Afghan Families Selling Children As Poverty Deepens, Reports BBC
BBC World, in a report on poverty and unemployment in Ghor province, has written that Afghan families, out of desperation, are resorting to harrowing choices, such as selling their own children, to cover basic living costs.
Saeed Ahmad, a resident of Ghor, told the BBC that after his five-year-old daughter, Shaiqa, was diagnosed with appendicitis and a liver cyst, and he was unable to afford the cost of her treatment, he was forced to sell her.
He said: "I had no money to pay the medical expenses. So I sold my daughter to a relative,"
Shaiqa's surgery was successful. The cost was paid out of the same 200,000 afghanis (3,200 dollars) for which she had been sold.
Shaiqa's father said he had reached an agreement with his relatives whereby they would, for now, pay only the cost of her treatment, with the remaining sum to be paid over the next five years. He said: "If I had taken the whole sum at that time, he would have taken her away.”
Saeed says: “If I had money, I would never have taken this decision, but then I thought, what if she dies without the surgery? This way at least she will be alive.”
The BBC wrote in its report that men gather every dawn at a crossroads in Chaghcharan, Ghor, hoping to find work. They are only able to bring bread home for their families if someone comes to hire them; but on many days, they return home empty-handed.
Juma Khan, aged 45, said he had found work on only three days in the past six weeks, earning between 150 and 200 afghanis (2.35 dollars) a day. He says: "My children went to bed hungry three nights in a row. My wife was crying, so were my children. So I begged a neighbour for some money to buy flour."
Abdul Rashid Azimi, another Ghor resident, holding his seven-year-old twin daughters Ruqia and Rohila in his arms, says he is prepared to sell them.
Weeping, he added: "I'm willing to sell my daughters, I'm poor, in debt and helpless." "I come home from work with parched lips, hungry, thirsty, distressed and confused. My children come to me saying 'Baba, give us some bread'. But what can I give? Where is the work?", he said.
Holding Rohila in his arms and kissing her, this father says: "It breaks my heart, but it's the only way."
Kayhan, the family's mother, said: "All we have to eat is bread and hot water, not even tea."
Two adolescent boys from this family polish shoes in the city centre. Another collects rubbish, which the mother uses as fuel for cooking.
Rising child mortality
The report also highlighted a rise in child deaths in Afghanistan due to poverty and hunger.
Mohammad Hashim, who lost his 14-month-old daughter a few weeks ago, told the BBC: “My child died of hunger and a lack of medicine... When a child is sick and hungry, it is obvious they will die,”
A local elder said that child deaths, primarily due to malnutrition, have truly increased over the past two years.
The BBC wrote that, owing to the absence of any official records of child deaths in Ghor, it visited a local cemetery as the only witness to these events.
The report stated: “we counted the small and big graves separately. There were roughly twice as many small graves as big ones – suggesting twice as many children as adults.”
The report added that further evidence was found at the main provincial hospital in Chaghcharan. Among other things, the neonatal ward is the busiest part of the hospital, with some beds even holding two babies. Most are underweight and often struggle to breathe on their own.
Fatima Husseini, a nurse at this hospital, said that on some days as many as three newborns die in a single day: “In the beginning, I found it very hard when I saw children dying. But now it has almost become normal for us.”
The story of these families is one shared by many citizens inside Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, three out of every four people are currently unable to meet their basic needs, such as adequate food.
The report stated that unemployment has become widespread in Afghanistan, the health system is collapsing, and the aid that once met the most essential needs of millions has been drastically reduced.
The United Nations previously, in a report, noted widespread shortages of water, food, medical services, shelter, heating, and clothing affecting millions of families, and stated that more than 80 percent of households are in debt.
Hamdullah Fitrat, the Taliban's deputy spokesperson, responding to the report's findings, told the BBC: “During the 20 years of invasion, an artificial economy was created due to the influx of US dollars, after the end of the invasion, we inherited poverty, hardship, unemployment and other problems.”
Aid agencies and human rights organisations have consistently said that the Taliban's restrictions on women are among the main reasons for the reduction in aid and the reluctance of donors to support Afghanistan. However, Fitrat rejected this, saying humanitarian aid should not be politicised.
The conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan has entered a dangerous new phase since late February, raising serious concerns about regional stability.
Pakistan has carried out multiple airstrikes in the provinces of Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika and Nangarhar, while the Taliban have responded with ground assaults and drone attacks.
The United Nations said 143 people were killed in a Pakistani airstrike on a drug treatment centre in Kabul, although the Taliban put the death toll at as many as 400.
The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA, reported that from late February to the present, between 75 and 212 Afghan civilians have been killed, with hundreds more wounded.
A key question remains: if civilians are being hit, why is Pakistan not targeting the Taliban’s senior leadership?
What is Pakistan’s Calculated Approach to War?
Based on strategies previously used against leadership figures in Iran, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, and al-Qaida, eliminating leaders in ideologically driven militant groups often leads to the rapid emergence of successors who may be even more radical and harder to contain.
Retired Pakistani General Inam-ul-Haq said Islamabad is not pursuing an all-out war against the Taliban, but is instead applying what he described as “calibrated” pressure. According to him, Pakistan is deliberately avoiding direct strikes on Taliban leaders and is not cutting ties with the ruling authorities. Instead, it is focusing on weapons depots, mid-level commanders and border posts in an effort to keep the Taliban under sustained pressure.
Haq said Pakistan does not want to cross a “red line” that could turn the conflict into a full-scale crisis.
He said one of Islamabad’s concerns is that killing senior Taliban leaders could create a power vacuum in Afghanistan, widen the conflict and further destabilise Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, making both provinces harder to control.
Pakistan’s assessment, he said, is that the Taliban do not have a well-organised replacement leadership, and that the loss of top figures could endanger the wider region. Foreign militant groups now operating under Taliban influence could expand their activities into China, Central Asia and Pakistan itself if the Taliban leadership were removed.
For that reason, one option for Islamabad is to seek co-operation from within the Taliban and among aligned groups.
Haq said Pakistan is also monitoring networks of influence inside the Taliban. Groups such as the Haqqani network are viewed as relatively close, while greater pressure is being applied to other factions that have more limited co-ordination with Pakistan. Most of the areas targeted in Pakistani airstrikes lie outside Haqqani Network’s influence, he said.
Local sources say many Taliban fighters deployed along the Durand Line are from Kandahar and aligned with Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, with little involvement from the Haqqani network. One reason, they say, is that Hibatullah has appointed many loyalists in districts in south-western Afghanistan to military and government posts.
Haq views this distribution of power within the Taliban as part of an “internal balance” policy that helps preserve the group’s structure.
Several Afghan analysts share a similar assessment, interpreting Pakistan’s decision to spare the Taliban leadership as a deliberate choice.
Military Analysts’ Perspective
Azim Rahimi, a former professor at Kabul University and an expert in military affairs, said targeting the Taliban leadership remains an option for Pakistan, but one that is neither used constantly nor immediately.
“Pakistan will only use this option when there is a ‘need’ and a ‘political and security calculation’,” he said. “At this time, Pakistan does not genuinely seek the fall of the Taliban regime, but is instead applying limited pressure.”
He added that regional experience from past wars in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that toppling a ruling system can create long-term crises.
Why Are TTP Leaders Not Being Targeted?
From February 27 to March 13, Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan primarily targeted Taliban border posts, brigades, battalions, and arms and ammunition centres.
Retired Pakistani Brigadier Mahmood Shah said the main driver of Pakistan’s conflict with the Taliban is the activity of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP. After the Taliban returned to power, he said, attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas increased, including assaults on military bases and police, as well as attempts to seize border posts, deepening Islamabad’s concerns.
He said Pakistan initially tried to negotiate with the Taliban, but turned to airstrikes after those efforts failed.
However, Pakistani Taliban leaders, whose presence Islamabad has used to justify its operations, have not been targeted, or at least no evidence of such strikes has been shared with the media.
Sources in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas told Afghanistan International that some TTP leaders returned to their areas of influence in Pakistan at the same time as the attacks in Afghanistan. They also said signs of TTP activity and influence have increased near cities including Peshawar, Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Mardan.
That has raised further questions about the true targets of Pakistan’s airstrikes.
If Pakistani militants were the main target, why were strikes carried out at Bagram Airfield, in Kabul, and against Afghan brigades where there is no known TTP presence and no confirmed bases?
Many analysts believe Islamabad is seeking to destroy American weapons in Afghanistan, a goal they say aligns with joint US-Pakistan interests.
US Weapons In Afghanistan
Official US reports show that from 2004 to 2016, the United States supplied the Afghan National Army and police with 599,690 firearms, including light and heavy weapons. Most were light arms, including 358,530 rifles such as M16s, M4s and sniper rifles.
During the same period, 16,191 support devices were also delivered, including night-vision goggles, communication monitors, small reconnaissance drones such as the ScanEagle, and surveillance balloons. The overwhelming majority were night-vision goggles, totalling 16,035 units.
In aviation, a total of 208 aircraft were delivered to Afghan security forces between 2004 and 2016. They included 110 MI-17 and MD-530 helicopters, 60 transport aircraft, including the C-208, C-128, C-130, T-182, G-222 and AN-32, 20 A-29 attack aircraft and 18 PC-12 reconnaissance planes.
In addition, the US supplied 75,898 vehicles, including Rangers, Humvees, lorries and tanks. Of those, 42,604 were Rangers and 22,174 were Humvees, making them the most widely used. Some of the vehicles later became inoperable because of explosives, suicide attacks or prolonged use.
Over the past five years, Pakistan has repeatedly complained to the UN Security Council about US weapons left behind by Afghan forces and the United States, saying some of them ended up in the hands of TTP fighters.
Taliban Mediation And Relations With Pakistan
The Taliban government has officially acknowledged mediating negotiations twice between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Pakistan, saying the process had reached 90 percent progress. However, it said changes in Pakistan’s military leadership and the fall of Imran Khan’s government disrupted those efforts.
A significant faction within the Taliban sees Pakistan’s top military leadership as an obstacle to relations, referring to them as the “special circle”. Members of that faction believe the new Pakistani military leadership opposes talks with armed Pakistani groups and instead pushes them towards taking up arms.
Those uncertainties, combined with the fact that neither TTP leaders nor Taliban leaders have been targeted, have fuelled conspiracy theories about the Taliban-Pakistan conflict.
Political analyst Roshan Karwar described the crisis as a “manufactured war”, arguing that external threats can sometimes help strengthen states. He said Pakistani airstrikes on Kabul gave the Taliban an opportunity to build public support. He added that the fact TTP and Taliban leaders have been spared lends weight to the theory of an engineered conflict.
Pakistan’s Recent Approach
Mohammad Fayyaz, a professor at Lahore University, described Pakistan’s foreign policy over the past two years as “co-ordinated and systematic”.
He said Pakistan does not want to trigger a new domestic or regional crisis, and is instead prioritising border security, economic support and avoiding steps that could threaten the survival of the Taliban regime.
He said expanding the war against the Taliban would fuel new waves of radicalisation. In his view, Islamabad is seeking to contain Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, as an immediate threat without challenging the Taliban’s overall hold on power.
Since the conflict began, however, trade routes between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been closed. The Taliban have shifted their trade focus towards Central Asia and India, while the border between the two countries has been marked by violence and disruption.
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said the operations are part of Islamabad’s counterterrorism strategy. Analysts, however, say the actual targets remain unclear.
Although the strikes are publicly framed as an effort to contain the TTP threat, TTP leaders have not been targeted in practice, their Taliban supporters have been spared, civilian casualties have mounted, and tens of thousands of people have been displaced on both sides of the Durand Line.
The movement of residents out of the area, along with tightened security measures, could leave the border exposed to new waves of insecurity.
Analysts suggest several possible explanations. One is that Pakistan has not yet finalised its strategy and is still testing pressure tactics. Another is that its real objectives are more complex, and more concealed, than officially stated.