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Hibatullah Akhundzada: From Kandahar’s Deserts To Taliban’s Invisible Leadership

Afghanistan International Pashto
May 26, 2026, 09:30 GMT+1

From the dusty lanes of Sperwan village in Kandahar’s Panjwai district and the barren deserts of Takhta Pul district emerges the story of a man who today rules Afghanistan through decrees and edicts, yet whose face and private life remain cloaked in secrecy.

Much about the life of Taliban leader Hibatulah Akhundzada exists in fragments, scattered between oral accounts, local narratives and limited public information.

Who is the man now known as the Taliban’s “Amir al-Mu’minin”, or Leader of the Faithful? And how did he rise from a village madrassa to become the most powerful figure in today’s Afghanistan?

Roots In Kandahar’s Harsh Frontier

Akhundzada was born into a religious and semi-nomadic family from the Noorzai tribe, specifically the Turkotai branch. His ancestral roots trace back to the Tangi area of Takhta Pul district in Kandahar, a vast desert belt stretching across Spin Boldak, Registan, Shorabak, Panjwai and Maiwand districts, and extending into Helmand province’s Garmsir, Bahramcha and Dishu districts.

The region is defined by drought, migration and survival. Water is scarce, farmland limited and livelihoods largely dependent on livestock herding. Residents move across difficult terrain shaped by sandstorms and harsh seasonal conditions.

Yet much of Akhundzada’s childhood appears to have been spent in Sperwan village in Panjwai district.

His father, Mullah Mohammad Khan Akhund, served as imam of the local Pay Maliko mosque. Villagers describe him as an ordinary religious cleric who lived modestly through teaching and leading prayers.

Afghanistan International reporter Abdullah Hamim, who travelled to the village, said residents remembered the family as simple and lower middle-class. Villagers appear to remember Akhundzada’s father more vividly than the Taliban leader himself, partly because Akhundzada spent much of his youth outside Panjwai and later in Pakistan.

According to local accounts, Akhundzada’s father maintained close ties with Mawlawi Abdul Rahim, a Noorzai commander associated with Mawlawi Yunus Khalis, one of the anti-Soviet jihadi leaders of the 1980s and a prominent faction leader within Hizb-e-Islami.

Public information about Akhundzada’s family remains limited.

Sources close to the Taliban leader say he has four sons from two wives. One of his sons was reportedly killed in 2017 during an attack on an Afghan security outpost in Helmand’s Gereshk district, allegedly by explosives he was carrying himself.

According to these accounts, his three remaining sons live in Kandahar. His youngest son is said to study religious subjects at a madrassa affiliated with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in Kandahar city.

Little is publicly known about his daughters or other members of his family.

The secrecy surrounding Akhundzada also extends to his inner security circle.

Sources familiar with his movements say three figures among his guards hold particular importance: two are his brothers-in-law and one is his son-in-law. They reportedly remain constantly by his side.

After the Taliban returned to power in 2021, his family settled in the Commando area of Kandahar city’s District 10. Before that, they reportedly lived in Quetta and the Kuchlak area of Pakistan’s Balochistan province.

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Mystery, Rumours And Questions Over Identity

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Akhundzada’s life concerns speculation surrounding his identity and survival.

In 2018 and 2019, reports emerged of suicide attacks targeting the Taliban leader.

A source familiar with Akhundzada’s family told Afghanistan International that on 16 August 2019, he was wounded in a suicide bombing at his mosque in Kuchlak, near Quetta, during afternoon prayers. According to the source, one of his sons and a brother were killed in the attack.

But another narrative, circulating for years among some Taliban critics and local residents, goes significantly further.

According to these claims, Akhundzada himself was killed in the bombing.

One source alleged: “After the explosion, Hibatullah’s body was separated from his head. To prevent the collapse of the Taliban movement, his death was concealed, and his brother Hidayatullah began operating under Hibatullah’s name.”

The claims remain unverified.

However, they emerged at a time when the Taliban were already experiencing deep internal fractures.

The public revelation of the death of the Taliban’s founder, Mullah Mohammad Omar, triggered serious divisions within the movement. The later killing of his successor, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, further intensified internal tensions.

For some observers, the announcement of a third leader’s death could have risked splintering the movement altogether.

Among some residents of Quetta and Kuchlak, rumours persist that the current Taliban leader is not the original Hibatullah Akhundzada but his brother Hidayatullah.

Afghanistan International has not independently verified these claims.

For many Afghans, the most striking aspect of Akhundzada’s rule is the contrast between his immense authority and his near-total invisibility.

The man issuing decrees that shape the daily lives of millions remains largely unseen, his image, movements and personal life tightly controlled.

To supporters, he is a hidden religious leader guiding the Taliban’s Islamic system. To critics, he is the secretive centre of an increasingly authoritarian regime.

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And for many others, the question remains unresolved: is the man behind the curtain truly the same figure the Taliban claim him to be?

Residents of Kandahar who knew the Taliban leader’s family say the environment in which Hibatullah Akhundzada grew up played a decisive role in shaping his worldview and future path.

Sayed Dad Mohammad, a resident of Kandahar’s Zhari district, says Akhundzada’s father, Mullah Mohammad Khan Akhund, was a religious scholar and mosque imam whose family survived through teaching religion, leading prayers and traditional rural life.

According to him, Akhundzada spent his childhood surrounded by mosques, madrassas and conservative religious traditions because of his father’s clerical role.

“At that time, Kandahar’s rural society was deeply conservative, religious and traditional,” he said. “That environment had a profound influence on Hibatullah’s intellectual formation.”

Unlike many modern political leaders, Akhundzada received no higher education. His entire academic background was shaped through religious madrassas.

He began his early studies in Kandahar before continuing his education in Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s forced many Afghan clerics, fighters and families across the border.

Education In Pakistan’s Madrassas

According to Haji Nasrullah, a resident of Kandahar familiar with Akhundzada’s background, the Taliban leader gradually became known as a religious scholar, judge and mufti.

He said Akhundzada was among the early figures who joined the Taliban after Mullah Mohammad Omar established the group in 1994.

At the time, the Taliban portrayed themselves as a movement seeking to end corruption, insecurity and rule by warlords after years of civil conflict.

Akhundzada pursued religious studies in a number of madrassas in Quetta, Kuchlak and other parts of Pakistan’s Balochistan province. His studies focused on Hadith, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), Quranic interpretation (tafsir), principles of Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia.

He later became a teacher himself and earned the title “Sheikh al-Hadith”, a respected designation within Deobandi religious institutions for scholars specialising in the sayings and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad.

Like many senior Taliban figures, Akhundzada’s ideological outlook was heavily influenced by Pakistan’s Deobandi madrassa network.

However, unlike several Taliban commanders who built reputations through military leadership during the insurgency, Akhundzada became prominent primarily through religious teaching, issuing fatwas and judicial work.

Within Taliban circles, he was regarded as a trusted religious authority whose responsibilities centred largely on religious rulings, ideological guidance and judicial affairs.

Trusted By Mullah Omar

Haji Nasrullah says Akhundzada enjoyed the confidence of Mullah Omar from the movement’s early years.

“Mullah Mohammad Omar had special trust in him and consulted him on important religious matters within the Taliban,” he said.

According to Nasrullah, Akhundzada was also considered one of the more hardline figures within the movement from the beginning.

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“On many issues, he made decisions based strictly on his own beliefs,” he said. “Just as today he has blocked education.”

A resident of Kandahar and former Taliban member, who now opposes the group’s ideology, said Akhundzada taught Hadith, fiqh, tafsir and Islamic legal principles at several madrassas over the years.

Many Taliban members, judges, muftis and fighters, he said, once attended his classes.

After the Taliban first captured Kabul in 1996, Hibatullah Akhundzada rose steadily through the movement’s religious and judicial structures, gaining influence not as a battlefield commander but as a hardline religious authority.

During the Taliban’s first period in power from 1996 to 2001, Akhundzada served in several senior judicial and religious positions within the regime’s Sharia system.

His first known role was with the Taliban’s Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in Farah, where he was involved in enforcing the ministry’s strict social and religious directives on the population.

He later became head of the Taliban’s military court in Nangarhar and eventually served as deputy chief justice of the Taliban administration.

At the same time, he also taught at a Taliban-linked jihadist madrassa in Quetta, Pakistan, which was reportedly supervised directly by Mullah Mohammad Omar.

A former Taliban member from Kandahar, speaking anonymously, said the movement during that period imposed a rigid interpretation of Sharia law that included public executions, amputations, severe restrictions on women, bans on music and extensive social controls.

According to him, Akhundzada was regarded as a strong supporter of such policies and few inside the movement openly challenged his views.

Architect Of the Taliban’s Religious Judiciary

Within the Taliban structure, the Dar al-Ifta, the body responsible for religious fatwas and Sharia rulings, was considered one of the movement’s most powerful institutions.

Akhundzada remained closely connected to this apparatus for years and gradually emerged as one of its central figures.

The former Taliban member said Akhundzada’s responsibilities extended far beyond issuing religious opinions.

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“Mullah Hibatullah issued religious fatwas regarding the war, prepared guidance for Taliban judges, set rules for Taliban fighters’ behaviour, provided religious justification for governance, offered Sharia-based solutions to internal disputes, and organised the appointment and training of judges for the religious courts,” he said.

His influence expanded particularly after the Taliban regime collapsed in late 2001 following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan.

Former Taliban members say Akhundzada returned to Pakistan after the fall of first Taliban regime and became involved with the Taliban’s leadership council known as the Quetta Shura.

The Quetta Shura operated as the Taliban’s secretive leadership body during the insurgency years, overseeing military operations, organisational matters, political strategy and religious direction from across the border in Pakistan.

Another Taliban member, also speaking anonymously, said that although Akhundzada never developed a reputation as a front-line commander, he was widely viewed as the movement’s highest religious authority.

According to him, the Taliban gradually established parallel rural courts across large parts of Afghanistan during the insurgency years. Local residents frequently brought legal, tribal and family disputes before Taliban judges instead of approaching the then republic Afghan government’s courts.

Akhundzada was regarded as the head of this parallel judicial system.

He oversaw the appointment of Taliban judges, set religious principles for the courts and issued religious justifications for the insurgency.

The former Taliban member said Akhundzada’s positions during those years were, in some respects, even more uncompromising than they appear today.

The Man Who Rose From The Sands Of Sperwan

In May 2016, the Taliban faced one of the most sensitive moments in its history.

Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, successor to Mullah Mohammad Omar, was killed in a US drone strike at a time when the group was already struggling with a prolonged war, internal rivalries and growing instability within its leadership structure.

The Taliban’s system of allegiance and command had become increasingly fragile.

Against this backdrop, and while the insurgency against Afghan and international forces continued, Hibatullah Akhundzada was selected on 25 May 2016, just four days after Mansour’s death, by the Taliban’s 35-member leadership council as the movement’s new “Amir al-Mu’minin”, or Leader of the Faithful.

His appointment was widely viewed inside the movement as an attempt to reduce tribal tensions, prevent factional fragmentation and preserve a balance between the Taliban’s military campaign, religious authority and political structure.

A former Taliban member, Mullah Mohammad Younus, says the movement faced a serious leadership crisis following Mansour’s death.

According to him, Taliban leaders feared that appointing a military commander as the new leader could intensify internal rivalries and potentially split the movement.

At the time, Akhundzada was not associated with any major military faction and reportedly had relatively few internal opponents within Taliban ranks.

Pakistan, according to former Taliban figures, was also satisfied with his appointment.

“The Taliban believed Mullah Hibatullah possessed religious legitimacy, had remained close to Mullah Mohammad Omar, could maintain balance among different Taliban factions, preserve the movement’s religious unity and provide religious justification for both war and politics,” Younus said. “That is why the leadership council selected him as the new Amir al-Mu’minin.”

To strengthen internal cohesion, two influential Taliban figures were appointed as his deputies: Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob.

Since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in August 2021, Akhundzada has emerged as the group’s undisputed supreme authority.

Unlike previous Taliban leaders, however, he is widely regarded as an entirely non-military figure.

His influence has never primarily stemmed from battlefield command or military charisma. Instead, his authority has been built through religious rulings, fatwas, judicial rulings and his interpretation of Islamic law within the Taliban system.

Even after becoming Afghanistan’s de facto ruler, Akhundzada has remained largely absent from public view.

He rarely appears publicly, and most of his speeches, directives and political positions are communicated through written decrees, official statements or indirect messages delivered by Taliban spokesperson and senior officials.

Much of his personal life also remains deliberately concealed.

The Taliban release very limited information about the private lives of their senior leaders, and the secrecy surrounding Akhundzada has become one of the defining characteristics of his rule.

Some Taliban supporters argue that security concerns are a major reason for his invisibility. They point to threats from Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and rival militant groups, as well as the assassinations of previous Taliban leaders.

Others inside the group believe the secrecy also serves a symbolic purpose, preserving the sacred and untouchable image of the Amir al-Mu’minin.

When the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in 2021, some Afghans and international observers expected the group to adopt a more moderate approach than during its first rule in the 1990s.

Over time, however, Akhundzada’s leadership has increasingly reconnected the Taliban to many of the policies and restrictions associated with its earlier regime.

Under his authority, the Taliban reimposed sweeping limitations on women and girls, enforced strict social controls and expanded the role of religious decrees in public life.

For critics, the group gradually returned to the ideological framework that first emerged from the madrassas and deserts of southern Afghanistan decades earlier.

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Pakistan’s War Strategy: Are US Weapons The Main Target While Taliban Leaders Are Spared?

Mar 25, 2026, 10:15 GMT+0
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Afghanistan International Pashto
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The conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan has entered a dangerous new phase since late February, raising serious concerns about regional stability.

Pakistan has carried out multiple airstrikes in the provinces of Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika and Nangarhar, while the Taliban have responded with ground assaults and drone attacks.

The United Nations said 143 people were killed in a Pakistani airstrike on a drug treatment centre in Kabul, although the Taliban put the death toll at as many as 400.

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA, reported that from late February to the present, between 75 and 212 Afghan civilians have been killed, with hundreds more wounded.

A key question remains: if civilians are being hit, why is Pakistan not targeting the Taliban’s senior leadership?

What is Pakistan’s Calculated Approach to War?

Based on strategies previously used against leadership figures in Iran, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, and al-Qaida, eliminating leaders in ideologically driven militant groups often leads to the rapid emergence of successors who may be even more radical and harder to contain.

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Retired Pakistani General Inam-ul-Haq said Islamabad is not pursuing an all-out war against the Taliban, but is instead applying what he described as “calibrated” pressure. According to him, Pakistan is deliberately avoiding direct strikes on Taliban leaders and is not cutting ties with the ruling authorities. Instead, it is focusing on weapons depots, mid-level commanders and border posts in an effort to keep the Taliban under sustained pressure.

Haq said Pakistan does not want to cross a “red line” that could turn the conflict into a full-scale crisis.

He said one of Islamabad’s concerns is that killing senior Taliban leaders could create a power vacuum in Afghanistan, widen the conflict and further destabilise Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, making both provinces harder to control.

Pakistan’s assessment, he said, is that the Taliban do not have a well-organised replacement leadership, and that the loss of top figures could endanger the wider region. Foreign militant groups now operating under Taliban influence could expand their activities into China, Central Asia and Pakistan itself if the Taliban leadership were removed.

For that reason, one option for Islamabad is to seek co-operation from within the Taliban and among aligned groups.

Haq said Pakistan is also monitoring networks of influence inside the Taliban. Groups such as the Haqqani network are viewed as relatively close, while greater pressure is being applied to other factions that have more limited co-ordination with Pakistan. Most of the areas targeted in Pakistani airstrikes lie outside Haqqani Network’s influence, he said.

Local sources say many Taliban fighters deployed along the Durand Line are from Kandahar and aligned with Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, with little involvement from the Haqqani network. One reason, they say, is that Hibatullah has appointed many loyalists in districts in south-western Afghanistan to military and government posts.

Haq views this distribution of power within the Taliban as part of an “internal balance” policy that helps preserve the group’s structure.

Several Afghan analysts share a similar assessment, interpreting Pakistan’s decision to spare the Taliban leadership as a deliberate choice.

Military Analysts’ Perspective

Azim Rahimi, a former professor at Kabul University and an expert in military affairs, said targeting the Taliban leadership remains an option for Pakistan, but one that is neither used constantly nor immediately.

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“Pakistan will only use this option when there is a ‘need’ and a ‘political and security calculation’,” he said. “At this time, Pakistan does not genuinely seek the fall of the Taliban regime, but is instead applying limited pressure.”

He added that regional experience from past wars in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that toppling a ruling system can create long-term crises.

Why Are TTP Leaders Not Being Targeted?

From February 27 to March 13, Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan primarily targeted Taliban border posts, brigades, battalions, and arms and ammunition centres.

Retired Pakistani Brigadier Mahmood Shah said the main driver of Pakistan’s conflict with the Taliban is the activity of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP. After the Taliban returned to power, he said, attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas increased, including assaults on military bases and police, as well as attempts to seize border posts, deepening Islamabad’s concerns.

He said Pakistan initially tried to negotiate with the Taliban, but turned to airstrikes after those efforts failed.

However, Pakistani Taliban leaders, whose presence Islamabad has used to justify its operations, have not been targeted, or at least no evidence of such strikes has been shared with the media.

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Sources in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas told Afghanistan International that some TTP leaders returned to their areas of influence in Pakistan at the same time as the attacks in Afghanistan. They also said signs of TTP activity and influence have increased near cities including Peshawar, Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Mardan.

That has raised further questions about the true targets of Pakistan’s airstrikes.

If Pakistani militants were the main target, why were strikes carried out at Bagram Airfield, in Kabul, and against Afghan brigades where there is no known TTP presence and no confirmed bases?

Many analysts believe Islamabad is seeking to destroy American weapons in Afghanistan, a goal they say aligns with joint US-Pakistan interests.

US Weapons In Afghanistan

Official US reports show that from 2004 to 2016, the United States supplied the Afghan National Army and police with 599,690 firearms, including light and heavy weapons. Most were light arms, including 358,530 rifles such as M16s, M4s and sniper rifles.

During the same period, 16,191 support devices were also delivered, including night-vision goggles, communication monitors, small reconnaissance drones such as the ScanEagle, and surveillance balloons. The overwhelming majority were night-vision goggles, totalling 16,035 units.

In aviation, a total of 208 aircraft were delivered to Afghan security forces between 2004 and 2016. They included 110 MI-17 and MD-530 helicopters, 60 transport aircraft, including the C-208, C-128, C-130, T-182, G-222 and AN-32, 20 A-29 attack aircraft and 18 PC-12 reconnaissance planes.

In addition, the US supplied 75,898 vehicles, including Rangers, Humvees, lorries and tanks. Of those, 42,604 were Rangers and 22,174 were Humvees, making them the most widely used. Some of the vehicles later became inoperable because of explosives, suicide attacks or prolonged use.

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Over the past five years, Pakistan has repeatedly complained to the UN Security Council about US weapons left behind by Afghan forces and the United States, saying some of them ended up in the hands of TTP fighters.

Taliban Mediation And Relations With Pakistan

The Taliban government has officially acknowledged mediating negotiations twice between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Pakistan, saying the process had reached 90 percent progress. However, it said changes in Pakistan’s military leadership and the fall of Imran Khan’s government disrupted those efforts.

A significant faction within the Taliban sees Pakistan’s top military leadership as an obstacle to relations, referring to them as the “special circle”. Members of that faction believe the new Pakistani military leadership opposes talks with armed Pakistani groups and instead pushes them towards taking up arms.

Those uncertainties, combined with the fact that neither TTP leaders nor Taliban leaders have been targeted, have fuelled conspiracy theories about the Taliban-Pakistan conflict.

Political analyst Roshan Karwar described the crisis as a “manufactured war”, arguing that external threats can sometimes help strengthen states. He said Pakistani airstrikes on Kabul gave the Taliban an opportunity to build public support. He added that the fact TTP and Taliban leaders have been spared lends weight to the theory of an engineered conflict.

Pakistan’s Recent Approach

Mohammad Fayyaz, a professor at Lahore University, described Pakistan’s foreign policy over the past two years as “co-ordinated and systematic”.

He said Pakistan does not want to trigger a new domestic or regional crisis, and is instead prioritising border security, economic support and avoiding steps that could threaten the survival of the Taliban regime.

He said expanding the war against the Taliban would fuel new waves of radicalisation. In his view, Islamabad is seeking to contain Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, as an immediate threat without challenging the Taliban’s overall hold on power.

Since the conflict began, however, trade routes between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been closed. The Taliban have shifted their trade focus towards Central Asia and India, while the border between the two countries has been marked by violence and disruption.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said the operations are part of Islamabad’s counterterrorism strategy. Analysts, however, say the actual targets remain unclear.

Although the strikes are publicly framed as an effort to contain the TTP threat, TTP leaders have not been targeted in practice, their Taliban supporters have been spared, civilian casualties have mounted, and tens of thousands of people have been displaced on both sides of the Durand Line.

The movement of residents out of the area, along with tightened security measures, could leave the border exposed to new waves of insecurity.

Analysts suggest several possible explanations. One is that Pakistan has not yet finalised its strategy and is still testing pressure tactics. Another is that its real objectives are more complex, and more concealed, than officially stated.