The Taliban Foreign Ministry says US weapons and military equipment left in Afghanistan will not be returned. Ministry spokesman Abdul Qahar Balkhi told CBS that the equipment now belongs to Afghanistan.
Asked about US President Donald Trump’s demand for the return of the military equipment, Balkhi said the Taliban would not negotiate over what he described as state assets.
A CBS reporter told Balkhi that American taxpayers had paid for the equipment. Balkhi responded by saying Americans had killed many people in Afghanistan and destroyed large parts of the country.
In a report from Kabul, CBS said that five years after US forces withdrew from Afghanistan, Taliban forces continue to use armoured vehicles, military equipment and weapons that Washington had provided to the security forces of the former Afghan government.
According to figures released by the Pentagon, about $7 billion worth of weapons and military equipment fell into Taliban hands after the collapse of the former Afghan security forces in 2021.
The Taliban has displayed some of the equipment at military ceremonies in recent years.
Trump has repeatedly criticised the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan under former President Joe Biden. He has said billions of dollars’ worth of US military equipment was left behind and has demanded its return.
The CBS report was published ahead of the 25th anniversary of the 11 September attacks. The US war in Afghanistan began after those attacks and lasted about two decades.
The execution of Afghan citizens in Iran has risen sharply in recent years. Human rights groups say Iran has executed at least 23 Afghan nationals since the start of 2026.
According to figures compiled by rights organisations, Iran has executed nearly 190 Afghan citizens over roughly the past three years, including 80 in 2024, 84 in 2025 and 23 so far this year.
Most were sentenced to death in drug-related cases, while others faced charges including murder, espionage and participation in anti-government protests in Iran.
Human rights organisations have also raised concerns about the transparency of judicial proceedings in some cases involving Afghan citizens and whether defendants had adequate access to legal representation.
On Sunday, the Iran-based Hengaw Human Rights Organisation reported that Iranian authorities had executed 29-year-old Afghan citizen Valijan Nourzay, who had a disability, at Rafsanjan Central Prison in Kerman province while he was sitting in a wheelchair. He had been sentenced to death over his alleged involvement in a murder case.
Nourzay was shot by police during his arrest three years ago, leaving him unable to walk. According to Hengaw, he was from Afghanistan’s Farah province and was executed on the morning of Wednesday, 2 September 2026, at Rafsanjan Central Prison in Kerman province.
Hengaw had also reported several days earlier that Iran executed two other Afghan citizens, Ansar Nami, 52, and Nazif Rasoulkhandeh, 46, at Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad on charges of premeditated murder.
The report also gave 2 September as the date of their executions. Hengaw said the executions were carried out secretly and that their families were denied a final visit.
Human rights organisations say the actual number of executions may be higher because some are not officially announced. Reports indicate that a significant number have taken place at Adelabad Central Prison in Shiraz, Taybad Prison, Yazd Prison and Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan.
Iran Human Rights has also reported several executions of Afghan nationals this year that were not announced by Iranian officials or state media.
On 21 June, two Afghan citizens, Mirwais Khalilzad and Ibrahim Ahmadshahi, were executed in Shiraz in drug-related cases. Iranian authorities and media have so far released no information about their executions.
Afser Shah-Ahmadi, Safaei and Sadruddin Ahmadzad were also sentenced to death in July for alleged involvement in setting fire to a police facility.
On 20 August, Iran Human Rights reported that Qaem Hosseini, a 21-year-old Afghan citizen, had been executed at Isfahan Central Prison. His case was linked to anti-government protests in January, and he was among the defendants in the “Meydan-e Alikhani” case.
Iran Human Rights said Hosseini was the second Afghan citizen executed in connection with the case. Gul Mohammad Mohammadi had previously been executed over the same case.
Concerns Over Transparency of Executions
The United Nations and international human rights organisations have raised concerns not only over the executions of Afghan citizens but also over the fairness of the judicial proceedings against them.
Iran Human Rights says that in some cases defendants had limited access to defence lawyers, while some were also denied a final visit with their families.
According to the organisation’s 2025 report, a large proportion of executions in Iran were carried out in cases where defendants faced serious problems in exercising their rights to a fair trial, legal defence and access to a lawyer.
Iran Human Rights says at least 111 Afghan citizens have been executed in Iran for drug-related offences alone since 2021. Sixteen Afghan nationals were executed in 2022, rising to 25 in 2023 and 80 in 2024.
At least 84 executions of Afghan citizens were recorded in 2025.
The figures show that at least 164 Afghan nationals were executed in Iranian prisons in 2024 and 2025 alone. With another 23 recorded executions in the first eight months of 2026, the total rises to at least 187.
Human rights organisations stress, however, that the figures are not final because no comprehensive official data on the executions of Afghan citizens has been published.
The Taliban has so far not announced any specific response or action over the executions of these Afghan citizens.
Sources told Afghanistan International that Taliban forces detained several members of the Hazara and Shia Elders’ Public Relations Office in Kabul after surrounding the organisation’s office in western Kabul on Sunday.
According to the sources, those detained include Sayed Sufi Gardizi, head of the Hazara and Shia Elders’ Public Relations Office; Sayed Hassan Sharif Balkhabi and Hussain Sangardost, two former members of parliament; two guards; three visitors; and the organisation’s cook.
Hazara and Shia elders held a meeting on Sunday, 6 September, at the organisation’s office in Kabul’s Karte Seh area to discuss developments related to Khatam al-Nabieen seminary.
According to the sources, the operation was intended to detain all participants in Sunday’s meeting of Hazara and Shia elders.
Sources said that during the meeting, the Taliban governor of Kabul called Gardizi and asked him to leave the gathering and go to the governor’s office. They said the governor then advised Gardizi to visit the office of Abdul Hakim Sharei, the Taliban’s Justice Minister, but he was detained after going to the ministry.
Minutes after the meeting ended, armed forces linked to the Taliban Justice Minister raided the Hazara and Shia Elders’ Public Relations Office and detained those who remained inside.
Mohammad Akbari, deputy head of the Afghanistan Shia Ulema Council, and Sayed Hussain Alami Balkhi, a member of the council, were also present at Sunday’s meeting but had left the office before Taliban forces carried out the raid.
Sources said Taliban forces intended to detain all those who attended the meeting and that other participants could also be detained separately.
According to the sources, the Taliban cited a recent statement by Hazara and Shia elders opposing Abdul Hakim Sharei’s actions as the reason for the arrests.
Last month, a number of Shia clerics, politicians and Hazara and Shia elders held a joint meeting and called on the Taliban to stop what they described as the Justice Minister’s “arbitrary actions”.
They called for the reversal of the decision to confiscate Omid-e Sabz township, the reopening of Tamadon TV, Khatam al-Nabieen seminary and other Shia religious schools, and an end to what they described as discriminatory treatment of ethnic and religious communities.
The Afghanistan Shia Ulema Council, the High Commission of Shias and the Hazara and Shia Elders’ Public Relations Office are separate organisations operating in Kabul that occasionally hold joint meetings. Sunday’s gathering was held at the Public Relations Office.
The Taliban has not yet officially provided details about the number of detainees, where they are being held or the accusations against them.
On August 20, 2026, National Resistance Front (NRF) commander Hasib Panjshiri was ambushed alongside members of his group in northern Salang, in Afghanistan's Parwan province, while traveling toward Andarab district in neighboring Baghlan.
Among those killed with him were Commander Romal Panjshiri and Commander Atiq Andarabi.
Hasib and his team believed they were on their way to meet Taliban commanders who had become dissatisfied with the regime. The meeting was intended to explore cooperation and coordinated operations against the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. They never made it. The Taliban knew Hasib was coming.
The circumstances surrounding Hasib's death show that the Taliban had information about his planned meeting, his movements, and the route he intended to take before he reached Salang. His killing was not a chance battlefield encounter. It was the result of a Taliban intelligence operation that used compromised contacts inside the resistance network to track his movements and position forces along his route.
The operation involved the Taliban's General Directorate of Intelligence, or GDI, and the Special Forces Command of the Taliban Ministry of Defense. At the center of it was the network surrounding Mullah Juma Fateh, a dissatisfied Taliban commander arrested on August 16, whose detention gave Taliban intelligence an opening into opposition networks operating across northern Afghanistan.
The Juma Fateh Network
Before his arrest, Juma Fateh and members of his network had developed contacts with the NRF, including resistance members inside Afghanistan and contacts in Tehran. Those relationships became an intelligence opportunity for the Taliban after Fateh was arrested.
The GDI and Taliban Special Forces moved against several of Fateh's close associates in Badakhshan, including Commander Mohammad Hanif Mohammadi, Zarqawi Mujahid, and Qari Nazim Amini. All three had established relationships with anti-Taliban elements and gained access to resistance networks operating in Panjshir, Baghlan, and Parwan, including individuals associated with Hasib Panjshiri.
Rather than keep the three in custody, the Taliban turned them. They were offered amnesty and protection of their existing positions in exchange for cooperating with the GDI and Taliban Special Forces. After their release in the Nasi and Darwaz districts, they continued presenting themselves as dissatisfied Taliban commanders while providing information on resistance members, their activities, and their locations.
That arrangement allowed the three men to maintain the relationships they had already built with the resistance while quietly turning those relationships into an intelligence channel for the Taliban. One of those relationships would lead directly to Hasib Panjshiri.
The Operation Against Hasib
One of Hasib's close associates was communicating directly with Qari Nazim Amini and shared details about Hasib's planned movement toward Baghlan. Hasib's group was attempting to reach an understanding with members of Juma Fateh's network who appeared to remain dissatisfied with Taliban leadership. The plan was to meet in Andarab and discuss coordinated operations against the Taliban, including efforts to challenge Taliban control over major routes leading north toward Badakhshan and Panjshir.
But Qari Nazim was providing intelligence to the Taliban. He passed information about Hasib's planned movement to Mullah Mohibullah, also known as Nasrat Haji Lala, a Taliban Special Forces commander, and Qari Mohammad Sediq Mukhlis, head of the GDI intelligence directorate in Parwan province.
At the same time, Hasib received information through Qari Nazim's network indicating that the route through Parwan was secure. Based on those assurances, he continued toward Andarab believing he was going to meet Taliban commanders associated with Juma Fateh who remained dissatisfied with the regime and had neither been arrested nor surrendered alongside Fateh.
Taliban Special Forces under Mullah Mohibullah deployed to the Salang area of Parwan province and positioned themselves along Hasib's route. When Hasib and his men reached the area, Taliban forces intercepted them. A firefight followed, killing Hasib, Commander Romal Panjshiri, Commander Atiq Andarabi, and other members of the group.
The operation had begun long before the first shot was fired in Salang. The compromised network gave Taliban intelligence access to Hasib's plans while information flowing back through that same network gave him the confidence to continue the trip. The network remains in place.
The Intelligence Operation Continues
The three men who helped give the Taliban access to Hasib's network remain active in the Darwaz and Nasi areas. Mohammad Hanif Mohammadi, Zarqawi Mujahid, and Qari Nazim Amini continue presenting themselves as opponents of the Taliban while collecting information on commanders, personnel, locations, and activities connected to the NRF and Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF). That information then moves through Mawlawi Abdul Khaybar Nizami, the military official in Arghanjkhwa, Badakhshan, and a Tajik Taliban commander who formerly supported Juma Fateh but now works for Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat, Chief of the General Staff of the Taliban Ministry of Defense.
For resistance groups operating in northern Afghanistan, the problem is larger than these three men. A Taliban commander who genuinely breaks with the regime could provide valuable intelligence, access, recruits, or even a potential partner for future operations. That makes identifying real divisions within the Taliban important, but it also creates an opportunity for the GDI to exploit. By keeping compromised commanders in place as supposed opponents of the regime, the GDI and Taliban Special Forces can turn what could be a valuable opportunity for the resistance into a way to identify and target its people and networks.
The operation against Hasib is not the only recent example of the GDI using deception to penetrate anti-Taliban resistance networks. In another operation, a covert GDI intelligence officer named Ehsanullah Farahi has been operating under the name Commander Shahin Aseman, presenting himself as a member and representative of the AFF. His role has been to identify former Afghan military personnel and members of resistance fronts, verify their identities and affiliations, and help facilitate their arrests.
The deception went as far as staging a fake phone call involving a supposed conversation between the AFF and Juma Fateh. Farahi participated in the call while someone was presented as Fateh, creating the appearance of a legitimate connection between the resistance and Fateh's network. The ruse did not have the consequences of the operation against Hasib, but it shows the same GDI tactic: manufacture credibility, create what appears to be a trusted connection, and use that access to identify people inside the resistance.
The Tehran Connection
The intelligence picture also extends beyond Afghanistan. A coordination office in Tehran for former Afghan military personnel was involved in some of Hasib's plans and works primarily with Tajiks and other non-Pashtun former security personnel living in Iran. One of its main functions is to help them obtain residency permits and prevent their deportation to Afghanistan, where they could fall into Taliban hands.
The office was previously headed by Ikramuddin Sari, who was later assassinated. It is now led by Khoja Mahboob Saiqi, who operates under the cover of serving as the representative of Atta Muhammad Noor.
Saiqi provides another connection back to the network surrounding Juma Fateh. He has been involved in establishing links with members of Fateh's network while making false claims about some of those contacts. He has also traveled to Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif to meet with the GDI, including Directorate 197.
At the same time, Saiqi's position gives him access to former Afghan military personnel who rely on the Tehran coordination office. Information collected through that access is shared with both Directorate 197 and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO). The office is also indirectly used to recruit fighters for the resistance, making that access particularly valuable. An office intended to help protect former Afghan military personnel from deportation and the Taliban has also become an intelligence collection point.
Sari's own assassination shows where that access can lead. His killing was the result of coordination between the Taliban's GDI and IRGC’s Unit 840. The operation was jointly overseen by Mawlawi Abdul Jamil Abid, then head of Directorate 197, and Mohammad Jafar Shahlai, a senior commander within Unit 840. Directorate 197 is formally the Taliban's Foreign Relations Directorate, but it also serves a covert action role for the GDI. Its relationship with the IRGC gives the Taliban access to former Afghan military personnel and resistance-linked networks operating inside Iran.
That relationship continues. Mullah Abdul Jabbar Shahidmal, the new head of Directorate 197, has made a handful of official trips to Moscow and Tehran since March 2026. A central purpose of his travel to Tehran has been monitoring former Afghan military personnel living in Iran and setting them up for assassination. For former Afghan military personnel who fled to Iran, leaving Afghanistan has not put them beyond the Taliban's reach.
What Hasib's Killing Reveals
Hasib's killing shows that the Taliban is not simply trying to defeat the resistance on the battlefield. It is using counterintelligence to penetrate it from within. The GDI is exploiting real divisions inside the Taliban, creating false ones when necessary, and using supposed defectors and trusted intermediaries to gain access to resistance networks. For the NRF and AFF, identifying Taliban commanders who genuinely break with the regime could provide valuable opportunities. The challenge is determining which divisions are real and which have been manufactured by the GDI.
Hasib's killing demonstrates the cost of getting that assessment wrong. The Taliban did not find him by searching the mountains of northern Afghanistan. It penetrated the network around him and waited for him to arrive. The next resistance commander reaching out to a supposed Taliban defector could be walking into the same operation.
A crowd of Shia Muslims gathered at Khatam al-Nabieen seminary in Kabul’s Darulaman area on Saturday evening to protest a Taliban Justice Ministry order to evacuate the centre.
A video obtained by Afghanistan International shows a number of people gathered inside the seminary compound.
Sources said Taliban forces began detaining several clerics during the gathering. The claim has not yet been independently verified.
Taliban forces surrounded Khatam al-Nabieen seminary on Saturday, 5 September, and ordered its officials and students to evacuate the building.
According to sources, forces affiliated with the Taliban’s Justice Ministry, equipped with military gear, have been deployed around the centre, while several students remain inside.
Sources said the action was carried out on the orders of Abdul Hakim Sharaei, the Taliban’s Justice Minister. Videos shared on social media also show military vehicles bearing the Taliban’s white flag entering the seminary compound.
The Taliban has not yet officially commented on the incident.
A reliable source in Kabul told Afghanistan International that the Taliban had also taken control of Khatam al-Nabieen University last week and appointed a president and four deputies to run it.
What Is Khatam al-Nabieen Seminary?
Khatam al-Nabieen seminary is one of Kabul’s major centres for Shia religious education. It was established in 2007 by Mohammad Asif Mohseni, a Shia cleric and political figure.
Located on Darulaman Road in Kabul, the seminary has provided religious education as well as academic, research and cultural activities. Several Afghan Shia clerics and students have studied or taught there.
Mohammad Asif Mohseni was a prominent Afghan Shia figure and one of the founders of the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan. He also had a background in political and military activity. After his death, his children took over the management of the institution.
Tamadon TV, which was also affiliated with the same movement, has been closed since the seventh day of Muharram on the orders of the Taliban’s Justice Ministry.
Previous Disputes Over Shia Properties
The Taliban Justice Ministry’s latest action comes after its involvement in several cases concerning institutions and properties linked to Shia communities in Kabul in recent years.
In 2024, reports emerged of an order to evacuate about 100 homes in Kabul’s Sanatorium area. Sources also reported that a Shia Mosque in the area had been sealed.
In another case, forces linked to the Taliban’s Justice Ministry entered the headquarters of Tamadon TV on 23 June this year, forcing the broadcaster off air. Mohammad Rahmati, the channel’s director, and Mohammad Reza Ehsani, one of its employees, were also detained for a period.
The Taliban’s Justice Ministry said Tamadon TV’s operations had been halted because of its links to the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan and its use of land that the authorities considered to have been seized illegally.
Tamadon TV rejected the allegation, saying the land ownership case was still being considered by a Taliban court and that no final ruling had been issued.
The Taliban Justice Ministry has also ordered residents of Omid-e Sabz township in western Kabul to evacuate. Residents have sent a protest letter to the office of Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada.
According to sources, the office of Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani has also told residents not to leave the township unless a direct order is issued by Hibatullah Akhundzada.
However, the Taliban has yet to issue an official explanation regarding the order to evacuate Khatam al-Nabieen seminary or the fate of the students and clerics still inside the centre.
Informed sources in Badakhshan say the Taliban has built a “drone operations centre” near the provincial airport following rising tensions, opposition attacks and armed clashes in Faizabad and several districts.
According to information obtained by Afghanistan International, the drone operations centre was established about two weeks ago at a military base beside Faizabad airport and is operating around the clock to gather intelligence and conduct reconnaissance missions across the province.
Residents of Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan, say drones have been seen patrolling the skies above the city over the past two weeks.
One Faizabad resident, who asked not to be named for security reasons, said: “The drones fly at very low altitude over Faizabad at night.” He added: “It appears they are also monitoring people’s homes.”
Videos obtained by Afghanistan International show drones flying over Faizabad as well as the construction of a new tower near Badakhshan airport. The tower is reportedly intended to support the take-off and landing of the drones. The Taliban has not officially commented on the matter.
Local sources say drones previously used during operations against Juma Khan Fateh, a dissident Taliban commander in Nusay district, took off from the same centre.
The Afghanistan Freedom Front previously said it had shot down two Taliban drones during clashes in Zebak district. The group also released images of what it said were the downed drones.
Badakhshan has experienced a wave of insecurity and increased attacks against the Taliban in recent months. In response, the Taliban has deployed thousands of additional forces to the province and is now making broader use of drone technology for surveillance and security control.
Taliban Access to Drone Technology
In April, a source at the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan National Development Corporation told Afghanistan International, on condition of anonymity, that a 13-member drone specialist team made up of students from the engineering faculties of Kabul University and Kabul Polytechnic University had been working on modifying and designing drones since 2021.
According to the source, the team is now capable of assembling different types of suicide drones inside Afghanistan using imported components.
The Taliban first used its own drones during clashes with Pakistan and, in response to extensive Pakistani attacks on major Afghan cities, targeted areas inside Pakistan on several occasions. The group also claimed that it had targeted Pakistani forces in Islamabad.
Following the clashes with Pakistan and the Taliban’s use of drones against the country, the reported establishment of a drone centre in Badakhshan is the latest indication of the group’s expanding drone activities.
The creation of a dedicated drone centre in the province suggests that the Taliban is taking threats posed by opposition groups operating in Badakhshan seriously and is increasingly turning to modern technologies, including drones, to counter them.