Al Jazeera: Afghan–Tajikistan Border Insecurity Threatens Chinese Interests

In a Saturday editorial, the newspaper cited the assassination of Ikramuddin Sari in Tehran as evidence of what it described as a series of “strategic mistakes” by Iran’s responsible institutions in dealing with the Taliban. It said the killing showed that terrorists had been able to penetrate Tehran’s security environment.

The editorial said Iran’s intelligence and security agencies are now facing a complex plot that must be uncovered and countered. It stressed that it is unacceptable for a group claiming friendly relations with the Iranian government to carry out assassinations on Iranian soil in order to silence its opponents.

According to the newspaper, the Iranian government must respond decisively. It argued that the most effective step would be to “cut off the influence of the self-proclaimed Taliban government in Iran.”

The paper also criticised what it called mistakes in Iran’s engagement with the Taliban, including the transfer of Afghan political representations in Iran to the group. It described the Taliban as a “terrorist group” whose promises cannot be trusted.

The editorial cited the assassinations in Mashhad and Tehran, the Taliban’s refusal to grant Iran its water rights, restrictions imposed on Iranian institutions in Afghanistan, and the group’s treatment of Persian speakers and Shia communities as evidence supporting its claims.

The newspaper further argued that the lack of transparency surrounding the killings of Ikramuddin Sari in Tehran and Marouf Gholami in Mashhad appeared aimed at concealing the incidents so that, in its words, “the Taliban’s credibility would not be damaged.”

Jomhouri-e Eslami said Iran must swiftly correct these mistakes and sever the influence of what it described as the Taliban’s domestic supporters, adding that only such measures could prevent the continuation of “Taliban plots in Iran.”

Ikramuddin Sari, a former police commander of Takhar and Baghlan provinces, was assassinated on Wednesday, December 24, in Tehran near his workplace. The killing sparked widespread reactions among Afghan political figures.

However, three days after the incident, Iran’s police and security authorities have neither officially confirmed nor denied that the assassination took place. Several Iranian media outlets have criticised what they described as official silence, saying it has fuelled uncertainty and speculation.

In a statement, the NRF said the Taliban launched an attack on one of its positions on Friday in the Dara-e Kariz area of Barim village, in Nahrin district. The group said its forces responded with a counterattack.

According to the NRF, three Taliban fighters were killed during the counteroffensive, forcing Taliban forces to retreat. The group also claimed that, during the withdrawal, Taliban fighters shot and killed a civilian shepherd.

The NRF said none of its own fighters were injured in the clash.

The Taliban have not commented on the incident.

Between January and November 2025, Russia shipped more than one million tonnes of LPG to Afghanistan and the region, accounting for about 36 precent of its total LPG exports. This compares with 19 percent last year, highlighting a sharp increase in shipments.

Moscow has been forced to redirect supplies of LPG, including propane and butane, away from European markets after the European Union imposed restrictions on imports from Russia in December last year following the war in Ukraine.

LPG is widely used as vehicle fuel, for heating and in the production of petrochemical products. Traders said exports to Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan rose significantly in 2025 compared with the previous year.

Afghanistan has emerged as the largest buyer of Russian LPG in the region. In January, Russia accepted the credentials of the Taliban’s ambassador, becoming the first country to formally recognise the Taliban government.
According to Reuters, Russian LPG deliveries to Afghanistan, including supplies from the Russia–Kazakhstan joint venture KazRosGas, rose by about 50 precent in the first 11 months of the year to 418,000 tonnes.

Traders attributed the increase in Russian LPG exports to Afghanistan partly to a decline in Iranian supplies, caused by US sanctions that have constrained Iran’s export capacity.

In a statement, the committee said Uzbekistan’s total exports to global markets reached $30.9 billion during the 11-month period, marking a 26.2 percent increase compared with the same period last year.

Russia remained Uzbekistan’s largest export destination, followed by China, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Turkiye, France, the United Arab Emirates, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan.

The National Statistics Committee also said earlier this month that Afghans ranked first among foreign nationals entering Uzbekistan for business purposes this year. Data released on Thursday, December 18, showed that 339,585 Afghans travelled to Uzbekistan for commercial activities between January and October.

Following the closure of border crossings with Pakistan, the Taliban has sought alternative routes to sustain trade and economic ties with countries in the region.

Previously, the Taliban signed a memorandum of understanding with Uzbekistan on the transit of Afghan agricultural products. Under the agreement, Afghan produce will be exported by air via Uzbekistan to markets in Central Asia, South Asia and Europe.

Under a separate agreement, Afghanistan will export coal to Uzbekistan instead of Pakistan, while Uzbekistan will export high-quality cement and pharmaceuticals to Afghanistan.

Credible sources have told Afghanistan International that similar threats also exist against a number of other anti-Taliban commanders.

According to these sources in Iran, one of the leaders of the anti-Taliban resistance shared credible intelligence with Sari about a month earlier and advised him to reduce long-distance travel.

At the same time, Salahuddin Kohistani, Sari’s brother, confirmed to Afghanistan International that his brother had repeatedly received threats by phone. He said friends and close associates had urged Sari to leave Iran and move to another country, but Sari chose to remain in Iran to assist former Afghan military personnel.

Ikramuddin Sari was assassinated on Wednesday evening in Tehran. One of his companions, Commander Almas, was also killed in the attack. The incident occurred at around 7 p.m. in the North Mofatteh area of Tehran, a busy district known for its night markets and access to public transport. Sari died after being taken to hospital.

A Point of Reference for Former Afghan Forces

Several sources told Afghanistan International that Sari was one of the few figures who, due to relatively good relations with Iranian officials, helped facilitate residency, presence and the resolution of administrative problems faced by former Afghan military personnel in Iran.

The sources said concerns increased this summer when the Islamic Republic intensified the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Afghans, raising fears that former members of Afghanistan’s army and police, who had fought the Taliban, could also be expelled.

According to the sources, resistance leaders persuaded Iranian officials to allow these former military personnel to remain in Iran, particularly in Tehran and Mashhad. Iran committed to issuing renewable six-month and one-year residence permits.

The sources said Sari was responsible for introducing former military personnel, especially those without official military identity cards, to Iranian authorities and served as the main link between Iran’s migration administration and former Afghan forces.

Rising Threats Against Anti-Taliban Figures in Iran

Credible sources in Iran told Afghanistan International that threats against anti-Taliban leaders and commanders have increased in recent months.

One informed source said that in the case of the assassination of Marouf Ghulami, a key commander under Mohammad Ismail Khan, evidence pointing to Taliban involvement was found. Iranian officials shared this information with Ghulami’s relatives but had no plans to make the findings public.

Ghulami was shot dead in September this year in his office on Mofatteh Street in Mashhad. An armed individual entered his office under the pretext of a meeting and killed him on the spot. The office, operating under the name “Council of Jihadi Commanders of Western Afghanistan,” lacked an official licence and was located in a residential building.

Sources said Ghulami and Sari played similar roles: Ghulami handled residency and administrative matters for anti-Taliban figures in Mashhad, while Sari performed the same function in Tehran.

Sources also said several prominent anti-Taliban figures in Iran have increased their security measures in recent months.

One individual close to Mohammad Ismail Khan told Afghanistan International that in the early months of his stay in Mashhad, Ismail Khan used to go hiking with local migrants on weekends. After becoming aware of serious threats, he stopped these activities and has largely remained at home over the past year.

The sources said other former jihadi commanders and senior anti-Taliban figures have also tightened security, while fear of assassination has spread among mid-level commanders in Iran.

One source said creating fear and intimidation among former jihadi commanders, police officers and members of Afghanistan’s former army is one of the Taliban’s main objectives in Iran and Tajikistan.

Iran’s Restrictions and Taliban Freedom of Action

Sources say Iran’s intelligence services and foreign policy establishment have adopted differing approaches toward the Taliban.

One source pointed to the killing of Ejbar Rustami, a Baloch political activist opposed to Iran, who was assassinated this year in Herat. According to the source, the incident received no media coverage and no explanation from the Taliban.

The source said the Taliban believe Rustami was killed by Iran and expect Tehran to remain silent if similar actions are carried out on Iranian soil.

According to the sources, Iran’s foreign policy establishment is neither seeking close alignment with the Taliban nor open confrontation. However, Iran’s intelligence institutions maintain closer ties with the group.

The sources said Iran does not allow political offices run by Taliban opponents to operate. They added that Tehran supports an entity known as the “Supreme Council for the Coordination of Afghan Armed Forces,” headed by Hafizullah Sultani, who is described as having close ties to Iranian intelligence while also maintaining relations with the Taliban. One source said Sari had previously criticised the creation of this body.

According to the sources, Iran has not allowed political offices for former military leaders or groups, including the National Resistance Front, to operate. They said the “Massoud Foundation,” active in Mashhad for years before the Taliban’s return to power, mainly conducts cultural activities and is one of the few remaining organisations linked to anti-Taliban movements in Iran.

The sources said Iran has adopted a dual policy toward the Taliban and their opponents. While Tehran does not appear to have been directly involved in the assassinations of Ghulami and Sari, they believe the space afforded to the Taliban has emboldened the group to carry out such operations on Iranian soil.

The National Resistance Front and the Afghanistan Freedom Front hold the Taliban responsible for the assassination of Ikramuddin Sari.