On International Day of Democracy, assessments by major international organisations show that Afghanistan under Taliban rule ranks at the bottom of global democracy tables after a historic collapse in political and civil rights.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s annual Democracy Index shows Afghanistan’s score fell from 2.85 in 2020 to 0.32 in 2021, and then to 0.25 in both 2024 and 2025, a decline of nearly 89%, reflecting the dismantling of mechanisms based on public will and the rule of law.
Meanwhile, Freedom House, in its 2026 report, classified Afghanistan as “Not Free”, giving it just 8 points out of 100. The organisation awarded Afghanistan only 1 point out of 40 for political rights and 7 out of 60 for civil liberties.
According to the report, key indicators, including the election of the country’s leader and parliament, the existence of a transparent electoral framework, political party activity, the ability of opposition groups to win through political processes, media freedom, judicial independence and access to a fair trial, are all at their lowest levels.
A Vote With No Ballot Box
In democratic systems, elections are the main mechanism through which citizens participate in determining the political structure of their country. But after the Taliban returned to power, electoral commissions were dissolved in late 2021 and national elections were removed from the political agenda.
At the same time, political parties were banned across the country, eliminating the legal basis for political competition.
This structural change has taken place despite continued public interest in participating in decisions about Afghanistan’s political future.
The results of a field study involving 400 respondents in six Afghan provinces found that 91.5% supported elections as a method for choosing the country’s leadership.
Shahim Ahmadi, a university lecturer and political science expert, told Afghanistan International that the weaknesses of the former regime should not be equated with the complete absence of political mechanisms.
He said that in the republic regime, even though elections faced fraud, weak institutions and party crises, the basic right to protest, compete politically and seek peaceful change still existed. Today, the issue is not simply that there is no election day; the issue is that citizens have lost all legal means of monitoring and pressuring those in power.
Ahmadi added that political parties are not merely election machines, but institutions that formulate the demands of different sections of society and turn them into political programmes.
He believes that eliminating both political parties and ballot boxes has deprived society of political representation and concentrated power within a closed circle.
Civil Protest: The Heavy Cost of Seeking Justice in the Streets
Political participation is not limited to voting. The right to peaceful assembly is also one of the main ways citizens express demands and object to government decisions.
Over the past five years, the Taliban has suppressed protest gatherings and demonstrations, while protesters and civil society activists have faced threats, detention and violence.
In August 2026, the Taliban approved and published the “Shurta Law”, banning protest gatherings and demonstrations across Afghanistan.
After the law was issued, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid said that the concept of demonstrations did not exist within the group’s system.
Such restrictions had already existed before the law was formally adopted.
In June 2026, following the detention of several women in Herat, public protests in the city’s Jebrael area were met with violence.
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, said at least one teenager was killed and several others wounded after Taliban security forces opened fire and suppressed the protest.
Ahmadi said the securitisation of public space had cut off a key channel of communication between society and those in power.
He stressed that when citizens cannot protest peacefully, the main channel of dialogue between society and the authorities is severed. Protest does not necessarily mean opposition to an entire political system; it can be a way to correct a wrong policy. Fear and enforced silence should not be interpreted as public satisfaction. People are dissatisfied, but the high cost of repression forces them into silence.
Media Under Censorship and Systematic Intimidation of Journalists
The media is widely considered a pillar of democracy and an important means of holding those in power accountable. But recent monitoring reports point to an unprecedented decline in freedom of expression under Taliban rule.
The Afghanistan media support organisation NAI said in a report marking five years of Taliban rule that it had documented more than 700 cases of violence against journalists and media workers during that period.
According to the report, at least six journalists were killed and around 400 journalists and media workers were detained.
NAI also reported around 300 cases of journalists being beaten, nearly 5,000 journalists and media workers losing their jobs, and around 500 media outlets ceasing operations over the past five years.
At the same time, arbitrary detentions by the Taliban’s intelligence service and morality enforcers have continued, while a ban on filming living beings in more than 20 provinces has restricted the work of some visual media outlets.
Reports published in 2026 by UNAMA and Reporters Without Borders place Afghanistan 175th out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index, among the lowest-ranked countries in the world.
Reporters Without Borders has also said that 43% of Afghanistan’s media outlets disappeared within the first three months after the Taliban returned to power, while more than two-thirds of the country’s 12,000 journalists left the profession.
Ahmad Mousavi, a pseudonym, told Afghanistan International that self-censorship had become an inseparable part of journalism.
“Before publishing every fact, a journalist has to calculate what security consequences the report could have for themselves, their family or the continued operation of their media outlet.”
Mousavi, who still works as a journalist inside Afghanistan, said major media organisations had altered their language to suit those in power, violating media ethics and press freedom.
He said that when access to information is cut off and questioning major political and security cases risks imprisonment, the media is reduced from a watchdog to a provider of harmless administrative news.
Restrictions on the media have not been limited to news content and journalists’ work.
Female journalists and media workers have also faced widespread pressure, and many have been pushed out of the profession because of Taliban restrictions.
Women and Systematic Exclusion
Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan has become the only country in the world where girls are formally and systematically barred from education beyond primary school and from university.
UNESCO reported in August 2026 that around 2.4 million girls are currently excluded from secondary and high school education.
Before the collapse of the former republic in 2021, nearly one million girls were enrolled at those levels.
Since December 2022, universities have also been completely closed to female students.
These restrictions have created a structural crisis in the education system.
According to UNESCO figures, the number of female university lecturers across Afghanistan fell from 2,599 in 2019 to 794 in 2024.
At the same time, a field assessment of 198 women working in teaching and education found that 98.5% had experienced a sharp fall in income.
Their average monthly earnings fell from 40,000 afghanis to 4,852 afghanis, while 91% of the women were the sole breadwinners in their households.
The exclusion of women from education has been accompanied by growing censorship and the entrenchment of restrictions through laws such as the Taliban’s “Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Law”.
Under the law, women’s voices and images are treated as “awrah”( parts of the human body that must be covered in public), and their appearance in media and public spaces is subject to censorship.
The Taliban judiciary has also continued to use corporal punishment and public flogging of defendants in stadiums and other public places.
Hosina Akbar, a women’s rights activist and athlete, told Afghanistan International that removing women from schools and universities was not simply about denying literacy.
She said it also meant the social isolation and economic exclusion of half the country’s population.
Women have lost pathways to independence and influence in healthcare, administration and the justice sector, she said.
Afghanistan is effectively losing a generation of skilled professionals, doctors and lecturers whose absence will create long-term consequences for the whole of society.
Ethnic and Religious Concentration of Power
Experts say the erosion of democratic principles in Afghanistan under Taliban rule is not limited to civil restrictions.
Critics argue that power has also become heavily concentrated along ethnic lines, with Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and other groups having only limited influence over major decisions.
Research by the Middle East Institute indicates that nearly 90% of key leadership positions in the Taliban are held by Pashtuns.
According to the data, Tajiks hold 5.2% of key posts and Uzbeks around 3%, while Hazara representation in the Taliban’s leadership structure is close to zero.
UN reports have also pointed to the concentration of power within the Taliban and the prominent role of Pashtuns in judicial and executive structures.
At the same time, Richard Bennett, the UN special rapporteur on Afghanistan, has warned in his reports about structural discrimination and the marginalisation of ethnic and religious minorities.
His reports have raised issues including forced displacement, land disputes and restrictions on some religious practices.
Wasi Rahmani, a legal affairs expert, told Afghanistan International that the existing legal structure had created conditions for widespread violations of the rights of ethnic groups.
Rahmani said that one ethnic group had monopolised power and that major laws and national decisions were being developed solely based on Hanafi jurisprudence.
He said the Taliban, despite repeatedly denying the issue, had effectively placed the core structures of power under its complete control.
According to Rahmani, this ethnic and religious concentration not only undermines inclusion but directly and structurally creates conditions for violations of the fundamental rights of other ethnic and religious communities.
Hussain Yasa, a writer and political analyst, believes the Taliban’s approach to Afghanistan’s diverse society is rooted in a denial of the political existence of different communities.
He said the current authorities not only reject democratic legitimacy and the legal legacy of previous governments but also disregard Afghanistan’s historic diversity through religious and ethnic homogenisation.
Yasa said actions such as taking over cultural and religious centres or disregarding the rights of Hazaras and Shia communities should not be viewed merely as administrative or legal disputes.
He argued that they reflect a policy in which ethnic participation in power and the independent religious and social existence of communities are effectively denied.
Experts say the single-ethnic and male-dominated composition of security, judicial and executive institutions, the exclusion of Jaafari jurisprudence and forced displacement have deepened national divisions.
They say the situation has also pushed Afghanistan to the bottom of global rankings on inclusive governance and the rule of law.
Collapse of Judicial Independence, New Codes and Public Punishments
The rule of law and an independent judiciary are central to protecting citizens from political power.
But in its 2026 report, Freedom House gave Afghanistan under Taliban rule a score of zero on indicators relating to judicial independence, access to a fair trial and equality before the law.
At the same time, the abolition of previous statutory laws and the constitution has brought major changes to Afghanistan’s legal and judicial structure.
The Taliban Justice Ministry and Supreme Court have introduced and approved documents such as the “Code of Criminal Procedure” and the “Code on Separation of Spouses”, reshaping parts of the legal system.
The “Code on Separation of Spouses”, issued by decree of The Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, includes provisions on marital separation and issues relating to the marriage of minors.
The “Code of Criminal Procedure” removes independent investigation procedures and bases proof of crimes largely on confession and testimony.
The document also criminalises leaving the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, provides for heavy prison sentences for defying orders from officials, and allows men to use domestic violence and corporal punishment within defined areas of authority.
At the same time, the independent bar association has been closed, professional legal staff and women have been removed from judicial positions, and corporal punishment and public executions have continued.
An Afghanistan International review of official Taliban Supreme Court statements shows that from the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 until the end of March 2026, defendants received more than 100,000 lashes in public.
During the same period, the Taliban also carried out several public executions.
Rahmani said: “The essence of justice is measured before a sentence is carried out. A fair trial requires the right to a defence lawyer, documented notification of charges and the right to defend oneself before an impartial court.”
“When the judge and law enforcer come from the same structure, follow a strict interpretation and base decisions on documents such as the court and family codes, women and religious minorities are deprived of meaningful access to justice.”
He added that public sentences and flogging served no purpose other than social intimidation and the consolidation of power.
A Fundamental Threat to Political Culture
Democracy is not simply a mechanism for distributing power.
Academic research identifies tolerance, civil competition and peaceful dispute resolution through legal institutions as central elements of democratic political culture.
Depriving society of civil institutions, independent media and elections does not only change today’s political structure; it also shapes the political experience of future generations.
Five years after the collapse of the former republic, the gap between Afghanistan’s Democracy Index score of 2.85 in 2020 and 0.25 in recent years illustrates the scale of the change.
An Afghan citizen today cannot decide the country’s future through the ballot box, cannot protest without facing severe consequences, cannot send his daughter to school, and cannot turn to an impartial court when fundamental rights are violated.
The central question for Afghanistan’s future is therefore not simply who holds power in Kabul.
The deeper question is how much influence the collective will of the Afghan people will have over the country’s future.
