UN Special Rapporteur Urges US To Lift Sanctions On ICC Judges

In a statement, Titus said the legal mandate for the CARE office is clear and that the Secretary of State is obligated to appoint a coordinator to oversee efforts related to the resettlement of Afghan allies.

She described Rubio’s refusal to do so as a violation of the law and a sign of disrespect towards the authority of Congress. Titus also warned that the move could damage the United States’ relationship with its Afghan allies.

Earlier, Bloomberg reported that the US State Department had notified Congress of its decision to close the office responsible for coordinating the relocation and resettlement of Afghan refugees.

In their letter to Rubio, the ten lawmakers expressed their “outrage” over the decision.

In a post on X, formerly known as Twitter, he wrote: “I am imprisoned by the Taliban’s Reform Commission. A few days ago, I criticised the remarks of Mawlawi Saeedullah Saeed, but now I admit I was wrong and retract my statement.”

Sources earlier told Afghanistan International that Sekandar had been detained after criticising Taliban officials over their opposition to Taliban fighters joining the conflict between Pakistani security forces and militant groups.

In his statement, posted Thursday on his official X account, Sekandar acknowledged his detention and withdrew his earlier remarks. It remains unclear whether the message was written by him personally or posted by the Taliban using his device.

Sekandar was reportedly arrested for criticising Saeedullah Saeed, the head of the Taliban’s Reform Commission in Kabul. Saeed had stated that no one is permitted to leave the country to wage jihad without direct orders from the Taliban’s supreme leader.

In an earlier Facebook post responding to Saeed’s comments, Sekandar had written: “What exactly are you trying to prove with these statements?”

The Reform Commission, established by Taliban leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, primarily monitors matters related to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Previously, the Taliban also imprisoned General Mobin, another high-profile supporter, sentencing him to one and a half years in prison for statements and behaviour deemed inconsistent with the group’s official policies.

In a statement released 6 June, the ministry said Avalist expressed his commitment to sharing “the realities and developments on the ground” in Afghanistan with both the Indonesian government and public during his tenure.

Muttaqi, in turn, thanked Indonesia for its continued engagement, for hosting Taliban diplomats in Jakarta, and for its broader support.

Indonesia has repeatedly urged the Taliban to reverse its ban on girls’ education. In response to the restrictions, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry has expressed hope that the Taliban will reconsider the policy, emphasising that access to education for all including women and girls remains vital to Afghanistan’s future.

While some regional nations have maintained diplomatic channels with the Taliban, no country has formally recognised the group as Afghanistan’s legitimate government since its return to power in August 2021.

This inconsistency has created a complex web of sanctions, diplomatic engagements and humanitarian challenges, leaving the global community divided and uncertain over how to engage with the Taliban.

At the centre of this international framework is the United Nations Security Council, which imposed sanctions on the Taliban after the group provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda prior to 9/11. Under Resolution 1988, the Security Council targets individuals and entities associated with the Taliban through asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes. This sanctions list operates separately from that targeting al-Qaeda, ensuring that the Taliban remain subject to global financial oversight and restrictions.

Many UN member states, including the United Kingdom and European Union countries, implement these sanctions. Although they may not classify the Taliban specifically as a “terrorist organisation”, they are obligated to enforce these restrictions under international law.

The United States has taken a distinct approach. Under Executive Order 13224, issued on 23 September 2001, the Taliban were designated as “Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” targeting their financial networks and prohibiting US citizens from engaging in transactions with them. While the Taliban as an organisation are not listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the US State Department, closely linked groups such as the Haqqani Network and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are reflecting the deep overlap among extremist groups in the region.

Elsewhere, countries such as Australia and Canada officially designate the Taliban as a terrorist organisation, while New Zealand implements the UN sanctions without adding an independent listing.

The approach of some key states has been more nuanced. Russia designated the Taliban as a terrorist organisation in 2003 but shifted to pragmatic engagement following the group’s return to power in 2021. In recent months, Russia’s Supreme Court approved the suspension of the Taliban’s designation as a terrorist group, a move welcomed by the Taliban. Despite this delisting, Russia’s Foreign Ministry stressed that it remains bound by UN sanctions on Taliban officials.

While Moscow has established diplomatic ties with the Taliban recently accepting their proposed ambassador and handing over Afghanistan’s embassy to the group it stops short of formally recognising them as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. This reflects a broader reality: a state may classify a group as terrorist while maintaining diplomatic engagement for strategic or regional stability reasons.

Kyrgyzstan also recently removed the Taliban from its list of banned organisations. Its Foreign Ministry said the decision followed a thorough review by national authorities. The Taliban had been designated an extremist group in Kyrgyzstan in 2006.

Other Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan, have taken similar approaches to Russia’s, periodically revisiting or removing such designations signalling a dynamic shift in regional policy.

Central Asian states appear to be following the lead of Russia and China, both of which have deepened engagement with the Taliban in recent years.

India, meanwhile, has said its decision on recognising the Taliban will align with the stance of the United Nations.

Although no country has formally recognised the Taliban as Afghanistan’s government, dozens including all six of Afghanistan’s neighbours have permitted Taliban-appointed diplomats to assume control of Afghan embassies or consulates.

The United Kingdom, while enforcing UN sanctions, also does not recognise the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. It has adopted a limited and pragmatic approach, focused on humanitarian issues, counterterrorism and human rights, largely through its diplomatic mission in Qatar. The British government emphasises that such engagement does not confer legitimacy on the Taliban’s actions.

The Taliban remain under significant international pressure, with sanctions imposed by both the United Nations and the United States, which continue to view the group as a global threat.

But the variation in legal classifications and the shifting nature of political policies underscore the diplomatic complexity surrounding Afghanistan. The ongoing debate between formal recognition and pragmatic engagement presents a lasting challenge for the international community in dealing with the country’s current reality.

The suspension, which began on Monday, remains in effect. One of the key reasons cited is a new requirement for importers to provide a certificate of origin.

Importers transporting goods from Afghanistan to Pakistan said the sudden halt in customs clearance has left hundreds of vehicles loaded with coal and soapstone stranded on the Afghan side of the border.

The Dawn newspaper reported Thursday, 5 June, that the sudden enforcement of the certificate of origin requirement at customs clearance had triggered “mini panic” among coal and talc importers, many of whom had planned to complete their transactions ahead of Eid al-Adha.

Mujjebullah Shinwari, head of the Customs Clearing Agents Association at Torkham, told Dawn that efforts are under way to secure at least a one-time exemption from higher authorities in Islamabad to clear shipments already at the Torkham crossing and to offer some relief to importers and transporters ahead of the holiday.

Shinwari said there had been no violations in the import of coal and talc, noting that the minerals had been sourced from various regions of Afghanistan and that importers had previously provided sufficient documentation to Torkham customs officials.

A coal importer at Torkham noted that prior to the new restrictions, around 300 to 350 vehicles were crossing daily into Pakistan.

Critics of unregulated and poorly supervised coal extraction have described the cheap export of Afghan coal as a form of plundering the country’s natural resources.

In late 2023, the Taliban administration announced that 1,000 tons of coal were being extracted daily in northern Afghanistan and sold to traders.