Taliban Rule, IS-K Threats Increase Risks For Hazaras, Says Report

A new research report published on Genocide Watch’s website warns that conditions for Afghanistan’s Hazara community have deteriorated sharply under Taliban rule.

A new research report published on Genocide Watch’s website warns that conditions for Afghanistan’s Hazara community have deteriorated sharply under Taliban rule.
The authors note that threats from Islamic State Khorasan Province have also significantly increased the vulnerability of Hazara communities in different parts of the country.
Examining historical roots and contemporary developments, the research report says that although ISIS is not necessarily aligned with the Taliban, its growing influence and anti-Shia ideology in different areas have contributed significantly to increasing the vulnerability of the Hazara community.
The report also cites the latest findings of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which highlight the continuing difficult conditions faced by Hazaras. These include the killing of 12 civilians at a Shia shrine in Herat province in April 2026 and the detention of 45 Shia men in Kabul on June 18, 2026 for displaying Ashura flags.
The report also points to less visible forms of pressure, including forced displacement and apartheid. The authors say that over the past five years, the Taliban has dismantled police infrastructure in Hazara-populated areas, which they argue has contributed to insecurity.
As an example, the report cites the forced displacement of Hazara residents from the village of Pusht-e Asmidan in Sar-e Pol province in 2023. It also says that while the report was being prepared, a grenade explosion at a school in Dasht-e-Barchi injured more than 40 children.
Genocide Watch makes several recommendations aimed at improving the situation and ensuring accountability. It says international accountability mechanisms should seriously examine and investigate the Taliban’s role in facilitating attacks against Hazaras, including the dismantling of police infrastructure in Hazara areas and alleged failures to protect Shia religious gatherings and schools.
The organisation also calls on the UN Secretary-General and UNAMA to formally investigate and report on ISIS attacks against Hazaras, with the findings to be referred to the United Nations Human Rights Council.
Genocide Watch further urges donor countries and UN agencies to address barriers faced by Hazara women and girls by providing adequate funding for gender-responsive humanitarian services, including mobile health clinics and psychological support programmes.
Russia’s Foreign Ministry says Moscow is closely monitoring security along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and continues to provide military equipment to strengthen it. Senior diplomat Alexander Sternik stressed continued arms and technical support for Dushanbe.
The Russian Foreign Ministry said Moscow was continuously monitoring security developments along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border and would continue supporting Dushanbe in strengthening protection of its southern frontier.
Sternik, director of the Third Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States at Russia’s Foreign Ministry, said in an interview with RIA Novosti published on Monday, October 5, that security along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border remained a constant focus for Moscow.
The senior Russian diplomat said Russian security agencies were continuing to deliver technical equipment, military hardware and weapons to Tajik border forces as part of an interstate programme of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) aimed at strengthening the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, approved on November 28, 2024.
He said the assistance was also being provided under a programme to modernise Tajikistan’s armed forces through 2042.
Under a decision by CSTO member-state leaders in 2024, an interstate programme to strengthen Tajikistan’s state border with Afghanistan was developed and implemented for a five-year period.
Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province, which lies along the border with Tajikistan, has experienced an increase in armed clashes in recent months.
Alongside the activities of armed opponents of the Taliban, the presence of regional extremist groups in Afghanistan has also raised security concerns among Central Asian countries.
Islamic State Khorasan Province is also active in Afghanistan, while regional countries have repeatedly expressed concern about threats posed by armed groups operating from Afghan territory.
Earlier, CSTO Secretary-General Taalatbek Masadykov expressed concern about the situation along the Afghanistan-Tajikistan border. He said the first shipments of weapons and equipment intended to strengthen the border would be delivered to Dushanbe this autumn.
According to Masadykov, Russia is playing the main role in supplying the equipment. However, he did not directly link the delivery of weapons and equipment to Tajikistan with the recent clashes in Badakhshan.
The CSTO secretary-general nevertheless stressed that the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border should be reinforced as quickly as possible, warning that any security problem in the area could also affect other member states of the organisation.
Russia’s defence minister has also said that the country’s military bases in Tajikistan have been placed on full alert to respond to potential threats.
Hassan Mortazavi, deputy head of Iran’s embassy in Kabul, says Iran and the Taliban face common opportunities and threats in the current regional and global environment. He stressed that these commonalities require cooperation between the two sides.
Referring to his recent visits to Kandahar and Balkh, Mortazavi said such trips would continue in the future as the two sides seek to pursue and safeguard their “common interests” and those of the “Islamic Ummah”.
Speaking about his visit to Kandahar and meeting with the Taliban governor, Mullah Shirin, Mortazavi said the presence of the Taliban leader had given Kandahar particular importance. He said Iran, like other countries in the region, was pursuing some important issues through Kandahar as well as Kabul.
Mortazavi said his talks with the Taliban governor covered regional issues and security, economic and border cooperation. According to him, the two sides also emphasised continued cooperation between Tehran and Kabul amid war and sanctions.
Mortazavi has been one of Iran’s active diplomats in Afghanistan since the Taliban returned to power and has met Taliban officials in Kabul, Herat, Nangarhar and several other provinces in recent years.
Some observers describe Mortazavi as a security figure with close ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Some reports have also referred to his alleged previous involvement with the IRGC’s Quds Force and his reported role in the formation of the Fatemiyoun Division.
The Iranian diplomat also said he had met Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid, with media cooperation among the issues discussed.
Speaking about his visit to Balkh and meeting with the Taliban governor, Yusuf Wafa, Mortazavi said the talks covered broader issues between Tehran and Kabul in addition to matters concerning Balkh.
According to Mortazavi, the two sides emphasised maintaining the security of both countries, countering destabilising activities and cooperating in the fight against terrorism. Economic cooperation and regional projects were also discussed with the Balkh governor.
His latest remarks come after previous comments about “resistance” against the Taliban prompted reactions. Mortazavi had earlier said Iran did not support any political or military group opposed to the Taliban in efforts to fight the group.
Mortazavi had also said Iran did not consider armed struggle against the Taliban to constitute “resistance”.
Mohammad Sadiq, Pakistan’s special representative for Afghanistan, will lead his country’s delegation to the eighth Moscow Format consultations on Afghanistan, scheduled to take place in Moscow on Monday, 5 October.
Pakistani sources told Afghanistan International on Saturday, 4 October, that the Pakistani delegation had departed for Moscow to attend the meeting.
The delegation includes Naeem Iqbal Cheema, Director-General for Afghanistan, Iran and Türkiye at Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry; Ubaid ur Rehman Nizamani, Pakistan’s ambassador to Kabul; and Faisal Niaz Tirmizi, Pakistan’s ambassador to Moscow.
Pakistani sources said Mohammad Sadiq would hold bilateral meetings with the special representatives of Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on the sidelines of the Moscow meeting.
The Pakistani delegation will not meet Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Moscow. Muttaqi is leading the Taliban delegation to the eighth Moscow Format consultations.
Asked about the possibility of a meeting between Muttaqi and Mohammad Sadiq, a Taliban official said: “We have not requested any meeting.”
Tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban will be among the main issues discussed at this year’s Moscow Format meeting.
Zamir Kabulov, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s special representative for Afghanistan, told the newspaper Izvestia that Russia hoped to use the Moscow meeting to ease tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban.
He said that Russia would be pleased if it could use the Moscow platform to encourage Pakistan and the Taliban to engage in reasonable dialogue.
On 2 October, Russia’s Foreign Ministry announced that participants in the eighth Moscow Format consultations would discuss political and economic cooperation between Afghanistan and regional countries, as well as strengthening regional cooperation in combating terrorism and drug trafficking.
Special representatives and senior officials from Afghanistan, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will attend the meeting. Russia has also invited delegations from Belarus and Egypt as guests.
Pakistan’s special representative for Afghanistan is travelling to Moscow amid sharply deteriorating relations between Islamabad and the Taliban in recent months. Bilateral talks between Pakistan and the Taliban have been suspended since October last year, leaving relations between the two sides at a diplomatic impasse.
Pakistan accuses the Taliban of providing safe havens for anti-Pakistan armed groups on Afghan territory. The Taliban rejects these allegations and accuses Islamabad of carrying out attacks and violating Afghanistan’s sovereignty.
Mohammad Sadiq has also criticised the Taliban’s policies towards armed groups during recent remarks in Islamabad, saying the presence of armed organisations on Afghan territory cannot be ignored.
Tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban have also raised concerns among several Moscow Format member countries. Russia has repeatedly emphasised the need for dialogue and a negotiated resolution to the disputes between the two sides.
China hosted talks between the Taliban and Pakistan in the city of Urumqi in April, but those efforts have yet to resolve their differences.
Following attacks by opposition forces in Kamdesh district of Nuristan, the Taliban police command in the province has requested additional troops.
The Afghanistan Freedom Front claimed responsibility, but Taliban police also alleged that the National Resistance Front was involved.
Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Muzammil, the Taliban police chief in Nuristan, claimed in an interview with a Kabul-based media outlet published on Friday, 2 October, that Pakistan had sent between 300 and 400 young Afghans across the Durand Line into Nuristan to carry out the attacks.
He said the attackers belonged to the Afghanistan Freedom Front and the National Resistance Front, adding that most of those involved were former military personnel.
Pakistan’s Information Ministry had previously rejected Taliban allegations that Islamabad was involved in the Nuristan clashes.
Unlike the Taliban Defence Ministry, the Nuristan police chief did not accuse Islamic State of involvement in the attacks. Instead, he claimed that the National Resistance Front had participated alongside the Afghanistan Freedom Front, which had already claimed responsibility.
Referring to Nuristan’s strategic location, Muzammil said fighting against Soviet forces and the former Afghan republic had also begun through similar routes from across the Durand Line, with the attackers subsequently achieving success.
He said he believed armed Taliban opponents would not succeed this time because, according to him, they lacked public support.
The Taliban police chief said he had requested additional troops for Nuristan from Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and other officials. He also proposed recruiting the additional forces from local communities.
He provided no further details but said he had requested three additional police companies for each district bordering Pakistan and one additional company for every other district.
Nuristan has nine districts, two of which border Pakistan. Under Afghanistan’s government structure, a police force company typically consists of between 80 and 120 personnel.
On 29 September, the Taliban Defence Ministry claimed that the fighting in Kamdesh had ended with 41-armed opponents killed and another 61 detained.
The ministry provided no details about casualties among its own forces. However, the Taliban police chief in Nuristan confirmed that several Taliban fighters had been wounded during the clashes.
The Afghanistan Freedom Front, which claimed responsibility for the attacks, said it had captured several Taliban checkpoints and inflicted heavy casualties on the group. The Taliban rejected those claims.
A retired Pakistani general says the Taliban is pursuing three main objectives concerning Pakistan and that Islamabad has turned to military action after political and diplomatic efforts failed to change the group’s approach.
Muhammad Saeed, a retired Pakistani army commander, wrote in an article published in the Dawn newspaper that the Taliban wants to change the status quo along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, maintain transit trade without new restrictions imposed by Islamabad and, most importantly, see a government established in Pakistan that follows the Taliban’s interpretation of Sharia.
“Having defeated Isaf and Nato, the Afghan Taliban regime feels confident that its allies like Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, Baloch Liberation Army and others can achieve similar success against Pakistan.” he wrote.
Saeed claimed that Pakistani intelligence agencies possessed evidence of the Taliban’s objectives and future plans to support armed organisations opposed to Pakistan. He did not disclose details of that evidence.
The retired Pakistani army commander added that Islamabad had repeatedly engaged with the Taliban through political, diplomatic, intelligence and military channels since 2021. However, he said each of these efforts had been accompanied by an increase in the number and intensity of terrorist attacks originating from Afghan territory.
He accused the Taliban of privately acknowledging the presence of anti-Pakistan armed groups on Afghan soil during discussions with Pakistani officials, while publicly citing capacity limitations and obligations associated with “Pakhtunwali” as reasons for not confronting them.
Pakistan’s Change Of Approach
Saeed wrote that Pakistan had turned to the use of hard power after political and diplomatic efforts failed to persuade the Taliban to prevent Afghan territory from being used against Pakistan.
He described Pakistan’s military operations as necessary acts of self-defence against cross-border attacks, arguing that countries facing persistent attacks from across their borders could not indefinitely rule out the use of force.
However, the former Pakistani military official acknowledged that some political groups within Pakistan opposed military action against the Taliban and favoured continued engagement with Kabul. He said these differences should be managed through political consultation and the presentation of credible intelligence about the nature and scale of the threat.
Saeed also called for diplomatic channels with the Taliban to remain open, stressing that Pakistan should preserve credible opportunities for direct or mediated engagement with Kabul alongside its security policy.
He further argued that the Taliban should understand that armed groups succeed against states only when they do not face powerful military institutions.
According to Saeed, the Taliban’s victories in Afghanistan in 1996 and 2021 were made possible largely by the weakness or collapse of Afghan military forces. He argued that armed groups operating from Afghan territory could not replicate those successes against Pakistan.
The retired Pakistani general concluded that Afghanistan’s future depended on whether the Taliban could transform itself from an armed movement into responsible leadership and establish peaceful and constructive relations with neighbouring countries.
He warned that maintaining the current situation could perpetuate the cycle of conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan.