How Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour Drew the Taliban Closer to Iran

The strike took place along the highway that runs from Quetta, the provincial capital, towards Iran, roughly 500 kilometres from the Taftan border crossing.

The driver killed with him was identified as Mohammad Azam, a taxi driver who transported passengers between Taftan and Quetta. Mansour, however, had not been travelling under his own name. He was carrying a Pakistani passport issued under the alias “Wali Mohammad”.

Stamps in that passport indicated that Mansour had entered Iran in late March and returned to Pakistan on 21 May, the same day he was killed. His movements placed him at the centre of a wider and more sensitive question: how had the Taliban’s leader come to move so freely through Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan at a time when he was being closely tracked by the United States?

Before travelling to Iran, Mansour had gone to Dubai to collect money. According to accounts surrounding his final journey, the CIA had sought to arrest him before he could escape. But Mansour left Dubai and fled to Iran before such an operation could take place.

Susan Rice, who was then serving as National Security Adviser to President Barack Obama, reportedly asked that Mansour’s flight be turned back. Emirati officials, however, are said to have responded that it was already too late.

Within Taliban circles, some sources believed Mansour had developed close ties with officials in the United Arab Emirates. He was also thought to have been managing his own business affairs there. Those same sources regarded Emirati officials as having played a role in facilitating his escape to Iran.

After leaving Iran, Mansour crossed back into Pakistan. Once again, US officials became aware of his whereabouts. He had secretly travelled to the United Arab Emirates using the Pakistani passport issued in the name of “Wali Mohammad”, a document that helped conceal his identity while enabling his movement across borders.

Who Was Akhtar Mohammad Mansour?

Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the son of Mohammad Jan, was born in 1968 in the village of Band-e-Taimur, in the Maiwand district of Kandahar province. He belonged to the Ishaqzai tribe, one of the major Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan.

During the years of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Mansour lived in the Gardi Jungle refugee camp in Balochistan. There, like many Afghan refugees of his generation, he began his religious education. He studied religious texts at a madrasa in the Abdullah Khan Cross area of Quetta before later moving to Peshawar, where he continued his studies in Kacha Garhi and other areas. He also completed a short religious course at the Jalozai refugee camp near Peshawar.

In 1985, Mansour became active in the faction of a Kandahar commander named Qari Azizullah. Under the supervision of the current Taliban prime minister, Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund, he fought against Soviet forces and the then-Afghan government in the Pashmul area of Panjwai district, in Kandahar province.

At the time the Taliban group was formed, Mansour was studying at the Aminiya Madrasa in the Hijrat Kalay area of the Jalozai camp in Peshawar. Among those studying alongside him were Mawlawi Shahabuddin Delawar and Syed Quraish Baba. Mansour later joined the Taliban and rose steadily through its ranks, eventually becoming known as one of the founding Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar’s closest and most trusted associates.

During the Taliban’s first period in power, from 1996 to 2001, Mansour served as Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation. The post gave him access to important administrative networks and helped strengthen his standing inside the group.

Before he was chosen as the Taliban’s second leader, Mansour had already become one of the group’s most powerful figures. He served as its influential financial chief and commanded a strong network of military commanders.

Among his close military associates were Sadr Ibrahim, Qayyum Zakir, Mullah Mansour Dadullah, Mohammad Muzammil, and Hedayatullah Badri, also known as Mawlawi Gul Agha, who is now the Taliban’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum. His circle also included Mullah Mohammadzai; Pir Agha, known as the “Butcher of ISIS”, who died in a traffic accident in Ghazni two years earlier; Abdul Ahad Talib Mawlawi; and several other close companions.

When Mullah Mohammad Omar died in 2013, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was the only person who kept the death secret. Until 2015, Taliban members were told that Mullah Omar was still alive. Mansour issued orders in Omar’s name, sent written messages attributed to him, and prevented the release of audio recordings, citing the need to protect the leader’s security and privacy.

A close associate of Mansour, who currently holds no official position because of illness, said: “In July 2015, when the death of Mullah Mohammad Omar was officially announced, the Taliban leadership council and a number of religious scholars and elders held a meeting in Quetta, Pakistan, and selected Akhtar Mohammad Mansour as the new Amir al-Mu’minin, Commander of the Faithful.”

Mansour formally led the Taliban from 29 July 2015 until 21 May 2016. His time as leader was brief but significant.

On 21 May 2016, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, bringing an abrupt end to the leadership of one of the Taliban’s most powerful and secretive figures.

Internal Disputes Over Leadership

The death of Mullah Mohammad Omar set off one of the most sensitive internal crises in the Taliban’s history. Among the first figures said to have been informed of his death was Mullah Qayyum Zakir, a powerful Taliban military commander with deep influence among fighters in the south.

The limited circle of those aware of Omar’s death also included Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, Omar’s son; Mullah Abdul Manan, Omar’s brother; Sheikh Abdul Hakim, head of the Darul Ifta; Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, then the Taliban’s chief justice; Abdul Salam, Omar’s close courier; Mawlawi Noor Mohammad Saqib; and Amir Khan Haqqani, Taliban’s current foreign minister.

According to sources, the decision on who should succeed Mullah Omar was made during a separate meeting of four senior Taliban figures: Sheikh Abdul Hakim, Hibatullah Akhundzada, Abdul Salam and Mawlawi Noor Mohammad Saqib. Yet the decision was not accepted without resistance. Mullah Omar’s brother, Mullah Abdul Manan, viewed the transfer of leadership as a violation of his family’s rights.

Sources say Mullah Qayyum Zakir was the first person to encourage Abdul Manan to pledge allegiance to Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. But the initial efforts to preserve unity soon gave way to deeper internal tensions.

The disagreements became serious after Zakir merged Taliban fighting groups in the southern provinces without Mansour’s permission. He also ordered commanders to register their weapons and military equipment. Mansour regarded these moves as a direct challenge to his authority and responded by restricting Zakir’s powers. As a result, Zakir resigned from the Taliban’s military commission and temporarily suspended his activities.

Soon afterwards, however, Zakir began holding critical meetings with other dissatisfied Taliban leaders. Among those involved were Mullah Mohammad Rasool, Mullah Abdul Razzaq and Hassan Rahmani. Under Zakir’s leadership, the group presented Mansour with a ten-point list of demands and warned that, if he refused to accept them, they would reveal the secret of Mullah Omar’s death.

As Taliban leaders tried to contain the internal crisis, sources say Mansour came under pressure and accepted nine of Zakir’s ten demands. He rejected only the most important one: the demand that Zakir be restored as head of the military commission. Mansour reportedly argued: “I cannot give a position to someone who openly asks for it himself.”

By mid-2015, Zakir had begun holding funeral prayers and condolence ceremonies for Mullah Omar together with his close supporters. This move forced Mansour and those loyal to him to officially announce Mullah Omar’s death and formalise Mansour’s own leadership.

When the Taliban leadership council and the new emir were being announced, Zakir and Mullah Abdul Manan walked out of the meeting. They objected to Mansour’s name being included as the group’s leader.

Yet Mansour’s extensive connections, influence within the council and ties with key regional commanders blunted the opposition. Of the 19 members of the Taliban leadership council, 15 pledged allegiance to him. Zakir, who until then had not publicly declared formal opposition, was eventually forced to accept Mansour’s leadership through a written letter.

Taliban sources and several former battlefield associates of Akhtar Mohammad Mansour told Afghanistan International Pashto that Mullah Yaqoob, Mullah Omar’s son; Qayyum Zakir; Mullah Mansour Dadullah, the brother of the notorious Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah Akhund; Sadr Ibrahim; Mullah Mohammadzai; Mullah Muzammil; and several other Taliban leaders opposed Mansour’s leadership. They considered it a coup orchestrated by Pakistani intelligence services.

According to the sources, at the time of Mansour’s appointment, Mullah Baradar, widely regarded as the closest associate of Mullah Mohammad Omar, was imprisoned in Pakistan on accusations of maintaining contacts with former Afghan president Hamid Karzai. Pakistan, the sources said, did not want the Taliban leadership handed to him.

A former Taliban-era official, who is now a member of Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada’s advisory board, said: “In order to end distrust among the Taliban and keep the movement united, the Taliban leadership council decided to appoint Mullah Hibatullah and Siraj Haqqani as deputies to Akhtar Mohammad Mansour.”

Sources also said that, despite the distrust and suspicions surrounding Mansour’s rise, Mansour Dadullah and Mullah Qayyum Zakir eventually went their separate ways.

Tayeb Agha: A Thorn in Mansour’s Side

In 2012, when senior Taliban representative Tayeb Agha sought permission from Mullah Mohammad Omar to open a political office to organise prisoner exchange affairs, the move signalled a new direction in the Taliban’s internal power structure and decision-making process.

Mullah Omar approved the request. But the decision was taken without the consultation, consent or presence of his then-deputy, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. According to sources, this became a point of serious tension between Mansour and the Taliban’s political office in Qatar.

Tayeb Agha later not only withheld information from Mansour but also avoided consulting him on major decisions. The Qatar office itself was opened several months after Mullah Omar’s death, adding further complexity to the internal politics that surrounded the movement’s leadership transition.

Sources close to the Taliban say Mansour was deeply unhappy with the activities of the Qatar office. He believed its representatives were operating independently of the Taliban leadership and outside the directives of the leadership council. He also suspected that they were maintaining unauthorised contacts with Western intelligence agencies.

For Mansour, these relationships were not only politically unproductive but also costly. He believed they wasted resources, money and opportunities. Over time, he became increasingly disappointed with the members of the Qatar office and their dealings with major intelligence agencies.

Mansour reportedly concluded that the office was ineffective and that he personally needed to take action. He believed the Qatar office’s contacts were fully visible to the CIA and could not play any meaningful role in building relations with Russia, China or Iran. For that reason, he sought to strengthen direct ties with Iran and Russia himself, efforts that ultimately cost him his life.

After Akhtar Mohammad Mansour came to power, the Taliban intensified their attacks across Afghanistan under his leadership. At the same time, however, he also supported peace negotiations, which were then being hosted by China and Pakistan.

His close involvement in those peace talks drew criticism from some Taliban leaders and analysts, who viewed it as evidence of his ties with Pakistani intelligence agencies.

According to sources, another reason behind his killing was that, in his final days, Mansour had instructed his fighters to relocate from Pakistan to another safe haven.

His assassination came at a highly sensitive moment in the Obama administration’s Afghanistan policy. It reflected an effort to increase pressure for peace talks while also signalling the possibility of expanded military operations. The strike also sent a message to Pakistan: that the United States could act inside Pakistani territory without prior notice or consultation if it deemed such action necessary.

At the time, Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, warned that the strike would have “serious consequences” for relations with the United States. He described it as “completely against the United Nations Charter and international law”.

However, some officials from Afghanistan’s former government offered a different interpretation. Among them was General Abdul Raziq, the powerful police commander of Kandahar, who was later assassinated. Raziq said Mansour had lost his life after becoming trapped in Pakistan’s geopolitical game.

According to Raziq, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour had grown frustrated with Pakistan’s demands and pressure and wanted to move to Iran, as several other Taliban commanders had done before him.

Raziq believed Mansour was no longer willing to tolerate Pakistani pressure and intended to relocate to Iran. He said Mansour had opened an office in Mirjaveh, Iran, and had even moved his family there.

But certain circles within Pakistan were unhappy with this decision, Raziq claimed. According to the allegation, Pakistan’s intelligence services were able to achieve several objectives with a single strike.

Why Did Akhtar Mohammad Mansour Expand Relations With Iran?

Iran had reportedly provided Akhtar Mohammad Mansour with official offices and safe havens on its territory. Several Russian officials are also said to have met him repeatedly in Iran, as Mansour sought to broaden the Taliban’s regional relationships beyond Pakistan.

According to sources, those meetings produced tangible support. Mansour allegedly received Russian-made Kalashnikov rifles, other weapons and cash payments on several occasions.

A source familiar with the security situation at the time told Afghanistan International Pashto: “Russia was giving money and weapons to Mansour because he had recently been conducting operations against ISIS in the Zamindawar area of Kajaki district in Helmand, as well as in Kunar and Nangarhar, and his allies were gaining the upper hand over ISIS fighters.”

People close to Mansour’s family also told Afghanistan International Pashto that, between 2014 and 2016, donations for the Taliban were collected in Tatarstan with the cooperation of Russian intelligence. The money, they said, was delivered to Mansour through Iranian mediation.

Sources close to Mansour’s family say his relations with Iran strengthened further after one of his closest associates, Mullah Manan, was arrested in Quetta.

Mullah Abdul Rahim, widely known as Mullah Manan, was the former Taliban governor of Helmand. He belonged to the Ishaqzai tribe and was considered one of Mansour’s most trusted allies. According to sources, he was arrested by Pakistani intelligence services. After his arrest, Mansour’s associates reportedly began travelling to Mashhad and other Iranian cities for safety, instead of remaining in Quetta.

Mullah Manan remained one of Mansour’s key allies. After Hibatullah Akhundzada was appointed Taliban leader, disagreements later emerged between them. On 1 December 2018, Mullah Manan was killed in a US air strike in Nowzad district of Helmand province.

Mansour had also reportedly created fake identity documents under the names “Gul Mohammad” and “Mohammad Wali”. He owned two plots of land and four houses in Karachi, properties estimated to be worth tens of millions of Pakistani rupees. Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency reportedly stated that Mansour’s properties and bank accounts would be registered under the name “Ammar, son of Mohammad Yaser”.

Akhtar Mohammad Mansour had two wives. One was the daughter of the well-known Taliban figure Mawlawi Yaser, while the other came from his own tribe in Sangin district of Helmand province. Mansour had four sons and three daughters.

His eldest son, Fathullah Mansour, was appointed commander of Kandahar’s air force after the Taliban returned to power. However, after complaints over the alleged sale of leftover American weapons from Kandahar airport, as well as accusations of drug trafficking through the airport, he was reassigned to Kabul as a deputy minister at the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation.

According to sources, Fathullah Mansour owns luxurious homes and properties not only in Kandahar, but also in Helmand and Kabul.

Like some other Taliban members, the son of the former Taliban leader has also been accused of involvement in drug trafficking. Sources claim he owns two drug-processing factories in Sangin district of Helmand, where narcotics are processed before being smuggled into Iran through Helmand and Nimroz provinces.

Those who know Fathullah Mansour describe him, like his father, as calm-tempered. He generally avoids becoming involved in controversial disputes with the current Taliban leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada. He also does not possess the same level of power or public prominence as Mullah Mohammad Omar’s son, Mullah Yaqoob.

Unlike the Taliban’s first leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban do not formally commemorate the anniversary of Akhtar Mohammad Mansour’s death with special ceremonies. Instead, he is remembered only occasionally through limited memorial gatherings.