Taliban Eyes Stronger Russia Ties After Terror Label Move

Hashemi stated that these consulates could pave the way for enhanced cooperation across various sectors.

He noted that, under directives from Iran’s President and Interior Ministry, border provinces have been granted greater authority to strengthen economic relations with neighbouring countries, particularly Afghanistan under Taliban control.

Hashemi highlighted South Khorasan’s strategic advantage, sharing Iran’s longest border with Afghanistan and hosting four border markets. He said, “South Khorasan, with its extensive border and four markets, holds immense potential for expanding trade with Afghanistan.” He added that approximately 95 percent of the province’s exports go to Afghanistan, making the border a key economic asset.

Looking ahead to 2025, Hashemi outlined plans to reopen and activate the Yazdān, Mil 73, and Dukuhana border markets. To address traders’ challenges, he announced initiatives including meetings with Taliban officials, joint cooperation committees with Farah province, completion of the Mil 78 transit route, exhibitions to showcase collaboration opportunities, and efforts to establish a joint Iran-Afghanistan chamber of commerce. He also prioritised increasing staffing and extending border operations to 24 hours to facilitate trade.

Iran currently operates consulates in Herat, Balkh, Kandahar, and Nangarhar. The planned Farah consulate comes amid earlier concerns from Iranian sources about the presence of anti-Iran militants, notably Jaish al-Adl, in the border provinces of Farah and Nimroz. Some Iranian journalists have claimed that individuals linked to Jaish al-Adl hold government positions in these areas.

Iran’s Foreign Minister recently stressed that border provinces must elevate their engagement with the Taliban. Iran remains the Taliban’s largest economic partner in Afghanistan, with bilateral trade valued at around $4 billion.

Speaking on Tuesday, 1 April, in an interview with Taliban-controlled Radio Television Afghanistan, Haqqani stated that more than 4,000 Afghan detainees were released from Iranian and Pakistani prisons over the past year.

He reported that between March 2024 and March 2025, thousands of Afghan nationals were repatriated from various countries. Of the estimated 12,000 still imprisoned abroad, around 8,000 are held in Iran, approximately 3,000 in Pakistan, and between 500 to 1,000 in Türkiye.

Haqqani noted that last year alone, 3,000 Afghan prisoners were released from Pakistan, while 1,350 were freed from detention centres in the Islamic Republic of Iran and returned to Afghanistan.

Officials from the Taliban’s Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation also claimed that they have made full preparations to facilitate the return of Afghan nationals from countries across the region.

Taliban authorities assert that since their return to power in August 2021, nearly five million Afghans have returned to the country, including both voluntary returnees and those deported.

While exact figures on Afghan detainees abroad remain difficult to verify, Iranian officials have previously confirmed the high number of Afghan nationals held in their prisons. In 2023, Askar Jalalian, Iran’s Deputy Minister of Justice, reported that around 8,000 foreign nationals were imprisoned in Iran—most of them Afghan citizens.

In August 2023, the Taliban announced that following negotiations with the Iranian government, 4,000 Afghan prisoners had been transferred from Iranian custody to Afghanistan.

In an interview with Euronews, President Mirziyoyev responded to questions about Uzbekistan’s active diplomatic and economic engagement with the Taliban, distinguishing his country’s approach from that of many others which have remained hesitant or distant.

“Uzbekistan’s approach to Afghanistan has always been pragmatic and strategically oriented toward the long term,” he said. “We have never isolated or turned away from our neighbour.”

He noted that many who initially opposed Tashkent’s stance on engaging with the Taliban have since come to recognise its validity.

Mirziyoyev stressed that the development and stability of Afghanistan are impossible without constructive collaboration with its neighbours. He also stated that he had long doubted the sustainability of the previous Afghan government, citing its lack of control over the entire country, failure to engage with opposition forces, absence of an inclusive political framework, and widespread corruption.

The Uzbek president acknowledged the Taliban’s efforts in bringing a degree of stability to Afghanistan and in directing national resources toward infrastructure development, including the construction of airports, railway networks, and improvements in water and energy infrastructure. He also pointed to a reduction in drug cultivation and production as another area of progress.

“Afghanistan should be viewed through the lens of emerging strategic opportunities,” Mirziyoyev said. “It is critically important to integrate Afghanistan into global economic processes, including through the implementation of infrastructure projects on its territory.”

He reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s willingness to work with the European Union and other international partners to promote a constructive agenda aimed at supporting Afghanistan’s recovery.

“I am convinced that stabilising the situation in Afghanistan and supporting its reconstruction are in the common interests of Central Asian countries and the European Union,” he added.

PHR conducted medical and legal evaluations in February of 27 individuals deported from the US to Panama, using the internationally recognised Istanbul Protocol to assess evidence of torture and persecution.

In findings published on Monday, PHR reported that several of the Afghan deportees had previously fled Taliban persecution or had converted from Islam to Christianity while in Iran—putting them at grave risk if repatriated to Afghanistan. The group also included human rights defenders, former military personnel, LGBTQ+ individuals, and political activists from countries including Afghanistan, Cameroon, China, Eritrea, Iran, and Russia.

The evaluations were carried out by four physicians and a psychologist. According to the report, the individuals exhibited psychological symptoms consistent with their accounts of torture, mistreatment, and persecution. Many displayed signs of acute stress disorder or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and some had visible scars and injuries aligning with their testimonies.

Michele Heisler, Medical Director at PHR, said: “Most of the people we evaluated in Panama showed clear symptoms of acute stress disorder or PTSD consistent with their accounts of torture and ill-treatment. Some also showed scars and injuries consistent with what they reported.”

Heisler further noted that none of the individuals had been given an opportunity to explain to US or Panamanian authorities the reasons for fleeing their home countries or the specific threats they face if returned.

Among the expenditures was a payment of $132,000 to Mohammad Qasem Halimi—a former Minister of Hajj and Religious Affairs in the previous Afghan government and a former member of the Taliban.

In a statement published on the social media platform X on Tuesday, 1 April, DOGE did not disclose the purpose of the payment or how the funds were used by Halimi. He was also identified as having served as the chief of protocol for the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry during its first regime.

The Department of Government Efficiency was established by former President Donald Trump with the mandate to streamline and reduce the size of the federal government. Since returning to office in January 2025, the Trump administration has suspended all foreign aid, including projects funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), for a 90-day review period. The move has resulted in the cancellation of numerous US-backed programmes.

According to DOGE, the US Institute of Peace received an annual allocation of $55 million from Congress, which the previous administration allegedly spent without sufficient oversight. The department claims that roughly $13 million was transferred to a private endowment, largely used for travel and private events.

In addition to the payment to Halimi, DOGE reported that more than $2.23 million was moved to the institute’s foreign accounts—information the agency says had been deleted but has now been recovered. It also cited further questionable expenditures, including $1.3 million to an Iraqi youth association and $675,000 on private aviation services.