Torkham Border Reopens for Passengers, Sources Confirm

In this article, former Afghan spy chief, Rahmatullah Nabil, explores Afghanistan’s prospective position within global geopolitical equations.

More than a century after the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which defined the modern structure of the Middle East, the notion of a "New Middle East" emerged in 2006, articulated by Condoleezza Rice, then US National Security Advisor. This ambitious vision encountered substantial obstacles due to the region’s persistent political and security turmoil. Following the events of 7 October 2023, the Israeli Prime Minister revisited the concept of a "New Middle East." With Donald Trump’s return to power, this idea has regained prominence in geopolitical discussions.

Within this framework, US foreign policy, centred on countering China, necessitates reliable regional allies such as Russia, India, and Israel. These developments raise two pivotal questions:

1. Will Afghanistan once again be relegated to a geopolitical pawn in the global power struggle?
2. Or can it carve out a role as an independent actor?

Historically, Afghanistan has occupied a critical juncture in geopolitical conflicts. Today, amidst the redefinition of global strategies and the realignment of regional and transregional actors, Afghanistan has assumed renewed significance. Where does contemporary Afghanistan stand in the global power game? No longer merely a battleground, it has evolved into a vital instrument for countering China, curbing Iran’s influence, balancing Central Asia (either in cooperation or competition with Russia), and mitigating potential crises in Pakistan.

Afghanistan once again finds itself at the epicentre of the "Great Game"—no longer confined to an East-West rivalry but embedded within a more intricate equation involving emerging powers (China, India, and Iran), established powers (the US and Russia), and a web of regional players with conflicting interests. Khalilzad’s visit to Kabul, alongside the Taliban’s release of an American citizen, underscores the re-emergence of informal US diplomacy with Kabul. This approach prioritises maintaining open communication channels for potential contingencies rather than pursuing formal recognition.

Amidst this dynamic, several developments—including the return of figures like Haqqani, Pakistan’s allegations against the Taliban and India, the prospect of a US-Russia rapprochement, possible concessions to Russia in Ukraine, escalating tensions with Iran, and an increasingly assertive foreign policy—point to emerging regional consultations and potential behind-the-scenes recalibrations of Afghanistan’s future role.

Afghanistan’s Role in the Strategy to Contain China

As the world’s second-largest economy, China relies heavily on stable energy supplies and trade routes. Key statistics underscore this dependence:

• 70 percent of its oil consumption is imported.
• 80 percent of these imports traverse the Strait of Malacca.
• 45 percent of its natural gas consumption is also imported.

The Strait of Malacca, a critical geopolitical chokepoint for China, remains highly vulnerable. The US and its allies, under the QUAD alliance, seek to dominate this route and restrict China’s energy access as part of their containment strategy. In this context, Afghanistan assumes dual significance:

• As an alternative corridor for energy and trade transit, serving not only China but also India, Pakistan, and even Europe.
• As a destabilised zone capable of disrupting initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and Gwadar Port.

The Taliban’s Internal Power Struggle: The Kandahar-Kabul Divide

Afghanistan is not solely a theatre for external competition; within the Taliban, a profound schism has emerged between the Kandahar and Kabul factions. The Kandahar faction, led by Hibatullah Akhundzada, maintains ideological ties with Iran’s religious institutions and staunchly opposes engagement with the West. In contrast, the Kabul faction exhibits pragmatic tendencies, favouring cooperation with select regional stakeholders and Western allies while pursuing reforms to alleviate economic pressures.

Iran aligns more closely with the Kandahar faction, whereas certain regional and international actors interested in engaging the Taliban maintain broader ties with Kabul. This tension not only exacerbates the Taliban’s internal divide but also creates a potential platform for future proxy rivalries.

China and Iran: Expanding Influences

Over the past three and a half years, China and Iran have bolstered their influence in Afghanistan—not through formal recognition of the Taliban, but via economic, security, and cultural cooperation.

• Iran, particularly in western and southwestern Afghanistan, has cultivated soft power by establishing direct communication with the Kandahar faction through trusted intermediaries, leveraging media, religious institutions, and support for local groups.
• China, prioritising the security of mining projects and addressing concerns over the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, has forged both direct and indirect partnerships with the Taliban.

This growing influence has disrupted Afghanistan’s internal equilibrium, raising concerns among the US and its allies.

Future Scenarios for Iran and Their Impact on Afghanistan

Iran faces a critical juncture with three potential pathways:

A) Normalisation with the West:
By distancing itself from the China-Russia axis, reducing support for proxy forces, and abandoning its nuclear and missile programmes, Tehran could enter a new diplomatic phase. This shift might result in:

• A potential decline in Iran’s support for the Taliban or affiliated groups.
• Opportunities for other powers and internal Afghan forces to assume greater roles.
• Prospects for regional cooperation and investment if Afghan leaders capitalise on this opening—though failure to act could allow other actors to fill the void.

B) Military Conflict with the US/Israel:
Should Iran engage in direct conflict with the West, Afghanistan could become inadvertently entangled. In this scenario:

• Iran might exploit Afghan territory as strategic depth for its proxy groups.
• Tehran could mobilise allied religious and political factions or local commanders against Western interests or rivals, potentially intensifying activities by groups like ISIS and Jish al-Adl in proxy conflicts.
• Afghanistan’s security and international relations would face heightened complexity.
• The West might escalate pressure on Afghanistan to prevent Iran from leveraging its territory.

C) Collapse or Internal Instability in Iran:
Ethnic, religious, and economic unrest—particularly in Sistan and Baluchestan—could significantly affect Afghanistan’s western borders, triggering migration crises, insecurity, and religious tensions. Should such crises escalate:

• Spillover effects could destabilise Afghanistan’s western regions.
• A surge in migrants, economic challenges, arms trafficking, or sectarian strife might emerge.
• Extremist groups could exploit the disorder to gain traction.
• Iran might intensify interference in Afghanistan to deflect domestic attention.

India: A Rising Power with Strategic Objectives in Afghanistan

As an ascendant Asian power, India plays an increasingly vital role in Afghanistan’s geopolitical landscape. Competing with China and Pakistan on security and economic fronts, New Delhi has sought to secure a stable foothold through developmental investments, soft power, and regional collaboration. Projects such as the Salma Dam, the Afghan Parliament building, the Chabahar Port (developed with Iran), and support for educational and cultural initiatives reflect India’s broader strategy to counterbalance China’s influence and mitigate threats from the China-Pakistan axis. As a key US partner in the QUAD security pact, India views Afghanistan as integral to the West’s containment strategy against China. With intensifying regional competition, India’s influence could prove decisive in shaping Afghanistan’s security and economic future.

Pakistan: From Strategic Ally to Potential Risk

Pakistan faces mounting fragility:

• Escalating ethnic, political, security, religious, and economic crises.
• Pressure from India and the US to distance itself from China.
• The possibility of military collapse and nuclear disarmament amid these challenges.

Such developments directly affect Afghanistan, potentially destabilising its eastern borders and heightening tensions in border regions. Movements among Baloch and Pashtun communities, alongside other disaffected ethnic and religious groups, could reshape the region’s geopolitical dynamics.

Three Major Scenarios for Afghanistan’s Future

These developments suggest three possible trajectories for Afghanistan:

1. Stabilisation of controlled instability: The Taliban retains power but remains under pressure, lacking internal and external legitimacy.
2. Gradual integration into the global order: Mullah Hibatullah and his allies are sidelined, and new leadership secures relative recognition through modest reforms.
3. Internal transformation: Widespread dissatisfaction, bolstered by external support, gives rise to a new force. If underpinned by a national, transnational, and independent discourse, this scenario could upend the current order.

Lost Opportunities and Narrowing Horizons

Over the past two decades, Afghanistan squandered multiple opportunities to emerge as an independent or influential player due to corruption, political mismanagement, regional meddling, and reliance on foreign aid. Today, under Taliban governance and without a robust opposition, these windows of opportunity are closing as the "Great Game" nears its final configuration.

Rebuilding the National Image: A Foundation for Independence

For Afghanistan to transition from a geopolitical tool to an autonomous actor, it must reconstruct a national and political identity encompassing all ethnic groups, movements, and generations. This requires:

• Establishing an inclusive, justice-oriented national dialogue.
• Moving beyond monopolistic policies and ideological constraints.
• Forging a new social contract for coexistence and political participation.

Without a shared, equitable national narrative, Afghanistan cannot break free from its subordinate role in regional politics.

Conclusion: The Future Game Requires the Afghan People

Recent events—the US delegation, Haqqani’s return, the expanding influence of China and Iran, Pakistan’s accusations against the Taliban and India, and rising tensions with the West—signal Afghanistan’s entry into a new phase of the "Great Game." Yet, modern Afghan history demonstrates that neither the Taliban, the US, Iran, nor China will hold ultimate sway. The Afghan people, if they choose to act, possess the power to transform themselves from pawns into independent players. Our future need not be dictated by others; with resolve, we can author it ourselves.

He called for a clear separation between political disputes and commercial matters.

In a statement issued on Saturday, 23 March, Taliban deputy spokesperson Zia Ahmad Takal said Muttaqi requested a gradual and dignified return of Afghan migrants from Pakistan and urged Islamabad to avoid mass expulsions.

According to the statement, Sadiq acknowledged that security in Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s interest and pledged to improve visa facilitation for Afghan nationals. He also expressed support for expanding trade between the two countries.

Both sides agreed on the importance of taking practical steps to ease trade and transit and committed to resolving disputes through joint meetings.

Sadiq’s visit to Kabul follows weeks of escalating tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban. The Torkham border crossing reopened recently after nearly a month of closure due to a clash on 21 February between Taliban and Pakistani forces. The dispute arose over the Taliban’s construction of a border post and Pakistan’s installation of a road sign at the zero-point of the crossing.

As part of its ongoing crackdown on Afghan migrants, the Pakistani government has given residents of Islamabad and Rawalpindi until the end of March to leave the country. This has become a point of contention between the two sides. During the meeting, Muttaqi reiterated the Taliban’s opposition to the mass expulsion of Afghan refugees.

They accuse Khalilzad of enabling the Taliban’s return to power and contributing to the oppression of Afghan women.

In their letter, the women’s rights groups allege that Khalilzad acted not as a neutral diplomat but as a “traitorous agent” who helped transform the Taliban from a proscribed terrorist organisation into a recognised political force. They argue that his efforts to legitimise the group laid the groundwork for the Taliban’s return to power and the current repression of women in Afghanistan.

The signatories claim that Khalilzad’s policies directly led to the systematic stripping of women’s basic rights, including access to education, work, and participation in public life. They assert that his actions are responsible for what they describe as the Taliban’s reign of oppression and humiliation against Afghan women.

The groups have also called on the US State Department to launch a full investigation into Khalilzad’s role in the fall of Afghanistan. They urge American authorities to ensure he is prosecuted in a court of law and prevented from having any future influence on US policy towards Afghanistan.

The protest groups highlight Khalilzad’s repeated assurances that the Taliban had changed and would respect human rights, which they say have proven false. They cite the Taliban’s continuing repression, the exclusion of women from public life, and the resurgence of extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS in Afghanistan.

The women’s groups argue that these developments confirm the failure of Khalilzad’s diplomatic approach and represent a betrayal of American and Afghan values. They blame his strategy for endangering Afghan lives and undermining the freedoms once gained by Afghan women.

The letter follows Khalilzad’s recent visit to Kabul as part of a US delegation, during which he met with Taliban officials, including Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. This marked the first official visit by a US delegation to Afghanistan since the US withdrawal in August 2021.

Shortly after this visit, American citizen George Glezmann was released from Taliban custody. The women’s rights groups argue that Khalilzad’s renewed engagement with the Taliban raises fresh concerns about US legitimisation of the group.

In the letter, the protest groups stress that Khalilzad’s decisions have had devastating consequences—not only for Afghanistan but also for the United States, citing the deaths of American soldiers and Afghan civilians during the chaotic withdrawal.

They describe Afghanistan under Taliban rule as a “prison” for millions, especially women, and insist that Khalilzad be held accountable. They call for justice through US legal channels and urge the international community to acknowledge and condemn what they describe as the destructive outcomes of Khalilzad’s policies.

According to the statement, titled Resumption of Consular Services at the Embassy of Afghanistan in Norway, the announcement was shared via the ministry’s official X (formerly Twitter) account.

Meanwhile, Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had earlier confirmed the appointment of Najibullah Sherkhan, a Taliban representative, as First Secretary at the Afghan Embassy in Oslo.

A letter obtained by Afghanistan International confirms that Norway accepted Sherkhan’s appointment on 31 January 2025, following a formal request by the Afghan Embassy.

In September 2024, Youssof Ghafoorzai, the former Afghan ambassador to Norway, announced the conclusion of his mission after four and a half years of service in Oslo. Following his departure and the subsequent closure of the embassy, a reliable source among former Afghan diplomats in Norway told Afghanistan International that the host country had transferred responsibility for the mission to an individual deemed acceptable by the Taliban.

This development marks a rare case of formal engagement between a European country and a Taliban-appointed diplomat, though Norway, like most nations, has not officially recognised the Taliban government.

This marks Sadiq’s second visit to the Afghan capital in less than three months. His arrival comes at a time when relations between the two sides have deteriorated, particularly over border clashes and migration policies.

One of the main flashpoints has been the Torkham border crossing. On 21 February, Taliban and Pakistani border forces clashed over the construction of a Taliban checkpoint and the installation of a sign by Pakistani authorities at the zero point of the crossing. In response, Pakistan closed the border to trade and passenger movement.

While the crossing was partially reopened on 19 March for patients and cargo trucks, Afghan travellers are still barred from entering Pakistan.

Relations have been further strained by Pakistan’s ongoing crackdown on Afghan migrants. Authorities have ordered Afghan residents of Islamabad and Rawalpindi to leave the country by the end of March. This policy forms part of a broader effort to deport undocumented Afghans and has drawn criticism from the Taliban.

Islamabad continues to accuse the Taliban of sheltering fighters from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), alleging that the group uses Afghan soil to stage attacks inside Pakistan. The Taliban has consistently rejected these claims.

In recent remarks, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi acknowledged that tensions with Pakistan remain unresolved. He said that while the Taliban has cordial relations with its five other neighbours, he hopes the ongoing dispute with Islamabad can also be addressed through dialogue.