Reporter
Five years after the Taliban’s return to power, armed opposition groups have yet to shift the balance. The Taliban still controls Afghanistan’s territory, state institutions and main economic resources.
The opposition controls no territory and lacks effective foreign backing that could sustain and expand an insurgency in the way Pakistan’s support helped the Taliban during the years of war.
Afghanistan International spoke to Yasin Zia, leader of the Afghanistan Freedom Front, as well as several Afghan researchers and former officials about the future of Taliban rule.
Researchers broadly agree that the Taliban faces serious problems, but these do not yet mean its collapse is imminent.
Yasin Zia told Afghanistan International that the Taliban’s future should not be judged solely by developments on the battlefield. In his view, the group’s main weakness is political.
He said, “the most important reason for our optimism is the Taliban’s political failure, and fortunately we have achieved that objective”.
According to Zia, despite controlling extensive power and resources, the Taliban has failed to gain national legitimacy, public consent or international acceptance. But that is also where the opposition faces its central problem.
The Taliban’s political failure has not yet developed into a crisis of power within its own government.
Abbas Farasoo and Nematullah Bizhan, two Afghan researchers based in Australia, are more cautious in assessing the consequences of this weakness.
In their view, a lack of legitimacy is not in itself evidence that a regime is close to collapse.
The Taliban still possesses the main instruments of coercive power, while opposition groups have not expanded their armed resistance to a level capable of challenging the group’s territorial control.
Both researchers warn, however, that if Afghanistan’s economic, political and social crises persist, the Taliban cannot assume its stability is guaranteed.
For now, guerrilla attacks by resistance groups are largely symbolic and political. Their message is that the Taliban is not invincible.
But these attacks would become a serious threat only if resistance groups could begin limiting the Taliban’s territorial control, move beyond mountainous areas and establish bases among villages and local communities.
They would also need a reliable rear base capable of providing money, weapons, medical treatment for fighters and safe havens for their leaders.
Illegitimate but Dominant
Yasin Zia says the Taliban has closed almost every avenue for political change since returning to power.
There are no elections, the constitution has been set aside, and women have been excluded from large parts of public life.
He said when a government closes every path to reform, it effectively expands the social base of opposition against itself.
Discontent has become more visible in some parts of Afghanistan in recent years.
Protests in Badakhshan have reflected tensions between local communities and the Taliban over resources and the way these areas are governed.
In southern Afghanistan, the Taliban has also at times been forced to show flexibility in response to economic pressure from farmers.
The Taliban has informally allowed poppy cultivation in some areas of the south. Such concessions are not entirely unexpected. The south is the Taliban’s traditional stronghold, and growing discontent among poor farmers could prove costly for the group.
Abbas Farasoo considers the absence of a strong and organised opposition one of the most important factors behind the Taliban’s continued rule.
He says Taliban opponents remain fragmented, lack a unified command and political programme, and have no effective foreign support.
He mentioned that, given the current conditions, the most likely scenario over the next two to five years is the consolidation of the Taliban.
That prediction does not mean the Taliban has solved its problems.
In his view, the group has survived largely because its opponents have so far failed to exploit its weaknesses.
What Has Zebak Changed?
Recent fighting in Zebak district of Badakhshan has particular significance for the Afghanistan Freedom Front.
Yasin Zia says the clashes went beyond the small-scale guerrilla attacks that have characterised most of the group’s operations and developed into more direct confrontations with the Taliban.
He said this development alone does not mean the balance of power has changed, but it shows that popular resistance against the Taliban has moved from limited guerrilla operations towards more complex forms of battlefield warfare.
At the same time, Zia acknowledges that most Afghanistan Freedom Front operations over the past five years have been small and limited.
“We should not replace reality with propaganda. A responsible movement must distinguish between its present capacity and its ultimate objective,” he said.
He added: “We know that endlessly repeating small attacks alone will not overthrow any government.”
Zia said the Afghanistan Freedom Front’s operations in recent years had pursued three objectives: maintaining a presence on the ground, undermining the perception that the Taliban is invincible, and building organised networks inside Afghanistan.
He says the next phase will require greater resources.
Expanding political organisation, strengthening links with communities, improving command cohesion, establishing a presence in more areas and presenting a credible political alternative are among the needs he identifies.
Ali Ahmad Jalali, Afghanistan’s former interior minister, also views developments in Badakhshan as a sign of growing public reaction to Taliban policies.
He told Afghanistan International that every authoritarian system eventually faces a public response but said the opposition’s current scattered attacks still do not represent a serious threat to the Taliban.
Jalali said limited operations in remote areas were not enough to change the balance of power.
In his view, opposition success requires political cohesion, a unified strategy and national leadership.
He warned that if protests and armed clashes remain fragmented, the Taliban can use its military and security resources to contain them.
When Does Poverty Become Dangerous?
The economy is another vulnerable point for Taliban rule.
According to United Nations figures, more than 20 million people in Afghanistan require humanitarian assistance.
The Taliban lacks sufficient resources to address hunger, unemployment and the livelihood crisis and, like previous Afghan governments, remains dependent on continued foreign assistance.
Some Taliban opponents, including Amrullah Saleh, former Afghan vice president, have hoped in recent years that reducing or cutting foreign aid would increase pressure on the group.
But the experience of the past five years has shown that widespread poverty does not necessarily lead to political revolt.
Yasin Zia considers dissatisfaction caused by poverty, alongside political repression and sweeping restrictions on women, part of the social conditions that can fuel resistance.
Nematullah Bizhan, however, distinguishes between widespread discontent and an immediate threat to the government.
He said that poverty or international isolation alone is unlikely to cause the government’s immediate collapse.
In Bizhan’s view, the problem becomes more serious for the Taliban when economic pressure begins to penetrate the structure of power itself.
Declining revenues, competition over resources, dissatisfaction among commanders and a reduced ability to reward loyal networks could weaken the Taliban’s internal stability.
Bizhan said that if people feel there is no hope of improving their lives, education, employment or their children’s future, discontent could take a more dangerous form.
Abbas Farasoo also says the Taliban has performed more effectively in some areas, including tax collection and domestic revenue generation.
But he does not regard this as evidence that the Taliban has transformed itself into a conventional government.
He says the Taliban’s economic structure is primarily based on customs revenues, taxation and mining, with the main objective of maintaining its political and security apparatus rather than creating a welfare state.
Farasoo describes the Taliban economy as a “predatory economy” and says Taliban factions are engaged in intense competition to seize these resources.
Divisions, but No Split
Differences between the Kandahar leadership, Kabul-based officials, the Haqqani network and some local Taliban commanders have repeatedly been reported.
But these disputes have not so far developed into a split that threatens the cohesion of Taliban rule.
Abbas Farasoo says the authority of the Taliban leadership, suppression of internal dissent, a shared fear of collapse, common enemies and an ideological belief in monopolising power have so far prevented the divisions from widening.
Bizhan also considers internal disagreements serious but says the risks would increase if several crises occurred at the same time.
A succession crisis, worsening internal disputes, commanders breaking away and a sudden decline in revenues are among the factors he believes could challenge Taliban cohesion.
Bizhan said if the current conditions in Afghanistan and the region continue, the most likely scenario is the continuation of the status quo accompanied by gradual erosion.
That erosion could continue for years without immediately leading to collapse.
Resistance Without a Foreign Backer
One of the most serious problems facing Taliban opponents is the absence of effective foreign support.
During its war against the former government, the Taliban benefited from extensive support from Pakistan.
The mujahideen also received backing from Pakistan, the United States and several other countries during the war against the Soviet Union and the governments of Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah.
Today’s resistance groups have no comparable support.
Even some regional countries that have disagreements with the Taliban have shown little willingness to support another war in Afghanistan.
Iran has also pressured some Taliban opponents to refrain from armed confrontation with the group.
Yasin Zia says the resistance cannot tie its future to the decisions of foreign governments.
He said that a government built by foreign powers can collapse just as quickly when those same supporters change their policies. The experience of the former republic order in Afghanistan and the Doha agreement offer very serious lessons for all of us.
Zia says the main foundation of the struggle must be built inside Afghanistan and should rely on former security personnel, young people, women, civil society, political elites and domestic networks.
Declining attention from major powers has also benefited the Taliban.
Farasoo says the war in Ukraine, crises in the Middle East and competition between the United States and China mean Afghanistan no longer holds the place it did in the foreign policies of major powers over the previous two decades.
The threat posed by Islamic State Khorasan Province has also strengthened the Taliban’s position.
Concern over IS-K’s expansion has pushed Iran, Russia and some Central Asian countries towards greater security cooperation with the Taliban.
There is little disagreement among opposition figures and analysts about the Taliban’s weaknesses.
Its legitimacy crisis, social discontent, economic pressure and internal divisions are real.
But the past five years have shown that the existence of these weaknesses alone is not enough to bring about a change of government.
Tamim Asey, Afghanistan’s former deputy defence minister, said these crises, combined with the characteristics of Taliban rule, could reduce the capacity of a regime like the Taliban to withstand political, economic and social shocks and open the way for internal uprisings and foreign intervention.
