials, experiences security incidents almost daily.

He said that in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, child marriage remains legal, music has been declared un-Islamic and outdated tribal traditions have become mainstream.

The Taliban consider music forbidden under their interpretation of Islamic law. The Afghan Taliban have repeatedly destroyed musical instruments, including burning hundreds of instruments in Parwan province in recent days.

Chaudhry said Pashtun leadership needed to reassess its direction. He called for the gradual transformation of religious seminaries into modern schools, a move away from tribal thinking and greater protection of the rights of women and children.

Both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban oppose girls’ education. After returning to power in Afghanistan, the Taliban closed secondary schools and universities to girls and women.

In Pakistan’s tribal areas, girls’ access to education also faces significant restrictions.

Chaudhry has previously criticised Taliban policies in Afghanistan, describing them as a threat to Pakistan and the wider region.