In August 2007, a Pakistani helicopter transferred about 27 detainees to Dera Ismail Khan before proceeding to Wana. One of the detainees on board was Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani.
Last year, on December 11, he was killed by an ISIS suicide bomber inside his ministry, yet the ambiguous aspects of that incident remain unclear even after one year.
August 2007 was a defining moment for Khalil-ur Rahman Haqqani, as he was released as part of a major hostage-taking and prisoner-exchange deal orchestrated by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Following his release, he returned to the battlefield.
After negotiations failed between a 21-member jirga of the Mehsud tribe, led by former Pakistani parliamentarian Maulana Merajuddin Mehsud, and the TTP regarding the exchange of captured soldiers and detainees, TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud killed three captured Pakistani soldiers when the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban were not released. Their bodies were dumped on the Wana–Jandola road. Mehsud warned: “If you do not release the prisoners, we will give you such gifts every day.”
One of the TTP’s key demands was the release of Khalil-ur Rahman Haqqani and other members of the Haqqani Network.
After the killing of the soldiers, the Pakistani government agreed to negotiations. Talks between the Pakistan army and the TTP were held in Dila, South Waziristan, led by Mawlawi Muawiya Wazirgi, the TTP’s head of economic affairs. Under the deal, the army released several tribal elders from Waziristan, along with 43 Taliban leaders, including Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, Nasiruddin Haqqani, Amir Khan Haqqani, two brothers of Akhtar Mohammad Osmani, and Malai Khan Zadran.
The dramatic capture of 350 Pakistani soldiers by 20 Taliban fighters in South Waziristan, and the subsequent release of a large group of Haqqani Network members in exchange, strengthened public suspicions that the entire episode was a jointly planned operation to secure the release of senior Haqqani leaders. At the time, US forces posed a significant threat of capturing Haqqani Network members and transferring them to Bagram or Guantanamo prisons.
Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, who was killed last year on December 11 by an ISIS suicide bomber inside the Taliban’s Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation, had been arrested by Pakistani forces in 2003 and imprisoned. From guesthouses linked to the Haqqani Network in Peshawar including Board, University Town, Hayatabad, Kohat Road and Chamakani he commanded fronts against Afghan and US forces in Afghanistan. Known as “Haji Lala,” he led the Peshawar-based wing of the Haqqani Network. Since the days of the Afghan jihad, he maintained close ties with Pakistan’s intelligence services as well as with the country’s political, religious and militant groups.
Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani was the brother of the Haqqani Network’s founder, Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and the uncle of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s current interior minister. He was considered one of the most influential members of the network, often handling tribal mediation and coordination among communities.
He also played a decisive role in expanding the Haqqani Network’s influence in Afghanistan.
In February 2011, the US Treasury Department added his name to its sanctions list and announced a $5 million bounty on him.
On February 9 the same year, the United Nations, under Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1904 (2009), listed Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani for maintaining close ties with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. He was accused of playing a key role in transferring the families and members of al-Qaeda and other foreign militants from Shahi Kot, Paktia, Paktika and Khost provinces into Waziristan.
Haqqani’s Position Within the Taliban Structure
Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani was considered one of the most active ministers during the Taliban’s second rule, serving as minister of refugees and repatriation. The ministry’s most important responsibility was overseeing the return of millions of Afghan refugees who, after decades of war, were facing mass expulsions from Iran and Pakistan. According to Taliban sources, during his tenure he managed the forced deportation and return of nearly 1.5 million Afghan refugees, a mission the Taliban viewed as a major political achievement.
Alongside his cabinet role, the senior Haqqani played a key part in expanding the influence of the Haqqani Network. He was regarded as Sirajuddin Haqqani’s “right hand” because of his strong connections with tribal elders, tribal structures and hard-line factions within the Taliban. Through jirgas and mediation efforts in Khost, Paktia and Paktika, he helped build an environment of support for the Taliban, a contribution seen as vital to consolidating the group’s authority.
During his tenure, delegations of tribal elders from Afghanistan’s southern provinces were sent to northern regions to strengthen intertribal relations and to fill the ideological gap in Taliban governance by reinforcing the Haqqani Network’s influence through tribal legitimacy.
Haji E’tibar, a 71-year-old who fought alongside Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani against the government during the rule of President Mohammad Najibullah, told Afghanistan International–Pashto that Khalil Haqqani played a key role in the fall of Khost province during the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime in the late 1980s. He was also a close aide to Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and when the Haqqani Network captured numerous tanks during the war, it was under Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani’s leadership that an armoured battalion was formed.
Expanding the Haqqani Network’s influence, maintaining relations with the Taliban’s central leadership and generating legitimacy for the Taliban through tribal structures were among the roles in which Khalil Haqqani was deeply involved.
A member of the Taliban-controlled Centre for Regional Studies, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Afghanistan International–Pashto that after the fall of the Taliban’s first regime in the 1990s, Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani worked to maintain and expand the Haqqani Network’s bases in North Waziristan. He managed the transfer and accommodation of foreign fighters, an effort described as crucial for al-Qaida and other global jihadist networks.
The source said: “As I recall, during the Taliban’s first rule, Khalil Haqqani had very close relations with Osama bin Laden, al-Hassami and several other al-Qaida members. He was one of their most trusted individuals.”
Securing supply routes for the Haqqani Network, procuring weapons and equipment, and managing financial resources were areas in which Khalil Haqqani played a decisive role. His activities were heavily focused in Pakistan’s urban areas, where he maintained an extensive network of contacts and operations.
The research centre member added: “His relationships with tribes in Pakistan dated back to the jihad era. He had strong ties with Sunni tribes in Kurram Agency, while at the same time maintaining cooperative relations with Pakistani state institutions. The Kurram Agreement, which aimed to end sectarian conflict, secured strategic locations for the Haqqani Network. These achievements were the direct result of Khalil Haqqani’s mediation and influence.”
The Kurram Agreement and Sectarian Conflicts
Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani and Ibrahim Haqqani played a decisive role in a 2008 agreement aimed at easing sectarian tensions in Kurram district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Under the agreement, sectarian clashes subsided temporarily, allowing the Haqqani Network to establish itself in several strategic areas of Kurram.
According to a report by Afghanistan International–Pashto, the Pakistani military, together with Ibrahim Haqqani and Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, played a significant role in brokering the agreement and expanding their influence among the local population. Shiite and Sunni communities deposited 40 million Pakistani rupees as surety and accepted several additional conditions and restrictions.
The Haqqanis persuaded Sunni tribes to withdraw from the conflict and, in return, gained access to supply routes from Shiite-majority areas into Afghanistan.
In the first week of December 2010, another three-day jirga was held involving Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani, several Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan commanders, tribal elders and local Pakistani officials. Haqqani again played a decisive role in the gathering.
Based on the jirga’s decisions, Afridi tribal elders from the Jamrud, Sra Kamar, Takhta Beg and Ghundi areas committed to cooperating with Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani and agreed not to obstruct supply routes.
The jirga enabled both the Haqqani Network and the Taliban to recruit young men from local religious seminaries and to use existing supply routes with greater confidence.
Another outcome of the Jamrud jirga was the recruitment of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan fighters for the Haqqani Network’s insurgency in Afghanistan. Young men from seminaries in the Afridi, Orakzai and Tirah areas joined TTP ranks and, with the support of the Haqqani Network, carried out attacks and operations inside Afghanistan.
Leadership in Social and Political Engagements
In August 2021, as the Taliban entered Kabul and the republican government was nearing collapse, Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani was among the Taliban representatives who held direct talks with senior government officials and political leaders. According to Taliban sources, the aim was to prevent an escalation of fighting, minimise bloodshed during the fall of Kabul and facilitate a smoother transfer of power.
Reports indicate that Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani attended several meetings inside the presidential palace and held discussions with influential political figures. He conveyed messages to former President Ashraf Ghani through Hamid Karzai and Dr Abdullah Abdullah.
In his final interview, he claimed that former Balkh governor Atta Mohammad Noor had assured him of cooperation with the Taliban if they took control of Afghanistan. He also spoke respectfully of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud and expressed a willingness to meet his son, Ahmad Massoud.
Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani sought to prevent any potential armed resistance to the Taliban.
Despite these political efforts, he was critical of Taliban leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada’s policies. Before his death, he openly criticised the leader’s approach during a visit to Kandahar. For this reason, some analysts view his assassination as the result of internal divisions within the Taliban.
The killing of Khalil-ur-Rahman Haqqani by ISIS during the Taliban’s second rule dealt a significant blow to the group, particularly as the Taliban publicly deny the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan and claim to have eliminated it.
A year after his death, Taliban authorities have not disclosed the findings of their investigation or identified those responsible for the attack. One of the central mysteries surrounding the incident is how the suicide bomber entered the ministry building undetected and why the security scanner was not functioning at the time. Although the Taliban officially attributed the attack to ISIS and the group claimed responsibility, the circumstances of the killing remain unclear.
