Kandahar Tightens Grip As Taliban Rivals Compete For Badakhshan’s Mines

After late February 2026, the conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran expanded, placing pressure on global markets, particularly through concerns over navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Under these conditions, a temporary ceasefire was announced through Pakistan’s mediation, followed by rare face-to-face talks between US and Iranian officials in Islamabad.

Both Washington and Tehran have publicly acknowledged Pakistan’s role, describing it as a central mediator.

The talks held in Islamabad on April 11–12, 2026 lasted more than 20 hours but ended without an immediate agreement. However, communication channels remained open, and efforts are under way to organise a second round.

A key question emerging from the negotiations is whether Pakistan acted primarily as a facilitator or played a more active role in managing the process.

Although the talks took place in Islamabad, Pakistan’s involvement appeared to extend across several parallel tracks.

Backchannel Communications
From the outset of the conflict, Pakistan facilitated exchanges between Washington and Tehran. Several Pakistani politicians have said US proposals, sometimes in the form of specific points or clauses, were delivered to Iran via Pakistan, with responses conveyed back to Washington. This role became particularly significant when traditional Gulf mediators, including Qatar, faced heightened security pressure and were subject to attacks linked to the conflict.

Structuring The Negotiation Agenda
By hosting the talks, Islamabad undertook several practical steps. It provided what officials described as a secure and logistically viable environment for both sides, reflecting a level of trust in Pakistan’s capacity. It also broke the agenda into key areas, including the nuclear programme, sanctions, frozen assets, the Strait of Hormuz and regional security. In addition, Pakistan encouraged both sides to consider the timing and framework for a second phase of talks to maintain momentum.

While the negotiations did not produce a concrete agreement, Pakistan appeared to make progress in facilitating discussions and structuring the agenda. It has continued efforts to support a second round.

Regional Co-ordination & Pressure Management
Pakistan has sought to broaden support for maintaining the ceasefire and resuming talks through engagement with regional actors, including Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Egypt. Such coordination is aimed at encouraging broader influence over the process and reducing the risk of destabilising actions by other parties.

Why Pakistan Was Trusted As Mediator
Analysts suggest Pakistan’s role reflects a combination of strategic necessity, influence and calculation. Pakistan maintains long-standing security relations with the United States and working relations with Iran, providing a channel of communication acceptable to both sides.

During the negotiations, Washington required a country capable of conveying messages aligned with US interests and providing a negotiating environment consistent with the approach of the administration of Donald Trump.

At the same time, India was not seen as an optimal choice, as US influence over New Delhi was viewed as more limited. Some Arab allies of Washington were under significant pressure and were perceived by Iran as partisan, reducing their credibility as mediators.

The United States was also seen as favouring an Islamic, nuclear-armed country to mediate. Pakistan, which meets both criteria, emerged as a suitable option.

Pakistan maintains relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and its trust-building efforts during negotiations were viewed by some observers as potentially effective.

Pakistan’s economic and strategic links to the Gulf and wider Middle East, including energy dependence, labour migration and regional stability concerns, mean that prolonged conflict could impose economic and internal security costs. These factors are seen as motivating Islamabad to support a ceasefire and continued dialogue.

At the same time, Pakistan faces domestic political and economic pressures. Amid political tensions and the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, the government is seen by some analysts as seeking to reduce both international and internal pressure through diplomatic engagement involving the United States.

Economic challenges are also a factor. Observers say Pakistan may hope that mediation efforts could contribute to improved relations with Washington and potential financial support from international and regional partners.

Pakistan also has defence ties with Saudi Arabia, which could create expectations of support in the event of escalation. Some analysts suggest that Pakistan has sought to avoid direct involvement in a broader conflict while emphasising a mediating role.

For Iran, Pakistan may not be the preferred mediator, but options are limited. Iranian tensions with several Arab states and the security environment in the region have reduced alternative channels. As a result, Tehran has also accepted Pakistan’s mediation role.

Role Of Security Institutions
In such a crisis, the role of security institutions has become more prominent. Reports suggest that Pakistan’s powerful army chief, Asim Munir, is viewed in Washington as a key interlocutor, facilitating faster communication and decision-making.

Pakistan has previously played a role in facilitating sensitive diplomatic contacts, including historical backchannel efforts between major powers.

Reports indicate that direct communication between the Trump administration and Munir has contributed to accelerating aspects of the process. Observers note that Pakistan’s military leadership is seen as having influence in security commitments, relations with Iran, ties with Arab states and an interest in regional stability.

Why The Army Chief Is Central To Diplomacy
In this mediation effort, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff has emerged as a central figure rather than civilian leadership.

The military has decades of experience in maintaining contacts with US and regional security institutions. Officials say Munir has been involved in maintaining communication channels with both political and military figures in Washington and Tehran, particularly where security guarantees are considered important.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stated that Munir’s role in the negotiations was substantial, noting that Munir greeted the Iranian delegation at the airport in full Field Marshal uniform and the American delegation in Western civilian attire, sending a clear signal that Pakistan was guaranteeing the process not merely at the civilian government level, but at the level of the state’s security structure.

Following the imprisonment of former prime minister, Imran Khan, public criticism of the military increased in Pakistan. Some analysts suggest Munir’s role in mediation may also reflect efforts to strengthen the institution’s standing.

A source within the prime minister’s office told Afghanistan International that, after the first round of talks, the office of President Donald Trump contacted Munir multiple times. The claim could not be independently verified.

This suggests that Pakistan’s army chief is acting as an indirect proxy for the United States and serves as a key conduit for messages. However, Pakistan’s political institutions and parties are uneasy with this role, fearing that a successful negotiation would further empower the military and bring an already weakened civilian political system under its shadow.

After the first round of negotiations, Munir travelled to Tehran to support preparations for further talks and convey messages and proposals.

Prospects For Mediation Success
Although the first round of talks did not produce an agreement, continued diplomatic efforts and global economic pressures, particularly those linked to the Strait of Hormuz, may increase the likelihood of partial progress.

Analysts suggest that a phased approach could improve prospects, including extending the ceasefire, establishing temporary arrangements for maritime security and allowing limited sanctions relief, followed by broader discussions on nuclear and regional issues.

Statements by Pakistani officials indicate active efforts to facilitate these stages. Islamabad hopes to reap the “sweetest fruit” from Washington and Tehran, as Iran has lost the capacity for a prolonged military confrontation with the US and seeks relief from sanctions weakening its economy, sanctions the US has also signaled willingness to ease.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration faces mounting domestic political and economic pressure, and Tehran has shown cautiously positive but conditional signals regarding US sanctions demands tied to its nuclear program. Consequently, optimism about successful negotiations has increased.

And if these negotiations succeed, another star will surely be added to General Asim Munir’s chest, alongside his Field Marshal insignia, as commander of an Islamic force that helped bring about global peace.

Pakistan has carried out multiple airstrikes in the provinces of Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika and Nangarhar, while the Taliban have responded with ground assaults and drone attacks.

The United Nations said 143 people were killed in a Pakistani airstrike on a drug treatment centre in Kabul, although the Taliban put the death toll at as many as 400.

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA, reported that from late February to the present, between 75 and 212 Afghan civilians have been killed, with hundreds more wounded.

A key question remains: if civilians are being hit, why is Pakistan not targeting the Taliban’s senior leadership?

What is Pakistan’s Calculated Approach to War?

Based on strategies previously used against leadership figures in Iran, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, and al-Qaida, eliminating leaders in ideologically driven militant groups often leads to the rapid emergence of successors who may be even more radical and harder to contain.

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Retired Pakistani General Inam-ul-Haq said Islamabad is not pursuing an all-out war against the Taliban, but is instead applying what he described as “calibrated” pressure. According to him, Pakistan is deliberately avoiding direct strikes on Taliban leaders and is not cutting ties with the ruling authorities. Instead, it is focusing on weapons depots, mid-level commanders and border posts in an effort to keep the Taliban under sustained pressure.

Haq said Pakistan does not want to cross a “red line” that could turn the conflict into a full-scale crisis.

He said one of Islamabad’s concerns is that killing senior Taliban leaders could create a power vacuum in Afghanistan, widen the conflict and further destabilise Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, making both provinces harder to control.

Pakistan’s assessment, he said, is that the Taliban do not have a well-organised replacement leadership, and that the loss of top figures could endanger the wider region. Foreign militant groups now operating under Taliban influence could expand their activities into China, Central Asia and Pakistan itself if the Taliban leadership were removed.

For that reason, one option for Islamabad is to seek co-operation from within the Taliban and among aligned groups.

Haq said Pakistan is also monitoring networks of influence inside the Taliban. Groups such as the Haqqani network are viewed as relatively close, while greater pressure is being applied to other factions that have more limited co-ordination with Pakistan. Most of the areas targeted in Pakistani airstrikes lie outside Haqqani Network’s influence, he said.

Local sources say many Taliban fighters deployed along the Durand Line are from Kandahar and aligned with Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, with little involvement from the Haqqani network. One reason, they say, is that Hibatullah has appointed many loyalists in districts in south-western Afghanistan to military and government posts.

Haq views this distribution of power within the Taliban as part of an “internal balance” policy that helps preserve the group’s structure.

Several Afghan analysts share a similar assessment, interpreting Pakistan’s decision to spare the Taliban leadership as a deliberate choice.

Military Analysts’ Perspective

Azim Rahimi, a former professor at Kabul University and an expert in military affairs, said targeting the Taliban leadership remains an option for Pakistan, but one that is neither used constantly nor immediately.

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“Pakistan will only use this option when there is a ‘need’ and a ‘political and security calculation’,” he said. “At this time, Pakistan does not genuinely seek the fall of the Taliban regime, but is instead applying limited pressure.”

He added that regional experience from past wars in Iraq and Afghanistan shows that toppling a ruling system can create long-term crises.

Why Are TTP Leaders Not Being Targeted?

From February 27 to March 13, Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan primarily targeted Taliban border posts, brigades, battalions, and arms and ammunition centres.

Retired Pakistani Brigadier Mahmood Shah said the main driver of Pakistan’s conflict with the Taliban is the activity of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP. After the Taliban returned to power, he said, attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas increased, including assaults on military bases and police, as well as attempts to seize border posts, deepening Islamabad’s concerns.

He said Pakistan initially tried to negotiate with the Taliban, but turned to airstrikes after those efforts failed.

However, Pakistani Taliban leaders, whose presence Islamabad has used to justify its operations, have not been targeted, or at least no evidence of such strikes has been shared with the media.

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Sources in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas told Afghanistan International that some TTP leaders returned to their areas of influence in Pakistan at the same time as the attacks in Afghanistan. They also said signs of TTP activity and influence have increased near cities including Peshawar, Bannu, Lakki Marwat and Mardan.

That has raised further questions about the true targets of Pakistan’s airstrikes.

If Pakistani militants were the main target, why were strikes carried out at Bagram Airfield, in Kabul, and against Afghan brigades where there is no known TTP presence and no confirmed bases?

Many analysts believe Islamabad is seeking to destroy American weapons in Afghanistan, a goal they say aligns with joint US-Pakistan interests.

US Weapons In Afghanistan

Official US reports show that from 2004 to 2016, the United States supplied the Afghan National Army and police with 599,690 firearms, including light and heavy weapons. Most were light arms, including 358,530 rifles such as M16s, M4s and sniper rifles.

During the same period, 16,191 support devices were also delivered, including night-vision goggles, communication monitors, small reconnaissance drones such as the ScanEagle, and surveillance balloons. The overwhelming majority were night-vision goggles, totalling 16,035 units.

In aviation, a total of 208 aircraft were delivered to Afghan security forces between 2004 and 2016. They included 110 MI-17 and MD-530 helicopters, 60 transport aircraft, including the C-208, C-128, C-130, T-182, G-222 and AN-32, 20 A-29 attack aircraft and 18 PC-12 reconnaissance planes.

In addition, the US supplied 75,898 vehicles, including Rangers, Humvees, lorries and tanks. Of those, 42,604 were Rangers and 22,174 were Humvees, making them the most widely used. Some of the vehicles later became inoperable because of explosives, suicide attacks or prolonged use.

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Over the past five years, Pakistan has repeatedly complained to the UN Security Council about US weapons left behind by Afghan forces and the United States, saying some of them ended up in the hands of TTP fighters.

Taliban Mediation And Relations With Pakistan

The Taliban government has officially acknowledged mediating negotiations twice between Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and Pakistan, saying the process had reached 90 percent progress. However, it said changes in Pakistan’s military leadership and the fall of Imran Khan’s government disrupted those efforts.

A significant faction within the Taliban sees Pakistan’s top military leadership as an obstacle to relations, referring to them as the “special circle”. Members of that faction believe the new Pakistani military leadership opposes talks with armed Pakistani groups and instead pushes them towards taking up arms.

Those uncertainties, combined with the fact that neither TTP leaders nor Taliban leaders have been targeted, have fuelled conspiracy theories about the Taliban-Pakistan conflict.

Political analyst Roshan Karwar described the crisis as a “manufactured war”, arguing that external threats can sometimes help strengthen states. He said Pakistani airstrikes on Kabul gave the Taliban an opportunity to build public support. He added that the fact TTP and Taliban leaders have been spared lends weight to the theory of an engineered conflict.

Pakistan’s Recent Approach

Mohammad Fayyaz, a professor at Lahore University, described Pakistan’s foreign policy over the past two years as “co-ordinated and systematic”.

He said Pakistan does not want to trigger a new domestic or regional crisis, and is instead prioritising border security, economic support and avoiding steps that could threaten the survival of the Taliban regime.

He said expanding the war against the Taliban would fuel new waves of radicalisation. In his view, Islamabad is seeking to contain Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, as an immediate threat without challenging the Taliban’s overall hold on power.

Since the conflict began, however, trade routes between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been closed. The Taliban have shifted their trade focus towards Central Asia and India, while the border between the two countries has been marked by violence and disruption.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said the operations are part of Islamabad’s counterterrorism strategy. Analysts, however, say the actual targets remain unclear.

Although the strikes are publicly framed as an effort to contain the TTP threat, TTP leaders have not been targeted in practice, their Taliban supporters have been spared, civilian casualties have mounted, and tens of thousands of people have been displaced on both sides of the Durand Line.

The movement of residents out of the area, along with tightened security measures, could leave the border exposed to new waves of insecurity.

Analysts suggest several possible explanations. One is that Pakistan has not yet finalised its strategy and is still testing pressure tactics. Another is that its real objectives are more complex, and more concealed, than officially stated.