The Taliban’s use of drones has evolved over five years from commercial surveillance aircraft and propaganda tools into a more ambitious program involving armed and apparent one-way attack drones.
From February 27 to March 15, the Taliban claimed responsibility for 15 drone attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and elsewhere in Pakistan, including what it described as a strike on Hamza Camp in Faizabad. In statements, the Taliban’s Ministry of Defense said the attacks targeted Pakistani military sites in Rawalpindi, Faizabad, Abbottabad, Kohat, Nowshera, Swabi, Jamrud, Mohmand district, Miranshah, Spinwam in North Waziristan, and Quetta in Balochistan.
The reported escalation followed remarks by Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoub on March 8 warning that “if Kabul becomes unsafe, Islamabad will become unsafe, and if Kabul is attacked, Islamabad will be attacked.”
Pakistani police inspect a drone that officials say was brought down on Pakistani territory after being launched by the Taliban.
Pakistan acknowledged some UAV incidents and said it had shot down several drones. Pakistani fighter jets then carried out repeated strikes on Taliban military sites in Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia and Khost, according to media reports. It said the deadliest strike hit the Omid rehabilitation center in Kabul.
Are Drones a New Weapon for the Taliban?
Afghanistan International’s reporting indicates the Taliban have used drone aircraft since 2020.
Before then, the Taliban’s Al-Emara Studio mainly used drones to film operations and produce propaganda videos. But after militants in Mosul of Iraq and elsewhere demonstrated how commercial drones could be fitted with explosives, the Taliban began using them in combat, according to the report.
The group initially used commercial drones, including the DJI Matrice 210, in attacks on Afghan security forces in Paktia, Kunduz, Balkh, Faryab, Takhar and Logar provinces, later expanding their use to targeted killings.
On November 7, 2020, a Taliban drone dropped a hand grenade on an Afghan security post in Logar province, wounding two police officer. Another drone attack a week earlier targeted a police post in Charkh district. On November 24, 2020, then-National Directorate of Security chief Zia Saraj told Afghanistan’s parliament that the Taliban were attacking government forces with small drones bought on the open market.
By January 15, 2021, two Taliban drones had attacked the airfield of the Afghan army’s 217th Pamir Corps in Kunduz, damaging a helicopter. The Taliban had earlier targeted the provincial governor, wounding eight bodyguards.
On March 8, 2021, a white commercial drone carrying two mortar rounds fell in Kunduz’s Kot-e-Gard area. In May, the Taliban used a drone to kill Piram Qul, a former lawmaker and local resistance commander, in Takhar. In July, a drone strike targeted the home of former Balkh governor Atta Mohammad Noor, wounding four people.
The early attacks appeared designed not only to inflict casualties but also to intimidate commanders opposing the Taliban, marking an important stage in the group’s adoption of drones as weapons.
How the Taliban Appear to be Using Drones Against Pakistan
The Taliban’s 313th Battalion, associated with the Haqqani network, became known during the insurgency for suicide attacks against Afghan and NATO forces. The group now appears to be shifting toward one-way attack drones, sometimes described as “kamikaze” drones.
After the Taliban takeover in 2021, the group gained access to some US-made ScanEagle drones. The aircraft is about 5.1 feet (1.6 meters) long with a 10.2-foot (3.1-meter) wingspan, depending on variant, and is designed primarily for surveillance.
By July 2025, a Taliban source told Afghanistan International that the group still had several surveillance drones about 1 meter long with a single rotor on the tail. It was not clear whether those aircraft were used only for reconnaissance or could also carry explosives.
Former Afghan General Sami Sadat said some Taliban drones are of Chinese origin and were originally supplied to Afghanistan’s former security forces before being modified to carry explosives.
A Taliban drone brought down on Pakistani territory
With limited access to missiles and fixed-wing aircraft, and an air arm still centered largely on helicopters, the Taliban have invested heavily in drone technology. Most drones used against Pakistani urban targets appear to be one-way attack UAVs with wingspans of about 2 meters, differing from more conventional military drone designs. The report said there is no indication ScanEagle drones were used for bomb delivery in these attacks.
Operations and Technical Characteristics
According to sources, Taliban drones are launched near the Durand Line from Kandahar, Nangarhar, Paktia and Paktika, reducing the distance to targets in Quetta, Peshawar, Islamabad and Waziristan.
David Hambling, a London-based drone analyst and author of Swarm Troopers: How Small Drones Will Rule the World, told Afghanistan International that the Taliban’s drones appear to be locally assembled, likely using Chinese-made or other imported parts. He said they resemble Iran’s Shahed-101, though on a smaller scale.
The Shahed-101 has been reported to have a much longer range and greater destructive power than the Taliban’s current drones. Hambling said the Taliban’s aircraft use composite wings, likely carbon fiber, and piston engines typical of small UAVs. Those materials help keep the aircraft light while maintaining structural strength and flight stability.
It is estimated that the drones’ payload are roughly 5 kilograms (11 pounds), with warheads capable of affecting an area of about 40 meters and damaging vehicles or buildings. It is said that the aircraft weigh about 10 to 15 kilograms (22 to 33 pounds), with wingspans of about 2.5 to 3 meters and lengths of 1.5 to 2 meters, giving them a potential range of 300 kilometers (186 miles) or more, depending on design, fuel, weather and payload.
Production capacity
Afghanistan International sources said a 13-member Taliban team, including engineering students from Kabul Polytechnic University and Kabul University, has been modifying drone designs since 2021. Former Afghan security personnel are also believed to be helping assemble the aircraft.
The drones are said to rely mainly on commercially available parts, including flight-control boards, gyroscopes, accelerometers, GPS modules and related electronics.
Sadat said that although the Taliban had sent delegations to China and sought drones from Russia, the program remained in an early stage, relying on imported parts and local technical knowledge. Analysts believe that Afghan engineers most likely handle assembly and basic design work.
Hambling said the Taliban could eventually develop longer-range drones with heavier payloads, following a trajectory similar to the Houthi movement’s drone program.
TTP Drone Ambitions
By July 2025, sources told Afghanistan International that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group were seeking commercial drones that could be modified to drop explosives and potentially hit targets up to 10 kilometers away.
The report said TTP drones currently lack advanced systems and are limited largely to daytime use, but militants are exploring thermal cameras and engine modifications to improve night surveillance and attack capability.
Pakistan’s effort to counter the drone threat has increased pressure on the Taliban, contributing to airstrikes and attempts to identify drone manufacturing site. Strikes on larger facilities could slow production, but small workshops and garages would make complete disruption difficult.
The conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan has entered a dangerous new phase since late February, raising serious concerns about regional stability.
Pakistan has carried out multiple airstrikes in the provinces of Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika and Nangarhar, while the Taliban have responded with ground assaults and drone attacks.
The United Nations said 143 people were killed in a Pakistani airstrike on a drug treatment centre in Kabul, although the Taliban put the death toll at as many as 400.
The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA, reported that from late February to the present, between 75 and 212 Afghan civilians have been killed, with hundreds more wounded.
A key question remains: if civilians are being hit, why is Pakistan not targeting the Taliban’s senior leadership?
What is Pakistan’s Calculated Approach to War?
Based on strategies previously used against leadership figures in Iran, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, and al-Qaida, eliminating leaders in ideologically driven militant groups often leads to the rapid emergence of successors who may be even more radical and harder to contain.
Retired Pakistani General Inam-ul-Haq said Islamabad is not pursuing an all-out war against the Taliban, but is instead applying what he described as “calibrated” pressure. According to him, Pakistan is deliberately avoiding direct strikes on Taliban leaders and is not cutting ties with the ruling authorities. Instead, it is focusing on weapons depots, mid-level commanders and border posts in an effort to keep the Taliban under sustained pressure.
Haq said Pakistan does not want to cross a “red line” that could turn the conflict into a full-scale crisis.
He said one of Islamabad’s concerns is that killing senior Taliban leaders could create a power vacuum in Afghanistan, widen the conflict and further destabilise Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, making both provinces harder to control.
Pakistan’s assessment, he said, is that the Taliban do not have a well-organised replacement leadership, and that the loss of top figures could endanger the wider region. Foreign militant groups now operating under Taliban influence could expand their activities into China, Central Asia and Pakistan itself if the Taliban leadership were removed.
For that reason, one option for Islamabad is to seek co-operation from within the Taliban and among aligned groups.
Haq said Pakistan is also monitoring networks of influence inside the Taliban. Groups such as the Haqqani network are viewed as relatively close, while greater pressure is being applied to other factions that have more limited co-ordination with Pakistan. Most of the areas targeted in Pakistani airstrikes lie outside Haqqani Network’s influence, he said.
Local sources say many Taliban fighters deployed along the Durand Line are from Kandahar and aligned with Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, with little involvement from the Haqqani network. One reason, they say, is that Hibatullah has appointed many loyalists in districts in south-western Afghanistan to military and government posts.
Haq views this distribution of power within the Taliban as part of an “internal balance” policy that helps preserve the group’s structure.
Several Afghan analysts share a similar assessment, interpreting Pakistan’s decision to spare the Taliban leadership as a deliberate choice.
Military Analysts’ Perspective
Azim Rahimi, a former professor at Kabul University and an expert in military affairs, said targeting the Taliban leadership remains an option for Pakistan, but one that is neither used constantly nor immediately.
“Pakistan will only use this option when there is a ‘need’ and a ‘political and security calculation’,” he said. “At this time, Pakistan does not genuinely seek the fall of the Taliban regime, but is instead applying limited pressure.”
He added that regional experience from past wars in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that toppling a ruling system can create long-term crises.
Why Are TTP Leaders Not Being Targeted?
From February 27 to March 13, Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan primarily targeted Taliban border posts, brigades, battalions, and arms and ammunition centres.
Retired Pakistani Brigadier Mahmood Shah said the main driver of Pakistan’s conflict with the Taliban is the activity of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP. After the Taliban returned to power, he said, attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas increased, including assaults on military bases and police, as well as attempts to seize border posts, deepening Islamabad’s concerns.
He said Pakistan initially tried to negotiate with the Taliban, but turned to airstrikes after those efforts failed.
However, Pakistani Taliban leaders, whose presence Islamabad has used to justify its operations, have not been targeted, or at least no evidence of such strikes has been shared with the media.
Sources in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas told Afghanistan International that some TTP leaders returned to their areas of influence in Pakistan at the same time as the attacks in Afghanistan. They also said signs of TTP activity and influence have increased near cities including Peshawar, Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Mardan.
That has raised further questions about the true targets of Pakistan’s airstrikes.
If Pakistani militants were the main target, why were strikes carried out at Bagram Airfield, in Kabul, and against Afghan brigades where there is no known TTP presence and no confirmed bases?
Many analysts believe Islamabad is seeking to destroy American weapons in Afghanistan, a goal they say aligns with joint US-Pakistan interests.
US Weapons In Afghanistan
Official US reports show that from 2004 to 2016, the United States supplied the Afghan National Army and police with 599,690 firearms, including light and heavy weapons. Most were light arms, including 358,530 rifles such as M16s, M4s and sniper rifles.
During the same period, 16,191 support devices were also delivered, including night-vision goggles, communication monitors, small reconnaissance drones such as the ScanEagle, and surveillance balloons. The overwhelming majority were night-vision goggles, totalling 16,035 units.
In aviation, a total of 208 aircraft were delivered to Afghan security forces between 2004 and 2016. They included 110 MI-17 and MD-530 helicopters, 60 transport aircraft, including the C-208, C-128, C-130, T-182, G-222 and AN-32, 20 A-29 attack aircraft and 18 PC-12 reconnaissance planes.
In addition, the US supplied 75,898 vehicles, including Rangers, Humvees, lorries and tanks. Of those, 42,604 were Rangers and 22,174 were Humvees, making them the most widely used. Some of the vehicles later became inoperable because of explosives, suicide attacks or prolonged use.
Over the past five years, Pakistan has repeatedly complained to the UN Security Council about US weapons left behind by Afghan forces and the United States, saying some of them ended up in the hands of TTP fighters.
Taliban Mediation And Relations With Pakistan
The Taliban government has officially acknowledged mediating negotiations twice between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Pakistan, saying the process had reached 90 percent progress. However, it said changes in Pakistan’s military leadership and the fall of Imran Khan’s government disrupted those efforts.
A significant faction within the Taliban sees Pakistan’s top military leadership as an obstacle to relations, referring to them as the “special circle”. Members of that faction believe the new Pakistani military leadership opposes talks with armed Pakistani groups and instead pushes them towards taking up arms.
Those uncertainties, combined with the fact that neither TTP leaders nor Taliban leaders have been targeted, have fuelled conspiracy theories about the Taliban-Pakistan conflict.
Political analyst Roshan Karwar described the crisis as a “manufactured war”, arguing that external threats can sometimes help strengthen states. He said Pakistani airstrikes on Kabul gave the Taliban an opportunity to build public support. He added that the fact TTP and Taliban leaders have been spared lends weight to the theory of an engineered conflict.
Pakistan’s Recent Approach
Mohammad Fayyaz, a professor at Lahore University, described Pakistan’s foreign policy over the past two years as “co-ordinated and systematic”.
He said Pakistan does not want to trigger a new domestic or regional crisis, and is instead prioritising border security, economic support and avoiding steps that could threaten the survival of the Taliban regime.
He said expanding the war against the Taliban would fuel new waves of radicalisation. In his view, Islamabad is seeking to contain Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, as an immediate threat without challenging the Taliban’s overall hold on power.
Since the conflict began, however, trade routes between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been closed. The Taliban have shifted their trade focus towards Central Asia and India, while the border between the two countries has been marked by violence and disruption.
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said the operations are part of Islamabad’s counterterrorism strategy. Analysts, however, say the actual targets remain unclear.
Although the strikes are publicly framed as an effort to contain the TTP threat, TTP leaders have not been targeted in practice, their Taliban supporters have been spared, civilian casualties have mounted, and tens of thousands of people have been displaced on both sides of the Durand Line.
The movement of residents out of the area, along with tightened security measures, could leave the border exposed to new waves of insecurity.
Analysts suggest several possible explanations. One is that Pakistan has not yet finalised its strategy and is still testing pressure tactics. Another is that its real objectives are more complex, and more concealed, than officially stated.