The role of colonial powers, the Soviet Union, the United States and their intelligence networks in Afghanistan’s wars has been widely exposed and examined. Yet oil companies, proxy wars, hired fighters and their brokers have received far less scrutiny.
Their role, however, has been broader and more influential than that of many other actors. After every victory, agents and brokers linked to these companies were placed in senior positions. One became an ambassador, another was appointed as a viceroy of the conquered country, while others became prime ministers and presidents. Power was also handed to the same groups and hired fighters whom they had selected and recruited.
Recently, Saudi-Arabia linked private company, Delta, signed a $200 million contract with the Taliban emirate for the extraction of oil and gas from the Kushk and Tirpul area.
What is particularly striking is the presence at meetings related to this contract of the former US ambassador in Kabul and former employee of the American oil company Unocal, acting as a broker and intermediary. More striking still, Washington announced that he was neither a US official nor a representative of Washington.
Saudi Arabia’s reaction was silence and an apparent reluctance to address the agreement. Neither the Saudi ambassador in Kabul nor another Saudi representative attended the meetings, and no statement was issued either confirming or rejecting the contract.
Yet the comments and praise from the Taliban emirate about the scale and benefits of this agreement were remarkable, even though they had already seen and experienced the consequences of such arrangements 30 years ago during their first period in power.
This is not the first test of a new experiment. It is the repetition of an experience with a history of more than half a century, one that has played an extensive role in Afghanistan’s instability and proxy wars.
Examples From Historical Experience
Fifty-five years ago, towards the end of Zahir Shah’s absolute monarchy, the United States, which held concessions for projects in southern and western Afghanistan, began oil and gas exploration in the same region because of the importance of its reserves.
It constructed the necessary buildings and took the initial steps. But serious objections from the then Iranian king, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, caused the work to be halted midway, because Iran at the time was America’s regional gendarme and, for Washington, more important even than Israel.
Extracting oil and gas from Badghis and Herat would have had a serious impact on Iran’s reserves because these areas are connected and geographically adjacent.
Five years later, during Sardar Daoud’s rule, when the Russians had replaced the Americans, they too began preliminary exploration and extraction work in the same region.
But fortune did not favour them, and their work remained unfinished.
The coup against Daoud, the failed communist governments, the subsequent occupation of Afghanistan and nearly 14 years of war left no opportunity for their affiliated company, Gazprom, to take control of the area.
When proxy groups entered the scene and their proxy wars began, major international oil companies such as Unocal and Bridas transferred their rivalry to Afghanistan.
Bridas succeeded in recruiting the Jabal al-Saraj alliance.
The company tried to persuade the rulers in Kabul to accept a plan under which Turkmenistan’s oil and gas would be transported, under Bridas management, through Badghis and Herat to Pakistan and India.
They reached an agreement without publicly announcing it. Gifts, presents and initial financial assistance did their work.
But the agreement did not remain hidden for long.
It was soon reported in the American media that in early 1996, Bridas had paid $1 million to Burhanuddin Rabbani’s government.
According to Bridas, the money was assistance for winter fuel supplies. But in the Bridas v Unocal case before a US appeals court, the payment was described as being made in return for an agreement granting Bridas the right to build oil and gas pipelines through Afghan territory.
Other sources exposed more of this secret deal and said Bridas had offered $1 million to a well-known member of the Jabal al-Saraj alliance to create problems for the Unocal project and, if Unocal secured the contract, to prevent the pipeline from passing through Afghanistan.
On the other side, the American company Unocal and Saudi Arabian Delta established a multinational consortium in 1997 called CentGas, or Central Asia Gas Pipeline Ltd, to transport Turkmenistan’s oil and gas.
The largest share, 46.5%, belonged to Unocal, while Delta held 15%.
Each of the other partners, including Turkmenistan, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and Pakistan, held 7% or less.
Russia was also allocated a 10% share, but this was something close to a joke, because the company had essentially been created in opposition to Russia’s Gazprom and with the aim of ending Moscow’s complete dominance over Central Asia’s energy reserves.
Russia therefore soon announced that it would not join the consortium. Moscow’s 10% share was then added to America’s 46%, bringing it to 56%.
Unocal sided with the Taliban, invited their delegation to the United States and received them with gifts and hospitality.
In fact, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Britain, the United States and Pakistan jointly played a role in the formation of the Taliban.
The group was formed in Quetta, Pakistan, among Kandahar’s Durranis because Britain and Saudi Arabia wanted to restore Afghanistan’s former monarchy and return the deposed king.
The Taliban had agreed to this plan. That was why Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan recognised their government.
Delta was confident that all of Turkmenistan’s oil and gas reserves would come under their control.
This was intolerable for Moscow and Tehran.
They therefore multiplied their support for Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani against the Taliban.
Every day, several Russian aircraft loaded with Russian weapons and ammunition, as well as Afghan banknotes printed in Russia, travelled through Mashhad city in Iran to Kulob city in Tajikistan and were then transferred to Khwaja Bahauddin in Takhar city of Afghanistan.
Now, nearly three decades later, Delta has returned to Afghanistan.
The former broker has returned with it, and the plan to connect Turkmenistan, Herat, Kandahar, Pakistan, India and Gwadar is once again under consideration.
The geopolitical continuity between today’s project and the plan of the 1990s is therefore clearly visible.
On 7 September 2026, the Taliban Ministry of Mines and Petroleum and Saudi company Delta International signed a contract for oil and gas exploration and extraction in the Kushk-Tirpul area of Herat.
An initial investment of $200 million was announced, and the former US ambassador in Kabul also attended the signing ceremony.
His presence was not sudden.
On 24 October 2025, the same ambassador was sitting beside Delta chief executive Shahr al-Taqi in a meeting with Abdul Ghani Baradar, where “gas exploration, extraction and pipeline construction” were explicitly discussed.
Delta’s current plan is not limited to extracting Afghanistan’s gas.
According to Taliban officials, Delta wants to buy Turkmen gas through TAPI, increase the production capacity of Turkmenistan’s gas fields, build a pipeline from Herat to Spin Boldak, extend it through Pakistan to the Indian border and establish a major gas centre in Gwadar.
The project is so enormous that it would require $50 billion in investment.
How can we believe that this company would dare undertake such a huge investment without the permission and approval of the US and Saudi governments?
This is especially difficult to believe when the United States does not recognise the government in Kabul and goes even further by saying that the Kabul government supports terrorism and terrorists, and that investment in the country benefits terrorists.
These companies choose countries that have neither a principled legal system, nor a government supported by the nation, nor a constitution, nor a representative council, nor a strong and united central administration.
By buying a few powerful figures, they can place the entire government and administration in their hands and do whatever they want.
Just as they have now succeeded, by winning over and recruiting a handful of powerful individuals, in securing a contract that they could not obtain through extensive military, political and financial efforts.
We can say with certainty that this agreement, like those of the past, will bring long and widespread proxy wars to Afghans.
The rivals of this company will not remain with their hands tied, watching indifferently.
Such agreements can only be implemented without serious problems when they are concluded with a lawful government that derives its authority from the will of the nation.
Governments created and imposed with foreign money and weapons can never trade away values and resources that belong to the entire nation and then prevent the damaging consequences of such arbitrary deals.
Even when someone sells their own private home, they are normally expected to consider the consent and interests of their neighbour.
But Afghanistan’s situation today is such that a handful of powerful figures from one group can sell the country, its values and its resources sometimes to America, sometimes to Russia and China, sometimes to India and Pakistan, sometimes to Iran and sometimes to Saudi Arabia, without asking the nation and without debating such major national matters in a council representing the people.
We must bear in mind that Russia wants to preserve its dominance and monopoly over Central Asian energy export routes and will try at any cost to prevent these countries’ oil and gas from being transported south through Afghanistan.
Iran is an even stronger opponent of this project than Russia and, over the past several decades, has invested more than Moscow in preventing it.
Tehran will not allow itself to permanently lose the two major markets of Pakistan and India.
Delta, Unocal and any other company can succeed only if such a major national agreement is concluded with a lawful government rather than with one side in a war, and if the contract is awarded through open competition among rival companies, not, as in the past, through bribery and the purchase of a handful of powerful figures.
If they believe Russia, China and Iran have become so weak that they now have no ability to act against them, that would certainly be a major mistake and an unfounded confidence in their own power.
They signed this agreement in Herat, but immediately afterwards the Houthis took control of Bab al-Mandab and carried out attacks against Saudi Arabia.
There was even a drone attack towards Mecca.
Saudi Arabia signed a defence agreement with Türkiye and Pakistan, and Mohammed bin Salman is now travelling to Egypt, where he will ask that country to take part in the ongoing war.
At the same time, security officials from Qatar and Türkiye are coming to Kabul.
Without doubt, one purpose of their sudden visit will be to persuade the Taliban to align themselves with Türkiye and Saudi Arabia rather than India and Iran.
It remains unclear whether the Taliban will preserve their previous cooperation with Tehran or change direction and conclude that joining an anti-Iran alliance would be more beneficial.
It is also unclear what role they would play if they chose that direction.
The current government in Kabul is the government of a group, not a national government.
It has neither a representative council nor a constitution. Its leaders were selected abroad, and Kabul was handed over to them by the United States.
Even now, it faces serious domestic opposition and armed resistance.
If anyone believes that this government can do a great deal for them, that would be another major mistake.
Were the failures of the past and the previous bloody experiences not enough to prevent the repetition of similar actions?
