Sources within the Taliban administration told Afghanistan International that Justice Minister Abdul Hakim Sharaei has ordered private broadcaster Shamshad TV to evacuate its building and hand it over to the Taliban administration.
According to the sources, Sharaei considers both the building and the land on which it stands to be state property.
Sources at Shamshad TV told Afghanistan International that part of the broadcaster’s premises had already been taken over by the Taliban-controlled Kabul municipality some time ago.
They said the Taliban Justice Minister had also blocked one of the entrances to the Shamshad TV building and closed several shops built on the property.
Sources said the land where Shamshad TV is located had been granted to the Omar Mine Clearance Organisation for 30 years during the former republic.
According to them, Fazl Karim Fazl, the owner of Shamshad TV, later built the broadcaster’s premises on the site, and a market was also constructed on part of the land in recent years.
Taliban sources allege that Fazl Karim Fazl, who also heads the Omar Mine Clearance Organisation, built the television premises and shops on the land in violation of the terms of the agreement.
According to the sources, the Taliban Justice Minister summoned Fazl Karim Fazl to the ministry and asked him to hand over the land associated with the Omar organisation to the Taliban administration.
However, a Shamshad TV official rejected the claim in comments to Afghanistan International, saying: “There is no such order.”
Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov says strengthening security along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan is a priority for Moscow’s defence and security policy.
He said Russia and Tajikistan maintain close military cooperation and that Russia’s military base in the country remains on alert to respond to external threats. Russia’s 201st Military Base is stationed in Tajikistan.
Speaking in Moscow on Tuesday, 8 September, at a ceremony marking the 35th anniversary of Tajikistan’s independence, Belousov said that Russia is actively expanding collective security formats within the CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Commonwealth of Independent States, with particular attention to strengthening Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan.
Belousov also described Tajikistan as a strategic partner of Russia.
His remarks follow high-level coordination between the two countries.
Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin told Tajik President Emomali Rahmon on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit that Moscow was aware of Dushanbe’s concerns about developments in Afghanistan and that the two countries remained in close contact on security issues.
Tajikistan has in recent months warned of security threats along its roughly 1,300-kilometre border with Afghanistan.
Dushanbe’s concerns increased after several security incidents in border areas, including armed and drone attacks late last year in which several Chinese citizens and workers were killed or wounded. Tajik officials have linked the attackers to armed groups based in Afghanistan.
Since the Taliban returned to power, Moscow and Dushanbe have further strengthened their security cooperation, while Russia has repeatedly warned of the risk of instability and terrorist threats spreading from Afghanistan into Central Asia.
The Collective Security Treaty Organisation has also put forward a comprehensive programme to strengthen the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and plans to provide military and technical equipment to improve Tajikistan’s border security capabilities.
The energy agreements signed between the Taliban’s Ministry of Mines & Petroleum and Saudi company Delta are among the most ambitious energy plans announced for Afghanistan in recent years.
The programme begins with oil and gas exploration in western Afghanistan, examines the use of gas for industry and power generation in Herat and, if successful, could lead to a roughly 700-kilometre pipeline from Herat towards the Pakistani border.
The Taliban’s Ministry of Mines & Petroleum has valued the Kushk–Tirpul contract at $200 million. Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban administration’s deputy prime minister for economic affairs; Mines & Petroleum Minister Hedayatullah Badri; central bank governor Noor Ahmad Agha; Taliban Spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid; and former US special envoy for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad attended the signing ceremony.
However, the programme presented by Delta is considerably larger than the initial contract. The company has described an integrated programme with potential investment capacity of up to around $50 billion over 25 years.
That figure does not represent guaranteed or pre-financed investment. The larger phases of the project depend on exploration results, confirmation of commercially recoverable reserves, technical and economic studies, the existence of a market, financing and subsequent investment decisions.
The central question is whether Afghanistan under Taliban rule can take such a programme beyond contracts and studies to commercial production and the construction of multibillion-dollar infrastructure.
Kushk–Tirpul: Geological Potential, Not Proven Reserves
The core of the Taliban-Delta agreement is oil and gas exploration in Kushk–Tirpul in western Afghanistan.
According to information released by Delta, the project area covers about 23,317 square kilometres. Planned activities include geological and geophysical studies, seismic surveys, exploratory drilling and reservoir assessment.
Kushk and Tirpul are not entirely unexplored areas in terms of oil and gas. In a 2009 assessment, the US Geological Survey estimated the Tirpul study area at about 8,700 square kilometres. That figure refers to the area examined in the USGS study and should not be confused with the much larger area covered by the new Kushk–Tirpul contract.
The same assessment estimated mean undiscovered resources in Tirpul at around 21.55 million barrels of oil, 44.76 billion cubic feet of natural gas and about 0.91 million barrels of natural gas liquids.
But these figures refer to undiscovered resources, not proven or commercial reserves. Exploratory drilling will be required to determine how much oil and gas actually exists and what proportion can be extracted technically and economically.
Previous studies recorded indications of oil, including leakage from an abandoned well in Tirpul, but no significant commercial production has yet been reported from the basin. Earlier efforts to collect seismic data in Kushk also faced security, technical and operational difficulties.
Delta’s first real test, therefore, will be proving the existence of reserves large enough to justify further major investment.
From Exploration to Pipeline: Three Parts of Delta’s Programme
Delta’s announced programme has three main components.
The first is exploration and, if successful, the development and production of oil and gas from Kushk–Tirpul. This phase would form the basis for the rest of the programme.
The second is a study of how gas could be used in Herat. Delta is expected to examine the possibility of supplying gas to Herat city, its industrial park, power generation facilities and other industrial users. If usable resources are discovered, Herat’s domestic market could become the first consumer.
The third component is a proposed roughly 700-kilometre pipeline from near Guzara in Herat to the vicinity of Spin Boldak in Kandahar.
Delta has named the proposal the “CentGas – Corridor of Prosperity”. The name appears in information released by the company about the new agreements, but the pipeline remains at the study stage, and construction has not been approved.
The potential cost of this section has been put at around $10 billion. Its implementation would depend on sufficient resources being discovered, feasibility studies, financing, permits and a final investment decision.
Such a pipeline would also require a sufficiently large market for gas consumption or exports. That brings Pakistan and wider South Asian markets into the project’s economic calculations.
The $200 million contract, the proposed $10 billion pipeline and the potential $50 billion programme are therefore three different levels of a long-term plan and should not be presented as a single financial commitment.
Delta and Khalilzad: Two Names Reappear Together After Three Decades
One political aspect of the new agreement is its similarity to efforts nearly three decades ago to establish a gas corridor through Afghanistan.
In 1997, a consortium called CentGas was formed to build a pipeline carrying Turkmen gas through Afghanistan to Pakistan. US company Unocal, with a 46.5 per cent stake, led the consortium, while Saudi firm Delta Oil, with a 15 per cent share, was one of its main partners.
From the outset, CentGas was not merely an economic project. The route for transporting Turkmen gas through Afghanistan to Pakistan formed part of wider competition over Central Asian energy corridors. It could have reduced the region’s dependence on Russian transit networks while keeping Iran out of a potential gas route to South Asia.
At the time, Unocal was also competing with the Argentine company Bridas to advance the project.
However, Afghanistan’s political and security conditions prevented the project from being implemented, and Unocal withdrew from the consortium in 1998. The idea of transporting Turkmen gas through Afghanistan later continued in the form of the TAPI pipeline project.
Zalmay Khalilzad provides another link between that period and today’s agreement. In the 1990s, while working with Cambridge Energy Research Associates, he worked on political-risk issues concerning Afghan projects for Unocal.
Nearly three decades later, Khalilzad attended a contract-signing ceremony in Kabul that once again brought the names Delta and CentGas into discussions about Afghanistan’s energy sector.
His involvement was not limited to the signing ceremony. Before the contract was signed, Khalilzad and Delta’s chief executive also attended meetings with Taliban officials on gas exploration, extraction and pipeline development.
This history does not mean that the dynamics of the 1990s are being repeated, but the new project also has political and regional dimensions worth considering, particularly if the proposed route is eventually linked to Pakistan, TAPI or wider South Asian markets.
However, no credible public document has so far identified Khalilzad as a shareholder, director or employee of Delta.
The US State Department told Afghanistan International: “Zalmay Khalilzad is not an employee of the United States government. Therefore, he does not represent the US government and conducts all of his activities in a personal capacity.”
Jennifer Murtazashvili, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, said Khalilzad’s repeated presence could raise questions about whether he has a private or advisory role, but should not be interpreted as evidence of US government support for the project.
A distinction must also be made between a private Saudi company and the Saudi government. Delta’s contract does not mean that the Saudi government or its sovereign funds have committed $50 billion to the project.
If the project reaches multibillion-dollar phases, a central question will be which banks, technical partners and financing sources Delta can bring on board.
How Is the New ‘CentGas’ Connected to TAPI?
The return of the CentGas name is particularly significant given Delta’s previous proposals concerning the TAPI project.
According to remarks by Abdul Ghani Baradar during a meeting with Turkmen officials, Delta had proposed participating in TAPI before the new agreement was signed. Its proposals included long-term purchases of Turkmen gas, investment to increase capacity at the Galkynysh gas field and construction of a pipeline from Guzara in Herat to Spin Boldak.
The same proposal also referred to the possibility of extending the line, under a separate agreement with Pakistan, towards the Indian border and the port of Gwadar.
These proposals suggest that the Guzara–Spin Boldak route forms part of Delta’s broader vision for the regional energy market. However, the new project cannot yet be considered an official part of TAPI.
Under TAPI, the main source of gas is Turkmenistan and Afghanistan serves as a transit route. Under Delta’s new programme, the first objective is to discover potential Afghan gas resources and use some of them in the domestic market.
There is also no announced agreement formally linking the new pipeline to TAPI or committing Pakistan to buying or transporting the gas.
For now, the connection between the two projects is a strategic possibility rather than a confirmed element of the agreement.
How Was the Contract Awarded to Delta?
The process through which the project was awarded has also raised questions.
In 2023, the Taliban’s Mines & Petroleum Ministry issued a request for expressions of interest for Kushk and Tirpul, saying the contract would be awarded through an open, transparent and competitive process. Applicants were required to demonstrate their legal, financial and technical capacity, and a timetable was set for later bidding stages.
However, in the ministry’s publicly available archive, the full chain of documents from subsequent stages, including the list of qualified companies, assessment results and documents explaining Delta’s selection, is not easily accessible.
This does not prove that legal procedures were not followed. However, for a project with potential value in the billions of dollars, it is important to clarify when Delta entered the process, which companies it competed against and on what basis it was selected.
China’s investment experience in Afghanistan also shows that signing a contract does not guarantee implementation.
Chinese companies with far greater financial and technical resources entered projects such as Mes Aynak copper and Amu Darya oil, but both faced delays and disputes. In 2025, the Taliban cancelled a 25-year Amu Darya oil contract with a Chinese company, accusing it of failing to meet its commitments.
Pakistan and Iran: Two Regional Variables
The proposed route’s arrival near Spin Boldak would make Pakistan an important factor in the project’s future.
If the pipeline is used only to transport gas within Afghanistan, it could remain a domestic project. But to become a regional corridor, cooperation with Pakistan and access to a market beyond the border would be essential.
This comes at a time when Taliban-Pakistan relations are strained over the TTP and wider security disputes.
Murtazashvili believes the presence of Saudi investment could create some space for mediation, but fundamental security disputes will not be resolved by an economic project alone.
Iran may also follow the project closely. Herat has extensive trade, fuel, electricity and transit links with Iran, and any project capable of supplying part of western Afghanistan’s energy demand from another source could, over time, affect Tehran’s economic influence in the region.
If Saudi investment in Afghanistan’s energy sector expands and the Herat–Kandahar–Pakistan route develops into a genuine energy corridor, some form of geopolitical competition between Iran and Gulf actors in Afghanistan could emerge, particularly over economic influence, transit routes and access to energy markets.
However, the Taliban currently maintains active official relations with Tehran, and Iran remains one of Afghanistan’s major economic partners.
Delta is also a private Saudi company, and there is still no indication of direct Saudi government involvement in the project.
It is therefore premature to speak of definite Iran-Saudi competition over the project at this stage, although the potential for such rivalry could grow if the programme expands.
The Challenge of Legitimacy and Contract Durability
Even if substantial reserves are discovered, the project’s risks will not be limited to geology.
International recognition of the Taliban government remains very limited, and several Taliban leaders remain under sanctions. This does not make foreign investment impossible, but it creates legal and political risks for banks, insurers and international companies.
For a 25-year contract, another important question is how a future Afghan government might treat long-term agreements signed by the Taliban.
Annie Pforzheimer, a former deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Kabul, told Afghanistan International that the Delta agreement indicates that a Saudi company ultimately wants a role in Afghanistan’s energy market, but actual exploration or production may still be years away.
Pforzheimer said: “I very strongly question whether a ruling group that lacks legitimacy should be allowed to sell the natural resources of the Afghan nation.”
She said she expected any future Afghan government to review this contract and similar agreements to determine whether they had genuinely benefited the Afghan people.
The possibility of a future review could itself become a commercial risk for a 25-year investment.
From a $200 Million Contract to a $50 Billion Dream
For now, the Delta agreement represents the beginning of a long process rather than the arrival of $50 billion in investment in Afghanistan.
Exploratory drilling must first be completed and commercially viable reserves confirmed. If successful, using gas in Herat could be the next practical step.
Building a pipeline and transforming it into a regional corridor would be more difficult, requiring capital, technical partners, markets and cooperation from regional countries.
The political significance of the agreement is no less important than its economic dimension.
The return of the Delta and CentGas names after nearly three decades, Khalilzad’s presence and efforts to connect potential energy resources in western Afghanistan to South Asian markets all tie the project to broader regional dynamics.
For the Taliban, the agreement is also an opportunity to demonstrate that, despite very limited international recognition, it can attract foreign investors.
But signing a contract is the easiest stage of such a project.
Its fate will be determined not by the $50 billion figure, but by the results of initial surveys and drilling, Delta’s ability to attract financing and technical partners, the existence of a market for the gas, and the durability of the project’s political and regional framework.
If those stages succeed, Afghanistan could shift from being primarily a transit country in historical projects such as CentGas and TAPI to becoming a producer, consumer and transit route for energy.
If they do not, the new CentGas project could, like several major projects before it, remain little more than a plan and an agreement.
The execution of Afghan citizens in Iran has risen sharply in recent years. Human rights groups say Iran has executed at least 23 Afghan nationals since the start of 2026.
According to figures compiled by rights organisations, Iran has executed nearly 190 Afghan citizens over roughly the past three years, including 80 in 2024, 84 in 2025 and 23 so far this year.
Most were sentenced to death in drug-related cases, while others faced charges including murder, espionage and participation in anti-government protests in Iran.
Human rights organisations have also raised concerns about the transparency of judicial proceedings in some cases involving Afghan citizens and whether defendants had adequate access to legal representation.
On Sunday, the Iran-based Hengaw Human Rights Organisation reported that Iranian authorities had executed 29-year-old Afghan citizen Valijan Nourzay, who had a disability, at Rafsanjan Central Prison in Kerman province while he was sitting in a wheelchair. He had been sentenced to death over his alleged involvement in a murder case.
Nourzay was shot by police during his arrest three years ago, leaving him unable to walk. According to Hengaw, he was from Afghanistan’s Farah province and was executed on the morning of Wednesday, 2 September 2026, at Rafsanjan Central Prison in Kerman province.
Hengaw had also reported several days earlier that Iran executed two other Afghan citizens, Ansar Nami, 52, and Nazif Rasoulkhandeh, 46, at Vakilabad Prison in Mashhad on charges of premeditated murder.
The report also gave 2 September as the date of their executions. Hengaw said the executions were carried out secretly and that their families were denied a final visit.
Human rights organisations say the actual number of executions may be higher because some are not officially announced. Reports indicate that a significant number have taken place at Adelabad Central Prison in Shiraz, Taybad Prison, Yazd Prison and Dastgerd Prison in Isfahan.
Iran Human Rights has also reported several executions of Afghan nationals this year that were not announced by Iranian officials or state media.
On 21 June, two Afghan citizens, Mirwais Khalilzad and Ibrahim Ahmadshahi, were executed in Shiraz in drug-related cases. Iranian authorities and media have so far released no information about their executions.
Afser Shah-Ahmadi, Safaei and Sadruddin Ahmadzad were also sentenced to death in July for alleged involvement in setting fire to a police facility.
On 20 August, Iran Human Rights reported that Qaem Hosseini, a 21-year-old Afghan citizen, had been executed at Isfahan Central Prison. His case was linked to anti-government protests in January, and he was among the defendants in the “Meydan-e Alikhani” case.
Iran Human Rights said Hosseini was the second Afghan citizen executed in connection with the case. Gul Mohammad Mohammadi had previously been executed over the same case.
Concerns Over Transparency of Executions
The United Nations and international human rights organisations have raised concerns not only over the executions of Afghan citizens but also over the fairness of the judicial proceedings against them.
Iran Human Rights says that in some cases defendants had limited access to defence lawyers, while some were also denied a final visit with their families.
According to the organisation’s 2025 report, a large proportion of executions in Iran were carried out in cases where defendants faced serious problems in exercising their rights to a fair trial, legal defence and access to a lawyer.
Iran Human Rights says at least 111 Afghan citizens have been executed in Iran for drug-related offences alone since 2021. Sixteen Afghan nationals were executed in 2022, rising to 25 in 2023 and 80 in 2024.
At least 84 executions of Afghan citizens were recorded in 2025.
The figures show that at least 164 Afghan nationals were executed in Iranian prisons in 2024 and 2025 alone. With another 23 recorded executions in the first eight months of 2026, the total rises to at least 187.
Human rights organisations stress, however, that the figures are not final because no comprehensive official data on the executions of Afghan citizens has been published.
The Taliban has so far not announced any specific response or action over the executions of these Afghan citizens.
Sources told Afghanistan International that Taliban forces detained several members of the Hazara and Shia Elders’ Public Relations Office in Kabul after surrounding the organisation’s office in western Kabul on Sunday.
According to the sources, those detained include Sayed Sufi Gardizi, head of the Hazara and Shia Elders’ Public Relations Office; Sayed Hassan Sharif Balkhabi and Hussain Sangardost, two former members of parliament; two guards; three visitors; and the organisation’s cook.
Hazara and Shia elders held a meeting on Sunday, 6 September, at the organisation’s office in Kabul’s Karte Seh area to discuss developments related to Khatam al-Nabieen seminary.
According to the sources, the operation was intended to detain all participants in Sunday’s meeting of Hazara and Shia elders.
Sources said that during the meeting, the Taliban governor of Kabul called Gardizi and asked him to leave the gathering and go to the governor’s office. They said the governor then advised Gardizi to visit the office of Abdul Hakim Sharei, the Taliban’s Justice Minister, but he was detained after going to the ministry.
Minutes after the meeting ended, armed forces linked to the Taliban Justice Minister raided the Hazara and Shia Elders’ Public Relations Office and detained those who remained inside.
Mohammad Akbari, deputy head of the Afghanistan Shia Ulema Council, and Sayed Hussain Alami Balkhi, a member of the council, were also present at Sunday’s meeting but had left the office before Taliban forces carried out the raid.
Sources said Taliban forces intended to detain all those who attended the meeting and that other participants could also be detained separately.
According to the sources, the Taliban cited a recent statement by Hazara and Shia elders opposing Abdul Hakim Sharei’s actions as the reason for the arrests.
Last month, a number of Shia clerics, politicians and Hazara and Shia elders held a joint meeting and called on the Taliban to stop what they described as the Justice Minister’s “arbitrary actions”.
They called for the reversal of the decision to confiscate Omid-e Sabz township, the reopening of Tamadon TV, Khatam al-Nabieen seminary and other Shia religious schools, and an end to what they described as discriminatory treatment of ethnic and religious communities.
The Afghanistan Shia Ulema Council, the High Commission of Shias and the Hazara and Shia Elders’ Public Relations Office are separate organisations operating in Kabul that occasionally hold joint meetings. Sunday’s gathering was held at the Public Relations Office.
The Taliban has not yet officially provided details about the number of detainees, where they are being held or the accusations against them.
On August 20, 2026, National Resistance Front (NRF) commander Hasib Panjshiri was ambushed alongside members of his group in northern Salang, in Afghanistan's Parwan province, while traveling toward Andarab district in neighboring Baghlan.
Among those killed with him were Commander Romal Panjshiri and Commander Atiq Andarabi.
Hasib and his team believed they were on their way to meet Taliban commanders who had become dissatisfied with the regime. The meeting was intended to explore cooperation and coordinated operations against the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. They never made it. The Taliban knew Hasib was coming.
The circumstances surrounding Hasib's death show that the Taliban had information about his planned meeting, his movements, and the route he intended to take before he reached Salang. His killing was not a chance battlefield encounter. It was the result of a Taliban intelligence operation that used compromised contacts inside the resistance network to track his movements and position forces along his route.
The operation involved the Taliban's General Directorate of Intelligence, or GDI, and the Special Forces Command of the Taliban Ministry of Defense. At the center of it was the network surrounding Mullah Juma Fateh, a dissatisfied Taliban commander arrested on August 16, whose detention gave Taliban intelligence an opening into opposition networks operating across northern Afghanistan.
The Juma Fateh Network
Before his arrest, Juma Fateh and members of his network had developed contacts with the NRF, including resistance members inside Afghanistan and contacts in Tehran. Those relationships became an intelligence opportunity for the Taliban after Fateh was arrested.
The GDI and Taliban Special Forces moved against several of Fateh's close associates in Badakhshan, including Commander Mohammad Hanif Mohammadi, Zarqawi Mujahid, and Qari Nazim Amini. All three had established relationships with anti-Taliban elements and gained access to resistance networks operating in Panjshir, Baghlan, and Parwan, including individuals associated with Hasib Panjshiri.
Rather than keep the three in custody, the Taliban turned them. They were offered amnesty and protection of their existing positions in exchange for cooperating with the GDI and Taliban Special Forces. After their release in the Nasi and Darwaz districts, they continued presenting themselves as dissatisfied Taliban commanders while providing information on resistance members, their activities, and their locations.
That arrangement allowed the three men to maintain the relationships they had already built with the resistance while quietly turning those relationships into an intelligence channel for the Taliban. One of those relationships would lead directly to Hasib Panjshiri.
The Operation Against Hasib
One of Hasib's close associates was communicating directly with Qari Nazim Amini and shared details about Hasib's planned movement toward Baghlan. Hasib's group was attempting to reach an understanding with members of Juma Fateh's network who appeared to remain dissatisfied with Taliban leadership. The plan was to meet in Andarab and discuss coordinated operations against the Taliban, including efforts to challenge Taliban control over major routes leading north toward Badakhshan and Panjshir.
But Qari Nazim was providing intelligence to the Taliban. He passed information about Hasib's planned movement to Mullah Mohibullah, also known as Nasrat Haji Lala, a Taliban Special Forces commander, and Qari Mohammad Sediq Mukhlis, head of the GDI intelligence directorate in Parwan province.
At the same time, Hasib received information through Qari Nazim's network indicating that the route through Parwan was secure. Based on those assurances, he continued toward Andarab believing he was going to meet Taliban commanders associated with Juma Fateh who remained dissatisfied with the regime and had neither been arrested nor surrendered alongside Fateh.
Taliban Special Forces under Mullah Mohibullah deployed to the Salang area of Parwan province and positioned themselves along Hasib's route. When Hasib and his men reached the area, Taliban forces intercepted them. A firefight followed, killing Hasib, Commander Romal Panjshiri, Commander Atiq Andarabi, and other members of the group.
The operation had begun long before the first shot was fired in Salang. The compromised network gave Taliban intelligence access to Hasib's plans while information flowing back through that same network gave him the confidence to continue the trip. The network remains in place.
The Intelligence Operation Continues
The three men who helped give the Taliban access to Hasib's network remain active in the Darwaz and Nasi areas. Mohammad Hanif Mohammadi, Zarqawi Mujahid, and Qari Nazim Amini continue presenting themselves as opponents of the Taliban while collecting information on commanders, personnel, locations, and activities connected to the NRF and Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF). That information then moves through Mawlawi Abdul Khaybar Nizami, the military official in Arghanjkhwa, Badakhshan, and a Tajik Taliban commander who formerly supported Juma Fateh but now works for Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat, Chief of the General Staff of the Taliban Ministry of Defense.
For resistance groups operating in northern Afghanistan, the problem is larger than these three men. A Taliban commander who genuinely breaks with the regime could provide valuable intelligence, access, recruits, or even a potential partner for future operations. That makes identifying real divisions within the Taliban important, but it also creates an opportunity for the GDI to exploit. By keeping compromised commanders in place as supposed opponents of the regime, the GDI and Taliban Special Forces can turn what could be a valuable opportunity for the resistance into a way to identify and target its people and networks.
The operation against Hasib is not the only recent example of the GDI using deception to penetrate anti-Taliban resistance networks. In another operation, a covert GDI intelligence officer named Ehsanullah Farahi has been operating under the name Commander Shahin Aseman, presenting himself as a member and representative of the AFF. His role has been to identify former Afghan military personnel and members of resistance fronts, verify their identities and affiliations, and help facilitate their arrests.
The deception went as far as staging a fake phone call involving a supposed conversation between the AFF and Juma Fateh. Farahi participated in the call while someone was presented as Fateh, creating the appearance of a legitimate connection between the resistance and Fateh's network. The ruse did not have the consequences of the operation against Hasib, but it shows the same GDI tactic: manufacture credibility, create what appears to be a trusted connection, and use that access to identify people inside the resistance.
The Tehran Connection
The intelligence picture also extends beyond Afghanistan. A coordination office in Tehran for former Afghan military personnel was involved in some of Hasib's plans and works primarily with Tajiks and other non-Pashtun former security personnel living in Iran. One of its main functions is to help them obtain residency permits and prevent their deportation to Afghanistan, where they could fall into Taliban hands.
The office was previously headed by Ikramuddin Sari, who was later assassinated. It is now led by Khoja Mahboob Saiqi, who operates under the cover of serving as the representative of Atta Muhammad Noor.
Saiqi provides another connection back to the network surrounding Juma Fateh. He has been involved in establishing links with members of Fateh's network while making false claims about some of those contacts. He has also traveled to Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif to meet with the GDI, including Directorate 197.
At the same time, Saiqi's position gives him access to former Afghan military personnel who rely on the Tehran coordination office. Information collected through that access is shared with both Directorate 197 and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO). The office is also indirectly used to recruit fighters for the resistance, making that access particularly valuable. An office intended to help protect former Afghan military personnel from deportation and the Taliban has also become an intelligence collection point.
Sari's own assassination shows where that access can lead. His killing was the result of coordination between the Taliban's GDI and IRGC’s Unit 840. The operation was jointly overseen by Mawlawi Abdul Jamil Abid, then head of Directorate 197, and Mohammad Jafar Shahlai, a senior commander within Unit 840. Directorate 197 is formally the Taliban's Foreign Relations Directorate, but it also serves a covert action role for the GDI. Its relationship with the IRGC gives the Taliban access to former Afghan military personnel and resistance-linked networks operating inside Iran.
That relationship continues. Mullah Abdul Jabbar Shahidmal, the new head of Directorate 197, has made a handful of official trips to Moscow and Tehran since March 2026. A central purpose of his travel to Tehran has been monitoring former Afghan military personnel living in Iran and setting them up for assassination. For former Afghan military personnel who fled to Iran, leaving Afghanistan has not put them beyond the Taliban's reach.
What Hasib's Killing Reveals
Hasib's killing shows that the Taliban is not simply trying to defeat the resistance on the battlefield. It is using counterintelligence to penetrate it from within. The GDI is exploiting real divisions inside the Taliban, creating false ones when necessary, and using supposed defectors and trusted intermediaries to gain access to resistance networks. For the NRF and AFF, identifying Taliban commanders who genuinely break with the regime could provide valuable opportunities. The challenge is determining which divisions are real and which have been manufactured by the GDI.
Hasib's killing demonstrates the cost of getting that assessment wrong. The Taliban did not find him by searching the mountains of northern Afghanistan. It penetrated the network around him and waited for him to arrive. The next resistance commander reaching out to a supposed Taliban defector could be walking into the same operation.