Commander, National Resistance Front
With the fall of Kabul on August 15, 2021, the psychological warfare waged by the Taliban— which played a crucial role in the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—entered a new phase.
In this phase, key political and media operatives of the Taliban, a network of military and intelligence veterans trained by Pakistan and other regional countries, propagated a narrative to the mass media claiming that the Taliban had seized military equipment and weapons worth $88 billion from Afghan security and defence forces, making their invincibility seem inevitable.
Domestically, this narrative aimed to intimidate the Taliban's military and political opponents, while regionally and globally, it sought to compel countries to accept the Taliban as the undisputed rulers of Afghanistan.
My comrades and I, who have the honour of fighting against Taliban terrorism and have actively served in the ranks of the Afghan security and defence forces for nearly two decades, know that this narrative is far from reality. It is merely a continuation of the Taliban’s organised psychological warfare against our people.
In this analysis, I aim to provide a clear picture—based on information and analysis rooted in security and intelligence data—of the state of the equipment and weapons left behind by the Afghan security and defence forces, particularly the national army, which collapsed on August 15, 2021, due to a multi-layered political and intelligence conspiracy.
The $88 Billion Spent on an Unfinished War
From 2002 to June 2020, the United States spent $88.61 billion through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, established by the US Department of Defense, on equipping, arming, supplying, training, infrastructure, and reconstruction of Afghan defence and security forces.
These resources—which included light and heavy weapons, vehicles including armoured ones, surveillance tools, special forces training, and the equipment of the Afghan Air Force—were deployed in stages as the need to counter threats grew.
A significant portion of this budget was spent annually based on needs assessments. Funds were also used to repair, and maintain equipment and vehicles. Thus, a substantial amount of the total allocated funds had been spent on the Afghan defence and security forces by 2021.
The larger picture was that the ongoing war and Afghanistan's economic dependence on foreign aid restricted the capabilities of the Afghan army and security forces. For instance, the army lacked strategic reserves of weapons, ammunition, and fuel, often facing difficulties in meeting basic needs. Unfortunately, this situation worsened with the start of direct US negotiations with the Taliban and the subsequent signing of the Doha Agreement. It is likely that cutting off US aid to the Afghan army was part of the preconditions for the Taliban's acceptance of the Doha Agreement, leading to a complete cessation of some aid after the agreement was signed.
How Much of the Afghan Security Forces’ Equipment Was Left Behind?
Approximately 70% of the military equipment used by Afghan security and defence forces was of American origin. This included various types of light and heavy weapons, such as M4, M16, M204, M249, M2, and MK19, which replaced older Russian-made weapons like the Kalashnikov, PKM, DShK, AGS, and Russian mortars. These weapons were introduced at the inception of the Afghan security forces and were extensively used throughout the 20-year war until the fall of the republic. Over time and with repeated use, many of these weapons became worn out, damaged, and completely destroyed.
In addition, after the fall of the republic, watchdog organisations and media reported on the sale of remaining weapons and ammunition by the Taliban in provinces like Kandahar, Zabul, Nangarhar, and Khost, with much of it being smuggled into Pakistan. Furthermore, documents and a letter issued by Mullah Hibatullah, the Taliban’s leader, including an 800-page annex listing serial numbers of missing weapons, reveal that about 40% of the weapons and military equipment went missing after the fall of the republic order in Afghanistan.
My experience, along with that of my comrades, indicates that a significant portion of the American military equipment—particularly those used in the Afghan war—was not of high quality. One reason for this was that private companies producing these weapons in the US prioritised profitability over product quality, leading to frequent technical issues. Repairing this equipment was time-consuming and costly.
Some of the equipment now in Taliban hands is worn out, and the Taliban lack the technical capacity and financial resources to repair it.
What Happened to the Afghan Air Force’s Aircraft?
Over the past 20 years, the Afghan Air Force was equipped with 229 combat and transport aircraft. Twenty-five of these were sent abroad for repairs, and 19 were on the verge of being delivered. On August 15, 2021, of the 185 remaining aircraft of the Afghan Air Force, about 46 were flown to Uzbekistan and 18 to Tajikistan. These transfers occurred because, following the signing of the Doha Agreement in February 2020, the withdrawal of contractor companies responsible for aircraft maintenance and a shortage of spare parts left these aircraft unable to deliver essential supplies to the defensive posts and bases of Afghan security forces. Unfortunately, in some cases, the bodies of fallen soldiers and the wounded remained at the frontlines for days before air transport could be arranged.
According to the latest statistics obtained from the Taliban administration, of the 121 aircraft—most of which were destroyed during the evacuation and collapse by a joint special unit of the Ministry of Defence, National Security forces, and US forces—about 52 aircrafts have been reactivated by the Taliban. However, due to a lack of spare parts, pilots, and technical staff, they have very limited operational capability. The Taliban regime, due to imposed sanctions, lacks the capacity to purchase the necessary spare parts for these aircraft.
What Happened to the Armoured and Non-Armoured Vehicles of the Afghan Security Forces?
Most of the armoured and non-armoured vehicles used by Afghan security forces were completely destroyed during the 20 years of war due to roadside bombs, direct combat, and overuse. All of these vehicles were manufactured in the US, spare parts were supplied by donor countries, and several foreign companies were responsible for the maintenance and repair of these vehicles under specific contracts.
After the Doha Agreement was signed, these companies’ contracts were terminated, and they left Afghanistan. The republic government was unable to replace these contractors or provide the necessary resources for vehicle repair and maintenance. In the final months of the republic of Afghanistan, around 80% of the armoured and transport vehicles used by the security and defence forces either required major repairs or were facing a shortage of spare parts.
The Taliban have acquired some of these vehicles, but many have deteriorated due to a lack of maintenance and repair, turning into useless scrap metal. A few are temporarily operational. As a result, the remaining vehicles in Taliban hands are in very poor condition. The lack of spare parts, technical capacity for repair and maintenance, and the high cost of fuel have severely limited the Taliban’s ability to use the vehicles left behind by the Afghan defence and security forces. This strategic gap reduces the Taliban’s capacity to conduct long-term military operations.
How Much Ammunition Does the Taliban Have?
Throughout the 20-year war, millions of rounds of ammunition, including light and heavy weapons for infantry and combat aircraft, were consumed. With the signing of the Doha Agreement, the start of the US troop withdrawal, and the complete cessation of NATO coalition air support for Afghan security forces, military aid to these forces sharply declined and, in some cases, was completely cut off. Afghan security forces faced a severe shortage of heavy weapons ammunition, such as mortars, DShK, AGS, PKM, and various aircraft bombs, which are highly effective in irregular warfare. This shortage greatly reduced the capacity of Afghan ground and air forces to fight the Taliban, accelerating the fall of districts and provinces.
Contrary to the Taliban’s organised propaganda, the group does not possess a significant amount of ammunition because most of what was available to Afghan security forces had been consumed in the final months of the war against Taliban terrorism.
The Myth of Taliban Invincibility
Before the Doha Agreement, despite the 20-year war against NATO and Afghan defence and security forces, the Taliban were unable to control significant portions of Afghanistan’s territory. Their attempts to temporarily control the centres of several provinces in the north, west, and south were unsuccessful. The group was unable to establish regular fronts or unified command and control within Afghanistan. Taliban fighters often received medical treatment in neighbouring countries, and their leaders resided in various cities in Pakistan, Iran, the UAE, Qatar, and other countries.
Therefore, the Taliban and their external supporters' portrayal of the group’s military strength is unrealistic and exaggerated, as the weapons and equipment left behind by Afghan armed forces are mostly worn-out weapons, malfunctioning vehicles, grounded helicopters, and empty ammunition depots. Replenishing and maintaining this equipment in the short term is impossible and extremely costly.
The strength of any military force relies on six principles: leadership, discipline, institution-building, technology and weaponry, strategy, and support systems. Taliban factions and militias are not only unfamiliar with these principles, but the equipment and weapons left behind by Afghan armed forces are inadequate to meet the group’s long-term military needs.
At best, the Taliban remain an insurgent group lacking the capacity for institution-building and governance. The armed struggle of Afghanistan’s freedom fighters over the past three years and the significant casualties they have inflicted on Taliban militias demonstrate the group’s vulnerability in military and intelligence terms. A powerful and united anti-Taliban front could bring the Taliban to their knees.
Taliban leaders and militias are unfamiliar with the diverse languages and cultures of Afghan society and will never gain national or popular legitimacy. The people of Afghanistan, both in cities and rural areas, view them as occupiers. The populace is fed up with the regressive, anti-women, and anti-freedom rule of the Taliban, and it won’t be long before our people’s uprising will drive them out of our land.
The continued existence of the Taliban's reign of terror, crime, and horror is not due to possessing $88 billion worth of weaponry and equipment but rather due to the divergent views, disunity, and failure of the leaders, elites, and political and military forces opposing the Taliban to learn from the lessons of the past.
