In November 2010, a man with a distinctive turban, considered the special representative of Mullah Omar, was discreetly transported by a German intelligence from the Gulf to Munich during a cold winter and accommodated in a luxurious hotel.
This marked the beginning of secret talks between the Taliban and the United States, later known as the Doha process. Following negotiations between Tayyab Agha and the American delegation, the Taliban opened an office in Qatar and, in exchange for their senior officials, released American prisoner Bowe Bergdahl from Guantanamo Bay.
Earlier, in 2005, German intelligence had hosted two Taliban representatives in a hotel in Zurich for talks, but these negotiations yielded no significant results, as Mullah Omar kept himself separate from al-Qaeda. However, in 2009, an Afghan resident in Germany informed the authorities that if Berlin truly wanted negotiations, they could locate the Taliban’s principal representative, Tayyab Agha. After Mullah Omar’s death, the Taliban removed him from this process.
The Doha process, spanning from Geneva to Mecca, Islamabad, Maldives, and Tashkent, represented Afghanistan’s twelfth attempt at peace. Yet, after agreements were signed, the Taliban failed to uphold the commitments they had made with the international community and Afghans in Qatar, Moscow, and other venues.
From Geneva to Doha (1988–2020), Afghanistan witnessed roughly twelve major and minor peace processes, none of which brought an end to the conflict. Each time, international mediation, ceasefire pledges, and power-sharing proposals were placed on the negotiation table, yet in practice, the sound of war remained dominant.
Afghanistan’s past 37 years of continuous conflict show that the repeated failures of peace efforts reflect a central issue: the Afghan war has been shaped by external pressures, leaders’ pursuit of power, and deep-seated mistrust. Consequently, peace agreements remained mostly on paper, having little to no impact on people’s daily lives or on the sustainable establishment of peace.
In nearly four decades of human history, ten failed peace attempts are remarkable, yet the factors behind Afghanistan’s peace negotiations’ failures remain strikingly consistent.
Geneva: The Withdrawal of Soviet Forces
On December 27, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and installed Babrak Karmal as the head of government. In response, Afghan mujahideen launched fierce and sustained resistance, receiving broad support from the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries. The war became increasingly costly for the Soviets, and due to economic weakness, international pressure, and the intensity of Afghan resistance, Mikhail Gorbachev decided to withdraw.
As part of this process, on April 14, 1988, under United Nations mediation, the Geneva Accords were signed between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The agreement focused on the withdrawal of Soviet forces, preventing Pakistan’s interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, and facilitating the return of refugees. According to the agreement:
Although the Soviet forces withdrew according to the agreement, the government of Mohammad Najibullah remained in power until spring 1992, as the Soviets continued to provide substantial economic and military support.
Najibullah assumed power on May 4, 1986, following the resignation of Babrak Karmal, becoming both the president of Afghanistan and the head of the ruling party. The Soviet Union supported him because he had previously led the KHAD intelligence agency and wielded significant influence. Relatively young, decisive, and articulate, Najibullah presented himself as a new face for peace and reconciliation, especially as Karmal had weakened due to internal party disputes and a lack of legitimacy.
Despite facing strong opposition within the party from Karmal’s close associates, including Farid Mazdak, Nabi Azimi, Mahmoud Baryalai, and others, Najibullah announced the National Reconciliation Program in a grand assembly on January 15, 1987. The program’s key points included a ceasefire proposal, a general amnesty, the allowance of political parties’ activities, and the establishment of an inclusive political process.
This program had several merits, as it was the first public declaration by a government leader advocating dialogue and reconciliation for peace. It opened a new chapter in politics for diversity and opposition inclusion. Given the public’s war fatigue and the prolonged conflict, it offered a new hope for peace. Through this program, Najibullah was able to maintain power for several years after the Soviet withdrawal.
However, deep divisions within the party (Khalq and Parcham factions) obstructed the practical implementation of the program. The mujahideen, particularly Pakistan-backed groups, rejected the program, labeling it a “communist ploy.” Many Afghans and mujahideen commanders returned to Afghanistan, but there was no effective mechanism for peace—only rhetoric. A lack of trust was a key factor, as neither the mujahideen nor the general public fully believed in it. Having lost the war, the Soviet Union also did not provide full international support for Najibullah’s program. Distrust within the army further weakened the system, with some generals rebelling and undermining governance.
Despite the Geneva Accords, the United States continued supporting the mujahideen after the Soviet withdrawal, intensifying the conflict. Consequently, Najibullah’s government weakened steadily, faced financial strain, and came close to collapse. The intensity of war, international and regional support for the mujahideen, internal party conflicts, lack of trust in the National Reconciliation Program, and the hurried involvement of the international community ultimately pushed Najibullah to resign, leaving the program incomplete.
Najibullah’s National Reconciliation Program was a historic initiative for peace in Afghanistan, as it marked the first national attempt at inclusive reconciliation. Yet, internal divisions, the absence of international trust, hardline opposition, Pakistan’s direct interference, and continued international support for the war led to its failure. Nonetheless, the program remains an important milestone in Afghanistan’s peace history and is remembered to this day as a “missed opportunity.”
Najibullah Resigns and the Mujahideen Fail to Unite
On April 16, 1992, following Dr. Najibullah’s resignation, a major political vacuum emerged in Kabul, effectively ending the influence of the so-called “deep state.” The United Nations sought to establish a transitional government to launch a peace process, but the leaders of the mujahideen each considered themselves the rightful heirs to power.
General Abdul Rashid Dostum’s forces advanced on Kabul from the north. In the east, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami mobilized its troops toward the capital. Jamiat-e Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and commanded by Ahmad Shah Massoud, entered from Panjshir. Meanwhile, Abdul Ali Mazari’s Hezb-e Wahdat demanded a share of power in Kabul.
By late April 1992, the mujahideen entered Kabul, and a transitional government was announced, with Burhanuddin Rabbani appointed as president. However, U.S. support was cut off, and complete anarchy ensued in Kabul.
Hekmatyar demanded the prime ministership and refused to recognize Rabbani’s authority. This disagreement triggered armed conflict in the city. Hezb-e Wahdat’s forces also engaged in heavy fighting with Jamiat-e Islami troops in western Kabul. Dostum, who had initially allied with Rabbani, later opposed him, further complicating the battlefield dynamics.
The Islamabad Peace Process
While Kabul was engulfed in a struggle for power, peace negotiations on power-sharing continued. In March 1993, direct peace talks began, with the first session hosted by Pakistan’s President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in Islamabad.
These talks, convened under external pressure, aimed to reconcile Afghan mujahideen leaders. The resulting Islamabad Accord established an agreement on power-sharing: Burhanuddin Rabbani would serve as head of state, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar would become prime minister. It was also agreed that a loya jirga (grand assembly) would be convened to form a unified government and draft a new constitution.
During the negotiations, hostilities slightly decreased, but the fighting did not cease entirely.
The accord quickly failed. Deep divisions among the mujahideen, widespread distrust, and competing ambitions for control reignited the fighting. Kabul once again became a target of rockets and bombardments, extinguishing hopes for lasting peace.
The Mecca Peace Accord
Following the failure of the Islamabad Accord, further negotiations were held in Mecca at the end of 1993, hosted by Saudi Arabia. The objective was to end Kabul’s internal conflicts, implement power-sharing, and establish a unified government. Afghan leaders present included President Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Abdul Ali Mazari, and other key figures.
Some short-term agreements were reached, connected to prior Islamabad commitments. All leaders swore on the Quran to implement the agreements and cease hostilities. However, due to a lack of trust among the jihadist leaders and ongoing struggles for exclusive control, these agreements were never practically implemented.
In summary, the period following Najibullah’s resignation illustrates the persistent challenges of political fragmentation, mistrust, and competing ambitions among Afghanistan’s mujahideen factions, which prevented the realization of a stable transitional government and enduring peace.
Domestic Peace Efforts in Jalalabad
Following the failures of the Islamabad and Mecca negotiations, a new peace initiative was launched in May 1993 in Jalalabad at the request of Pakistan, led by Haji Qadir.
The process initially involved representatives of the mujahideen leaders and later included the leaders themselves. Its primary objectives were to end the civil war in Kabul, agree on power-sharing arrangements, and establish a joint government.
Three meetings were held among the mujahideen leaders, attended by Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Abdul Ali Mazari, and other representatives. Subsequently, the talks included Rabbani, Hekmatyar, Mazari, Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, and other factions, taking place at the royal palace in Jalalabad.
During this period, students from Nangarhar University, at Haji Qadir’s request, staged a human chain demonstration around the royal palace, appealing to all leaders to end the fighting. Despite these efforts, the negotiations produced no tangible results. Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf insisted that a key actor, Ahmad Shah Massoud, be brought into the talks, prompting a move to Kabul.
Rabbani cited an ear ailment as a reason for his absence, although Haji Qadir insisted that Dr. Ishaq Khawarin could treat him in Jalalabad. Nevertheless, Rabbani left the city, breaking the students’ human chain. After seven days of talks, only temporary agreements were reached, and the withdrawal of key combatants from the negotiations indicated that the Jalalabad talks were likely more symbolic than substantive.
Following these talks, Osama bin Laden relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan, establishing a base in Loya Leva, Jalalabad, with his associates and family.
The Mahi-Pur Negotiations
After the failure of the Jalalabad talks, another round of negotiations was held in 1993 among Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Abdul Rashid Dostum in Mahi-Pur. These negotiations produced a relative outcome: Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami would be granted not only the prime ministership but also several other ministerial positions, with the expectation that Hekmatyar would go to Kabul to assume office.
It was decided that Hezb-e Islami would be disarmed upon entering Kabul. However, Hekmatyar remained in Chahar Asiab and appointed his representative Abdul Sabur Farid as prime minister. Farid took the oath of office and began his duties.
The first Mahi-Pur agreement collapsed after just 21 days. Shortly thereafter, Abdul Sabur Farid traveled to Jalalabad on an official visit and later went to Pakistan, where he was denied permission to return.
The collapse of the first Mahi-Pur agreement reflected the challenges of uneven power-sharing, external pressures, and mutual distrust. These dynamics paved the way for the emergence of the Taliban, who for the first time publicly declared their presence in Kandahar in 1994.
Maidan Wardak Negotiations
In 1995, after the fall of Ghazni, the Taliban easily advanced into Maidan Wardak. However, many of their attacks were directed against Hezb-e Islami fighters. To address this, Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Defense Minister of Burhanuddin Rabbani’s government, initiated negotiations with the Taliban in Maidan Wardak to form a joint front.
The negotiations primarily focused on power-sharing and the structure of governance. However, the Taliban demanded full control over everything from Massoud and the government, which prevented the talks from reaching any conclusion. During this time, Abdul Ali Mazari, leader of Hezb-e Wahdat, also went south of Kabul to negotiate with the Taliban near Ghazni, where he was killed.
These events revealed that the Taliban were unwilling to engage in any meaningful negotiations, paving the way for another round of discussions between Hezb-e Islami and Jamiat-e Islami.
Second Mahi-Pur Agreement
After the Taliban captured Kandahar, Burhanuddin Rabbani told Ata Mohammad Qismat, a journalist for Nangarhar National Radio and Television, that the Taliban were “white doves of peace” who had risen against militants and that a mutual understanding could eventually be reached.
Initially, Taliban attacks targeted Hezb-e Islami fighters, but three weeks later, when the Taliban reached Herat, they launched attacks against Ismail Khan, a commander of Jamiat-e Islami. Both Hezb-e Islami and Jamiat-e Islami became opposition groups for the Taliban.
The Taliban attacks on these groups prompted them to return to the negotiating table in 1996, initiating the second round of Mahi-Pur talks. The agreement stipulated that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar would serve as Prime Minister, Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal as Finance Minister, Wahidullah Sabawoon as Defense Minister, and Engineer Qutbuddin Hilal as Interior Minister.
Two days after the second Mahi-Pur agreement, Hekmatyar and his associates conducted the oath-taking ceremony in Kabul. However, shortly afterward, the Taliban captured Kabul, leaving the agreement incomplete. One reason for the collapse was the delay; had the first Mahi-Pur agreement been fully implemented, the final crisis may have been avoided.
Return to Islamabad
From 1996 to 1998, no peace negotiations occurred in Afghanistan. In 1998, however, Bill Richardson, the US representative at the United Nations, attempted to mediate in the Afghan peace process and encouraged the Taliban to engage in dialogue.
In April 1998, Richardson visited Kabul and Islamabad, meeting separately with the Taliban, opposition groups, and regional officials. The talks focused on ending the civil war, agreeing on a ceasefire, and initiating a political peace process.
Richardson emphasized that if the Taliban wanted international legitimacy, foreign support, and aid access, they had to participate in negotiations. Under this pressure, Taliban leaders agreed to engage in talks for the first time. The Taliban delegation was led by Wakil Ahmad Matukal, while the United Front delegation was led by Yunus Qanuni. Negotiations commenced in Islamabad.
Pakistan played a key role in facilitating the visit and persuading the Taliban. Although commitments were made to begin dialogue, the lack of trust and failure to implement promises led to continued fighting. These negotiations, while heavily covered in the media, remained largely symbolic and did not produce tangible results by 2000.
Ashgabat Hosts Peace Talks
Following the Islamabad negotiations, in 2000, peace talks were held in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, between former Pakistani intelligence chief Nasirullah Babar and Ahmad Shah Massoud’s group. Representing the Taliban, Babar pledged that a second round of talks would take place in Ashgabat, and in December of the same year, both sides met to continue discussions.
The outcome of these talks was limited to a press statement; the fighting did not stop and continued until the US-led international coalition intervened in Afghanistan. These peace negotiations, initiated under pressure from the United States and Pakistan, ended unsuccessfully and without any tangible results.
Repeating History: From the Geneva Agreement to the Doha Agreement
The Doha Agreement was signed on February 29, 2020, between the Taliban and the United States in Doha, Qatar. This agreement was the culmination of efforts that had begun in 2009 in Munich, Germany, through German intelligence channels. Simultaneously, scattered meetings occurred in the Maldives and Saudi Arabia between the Afghan government and armed groups, but they produced no significant outcomes.
From 2001, the US, supported by NATO forces, waged war against the Taliban regime under the pretext of eliminating al-Qaeda, toppling the Taliban government, and establishing a new Afghan government. However, the Taliban continued fighting against the Afghan government and international forces for the next 20 years. During this period, the Taliban received indirect support from Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and China, which contributed to sustaining the conflict in Afghanistan.
Key Points of the Doha Agreement:
Although the agreement was signed in the name of peace, Afghanistan’s government weakened due to reduced international aid, intensifying conflict, and the withdrawal of supporting military organizations. Consequently, on August 15, 2021, the Taliban captured Kabul, leading to the collapse of President Ashraf Ghani’s government. Another contributing factor was that the US limited its support to the Afghan government, military contractors departed, the air force collapsed, and the national army disintegrated.
Patterns in Afghanistan’s Peace Efforts
Over the past four decades, Afghanistan has witnessed 12 major and minor peace negotiations, all of which have failed. The causes of failure are largely consistent and evident:
This pattern demonstrates that Afghanistan’s long struggle for peace has repeatedly been shaped more by external influence and power politics than by genuine reconciliation or addressing the needs of its people.
