The operation followed the temporary seizure of Yaftal district on 17 July 2026 by Sepaheyan-e-Maihan (“Soldiers of the Motherland”), a newly emerged local armed group.
For the first time in almost five years since the Taliban returned to power, an opposition group—in this case, the AFF—not only captured territory from the Taliban but also held it while successfully repelling multiple.
As the Taliban approach five years of totalitarian rule, it has become increasingly evident that insurgency was far easier than providing effective and acceptable governance. They have failed in this regard while forcing people to accept their own interpretation of religion and way of life. The central question has always been whether such a system is sustainable. Although some may offer counterarguments, this article examines several key factors that support the argument that the Taliban's current model of governance is becoming increasingly unsustainable.
Internal Challenges
Contrary to the perception that the Taliban is a cohesive and unified movement, it is, in reality, a collection of smaller local forces led by regional commanders whose primary loyalty often lies with their own personal interests. The case of Jumma Fatih in Badakhshan demonstrated not only that a local commander's agenda could outweigh the orders of the so-called Supreme Leader, but also the Taliban leadership's inability to enforce its authority. Although Taliban leaders in Kandahar and Kabul explored various options to suppress this rebellion, they failed to achieve their objectives. Eventually, they resorted to negotiations and conceded to the local commander's demands.
Jumma Fatih represents only a relatively minor challenge compared with other, more influential commanders across the country who continue to support the regime only as long as their personal interests remain aligned with it. In reality, the Taliban functions as a coalition of various factions held together by a series of mutually beneficial arrangements.
Commanders such as Mawlawi Nooruddin, Qari Salahuddin, Makhdom Alem, and Mawlawi Najib of Raghestan are examples of influential figures who expected greater recognition and bigger share in power. Before the collapse of the former government, these commanders frequently complained about the concentration of power among senior Taliban leaders from Kandahar. Following the Taliban's return to power, these frustrations evolved into quieter but persistent grievances after they failed to receive the senior appointments they had anticipated.
Many of these commanders remain dissatisfied with the concentration of authority in Kandahar. Like Jumma Fatih, they could eventually challenge the leadership by disregarding orders from Haibatullah Akhundzada or by joining forces with other dissatisfied factions to form a coalition seeking to alter the status quo, if their personal interests are challenged.
These internal divisions are not limited to local commanders in Northern Afghanistan. There is also growing resentment among influential Pashtun commanders from the Ghilzai tribe, including members of the Haqqani network. Although the situation appears calm on the surface, resentment continues to build beneath it. Shir Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai has been the most outspoken representative of this camp, but he is far from alone. The Haqqanis have repeatedly said the leadership in Kandahar is testing their patience but this could run out soon. Many commanders in this camp are just waiting for an opportunity to capitalize on these divisions.
The Haqqanis were already frustrated before the take over of power in August, 2021. Having been appointed as the first deputy of the group after the appointment of Haibatullah as leader, the Haqqanis always struggled to raise their voice and have a meaningful impact over decision making. They were clearly outnumbered in the supreme leadership council by the Greater Kandahar members who would always act united and deny agendas raised by Sarajuddin Haqqani and a few others outside of the camp of Greater Kandahar.
Meanwhile AFF announced surge in operations against Taliban in Nuristan, Kunar and Takhar. In May AFF hit Taliban convoy in Soroubi District inside Kabul, hit a Taliban check post in Kapisa and in June attacked at Taliban camp in Waygal District, Nuristan, inflicting heavy casualties. There are activities conducted by smaller groups also in Kapisa, Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni & Zabul. Taliban sent reinforcement of around 1000 men from other provinces to Badakhshan in order to control deteriorating security situation. Taliban started weapon confiscation drive in Badakhshan and other Northern provinces in first week of July from the locals. Taliban even shuffled four senior military appointments in northern Afghanistan, primarily affecting Badakhshan province. Trusted commanders from Balkh and Jowzjan were brought into Badakhshan. All above measures indicate towards Taliban desperation. They believe threat is real and fear that development in North have potential to spiral outside of North Afghanistan which could collapse their rule.
Growing Regional Tensions
Multiple credible international reports indicate that Afghanistan under Taliban rule has become a safe haven for regional and international terrorist organizations that use Afghan territory to recruit fighters, conduct training, and plan attacks beyond Afghanistan's borders. The presence of groups such as Al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Jamaat Ansarullah of Tajikistan poses significant security concerns for neighbouring countries.
Although neighbouring states publicly appear to pursue different strategies, the issue remains a serious concern for their national security establishments.
Pakistan is undoubtedly the country most immediately affected by attacks carried out by the TTP from Afghan territory. Over time, however, other neighbouring countries may also face similar security challenges. The Taliban's policy of harbouring organizations regarded as security threats by neighbouring states is likely to deepen its international isolation and increase the likelihood that affected countries will eventually take action to address these threats. One sign of that isolation is that the European Union special Envoy for Afghanistan recently stated that Pakistan has a right to respond to Terrorist threats originating from Afghanistan.
Such policies expose Afghanistan and its people to consequences that majority of the Afghans would prefer to avoid. It is just the policy of an illegitimate group who do not represent Afghan people, yet it is the innocent people who pay the price as result of the actions taken by the affected states.
Nonetheless, support provided by the Taliban to the TTP and other militant organizations appears to extend beyond the actions of individual local commanders, despite occasional Taliban claims to the contrary. The appointment of Mullah Mohammadzai, the former shadow governor of Kandahar and Ghazni provinces, by Haibatullah to oversee these groups and report directly to him suggests a far more centralized policy. Pursuing such a strategy may ultimately shorten the regime's lifespan while bringing additional hardship to the Afghan people. The selection of MohammadZai to oversee the TTP has also been a deliberate action because he seems to have a deep resentment towards Pakistan, hence desperate to revenge. He belongs to the camp of late Akhtar Mansour’s friends who believe Pakistan assisted the United States in targeting Akhtar Mansour as he was on his way from Iran to Baluchistan province of Pakistan.
Political Miscalculation
There is little indication that the current Taliban leadership is prepared to abandon its support for the TTP.
The unsuccessful talks held in Türkiye , Saudi Arabia, China, and Qatar between Pakistani and Taliban delegations exposed what appears to have been a significant political miscalculation by the Taliban in addressing Pakistan's concerns.
The Taliban attempted to employ the same negotiating tactics they had used during the Doha negotiations with the United States. At that time, the United States was under growing domestic political pressure and determined to end its military involvement in Afghanistan. By prolonging negotiations, the Taliban gained leverage because Washington was operating under strict political and time constraints.
Pakistan, however, faces an entirely different situation. Unlike the United States, Pakistan is not leaving the region, nor is it constrained by a fixed deadline. Consequently, the Taliban's strategy of delaying negotiations is unlikely to produce similar results against a country that has had enough experience in bringing Regime changes in Afghanistan.
The manner of the US withdrawal may also have contributed to a degree of overconfidence within the Taliban leadership. However, the circumstances surrounding the American withdrawal were shaped by a unique combination of domestic political pressures and broader strategic considerations that do not necessarily apply to Pakistan, China, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan.
Growing Poverty, Unemployment, and Public Anger
On the surface, Afghanistan's economy has remained afloat through continued international humanitarian assistance, cash transfers made by the United States government, and an estimated $1.6 billion in annual remittances sent by Afghans living abroad to support their families.
Beneath this surface, however, unemployment remains widespread, dependence on humanitarian assistance continues to grow, major economic corridors remain disrupted, and long-term economic prospects remain bleak.
These economic hardships, combined with growing public anger over restrictions on girls' education and women's employment, create conditions that may encourage some individuals to organize spontaneous activities against Taliban or join armed resistance, including existing and newly emerging groups. There is no doubt that people always thought twice to raise their voice against a brutal regime that respects no law and their forces are allowed to resort to extrajudicial killing at will. However, when they realize that poverty will eventually kill them, unless they do something to liberate themselves, then all the fear evaporates.
Shortage of Operational Military Equipment
The increased activity of opposition groups will also place significant strain on the Taliban's heavy weapons and military equipment. Most of the helicopters and transport aircraft inherited from the former Afghan government require major overhauls before they can be fully operational. Budget shortages in critical sectors have left much of this equipment obsolete and increasingly difficult to maintain.
Moreover, many of the light weapons left behind by the former government have been looted from military depots, sold on the black market, or smuggled out of Afghanistan. The Taliban mistakenly believed that, following the signing of the memorandum of understanding with Russian government in May 2026, they would receive free assistance to repair heavy equipment and overhaul outdated aircraft. They soon discovered, however, that they would need to finance these costly repairs themselves.
According to several credible reports, their already limited fleet of helicopters and transport aircraft may have to be grounded within the next year due to a lack of resources and maintenance capacity.
Conclusion
The Afghanistan Freedom Front has broken the psychological barrier by demonstrating that it is possible not only to capture territory from the Taliban but also to hold it against repeated counterattacks. This effort could be reinforced by the entry of the National Resistance Front (NRF) and other like-minded groups on the battlefield.
Five years of suppression by Taliban Regime nearing completion. Corruption, nepotism and plundering of resources on the rise. Smuggling of gold, gemstones and Narco is rampant. Kandahari Taliban has established hegemony over all lucrative resources in Northern provinces having dislodged local land owners and local Taliban. The Taliban could have pursued a more inclusive and broadly accepted political settlement, potentially bringing an end to Afghanistan's long cycle of conflict. Instead, they chose to centralize power with all important appointments being held mainly by Kandahari Taliban and exclude large segments of the population.
The central argument is not that the Taliban's greatest vulnerability lies solely in military defeat. Rather, it lies in the gradual erosion of the political, economic, social, and regional foundations upon which Taliban 2.0 has built its rule. If these trends continue, they may ultimately prove more consequential than any single battlefield setback.
As financial resources continue to diminish, sustaining even a small fleet of aircraft and maintaining other heavy military equipment will become increasingly difficult. At the same time, the growing activities of opposition groups fighting to liberate the country from a tyrannical regime that has denied the rights of more than half of Afghanistan's population will present the Taliban with an unprecedented challenge. Unlike Taliban 1.0, this time they will have no place to hide.
Both AFF and Sepahian-e-Maihan had a good ice breaking session, but this will draw far larger numbers and groups to the ground in a bid to overthrow this brutal regime, restore justice and long-lasting peace and finally given the chance to people to live a decent life.
